Crum v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons
| Decision Date | 30 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-cv-3241 (DLF),20-cv-3241 (DLF) |
| Parties | DAVID HALL CRUM, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
David Crum, acting pro se, brings this action against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and Muriel Bowser, the mayor of Washington, D.C., alleging constitutional violations. Before the Court is BOP's Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 15, and Bowser's Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 18. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant both motions.
Crum, a federal prisoner, alleges that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by allowing him to be transferred from the District of Columbia Jail to the Federal Correctional Institution Beckley (FCI Beckley) in Beaver, West Virginia on November 13, 2019.2 See Compl. at 1-2, Dkt. 1. In particular, Crum alleges that histransfer without his medical records put his life in "direct danger" because it subjected him to two tuberculosis tests, which he is not supposed to take due to his medical conditions. Id. at 2. Crum asserts that the transfer never should have occurred in the first place, as officials at the D.C. Jail could have placed a "medical hold" on Crum due to his various medical conditions, which include high blood pressure, congestive heart failure, and a liver infection. Id. Crum further alleges that the transfer allowed BOP officials at his current institution to falsify a "point custody document," which caused him to be stuck at FCI Beckley without any prerelease or substantial halfway house placement, and which prevented him from regaining housing subsidies and social security insurance. Id. Crum seeks $50,000 in money damages from each of the defendants. Id. at 3.
Both BOP and Mayor Bowser filed motions to dismiss in January 2021. See BOP Mot. to Dismiss (BOP MTD); Bowser's Mot. to Dismiss (Bowser MTD). After Crum made the Court aware that he was experiencing delays in receiving these motions through the mail, Dkt. 21, the Court afforded Crum additional time to respond to both motions, see Minute Order of February 26, 2021, and also granted Crum leave to file multiple surreplies, see Dkts. 26-28, in which he further addressed the merits of this dispute.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal lawempowers federal district courts to hear only certain kinds of cases, and it is "presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must "assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged, and upon such facts determine [the] jurisdictional questions." Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the court "may undertake an independent investigation" that examines "facts developed in the record beyond the complaint" in order to "assure itself of its own subject matter jurisdiction." Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court that lacks jurisdiction must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is one that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard does not amount to a specific probability requirement, but it does require "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (). A complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," butalleging facts that are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Well-pleaded factual allegations are "entitled to [an] assumption of truth," id. at 679, and the court construes the complaint "in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged," Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, "the Supreme Court has made clear that . . . there is no requirement 'that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.'" Jean-Pierre v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 880 F. Supp. 2d 95, 100 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)).
Although a pro se complaint is generally entitled to liberal construction, see Washington v. Geren, 675 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2009), the assumption of truth does not apply to a "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). An "unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" is not credited; likewise, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
Crum purports to assert a single Bivens claim against both BOP and Mayor Bowser for violating his Eighth Amendment rights. See Compl. at 1, 3; see also Pl.'s Opp'n to Bowser MTD at 1 (), Dkt. 23.Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officials alleged to have violated certain constitutional rights. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because the Mayor of the District of Columbia is not a federal official or employee subject to a Bivens action, see Jordan v. Dist. of Columbia, 113 F. Supp. 3d 278, 281 (D.D.C. 2015); Jiggetts v. Cipullo, 285 F. Supp. 3d 156, 164 (D.D.C. 2018), the Court will liberally construe Crum's complaint as asserting a separate claim against the Mayor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than dismiss his Bivens claim against the Mayor on this basis, see Jordan, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 281.
Starting with Crum's claim against Mayor Bowser, it is difficult to determine from Crum's complaint whether he asserts a claim against Bowser in her individual or official capacity, see generally Compl., though Crum has clarified in subsequent filings that he intended to assert his claim against the Mayor in both capacities, see Pl.'s Supp. Mem. in Opp'n to Bowser MTD at 3, Dkt. 28. Either way, his claim must be dismissed.
"[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. To assert a claim under § 1983, "a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Id.
Crum has failed to do so with respect to Mayor Bowser. The complaint alleges that the D.C. Jail operates under the Mayor's "legal authority." Compl. at 1; see also, e.g., Pl.'s Opp'n to Bowser MTD at 3 (). But aside from noting the Mayor's general authority over the medical unit, thecomplaint contains no specific allegations about any actions the Mayor took that caused Crum to be transferred without his medical records or to be the subject of a false "point custody document." See generally Compl. Because Crum has not "allege[d] that [Bowser] was personally involved in the illegal conduct," Simpkins v. Dist. of Columbia Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997), his claim against Bowser in her individual capacity will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See also Stone v. Walsh, 756 F. Supp. 2d 4, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2010) (), aff'd, No. 10-7177, 2011 WL 1766057 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2011).
"A section 1983 suit for damages against municipal officials in their official capacities is . . . equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself." Atchinson v. Dist. of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). However, a municipality cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees alone. See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978) (). Rather, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality followed a "policy or custom" that resulted in the constitutional injury. See id. at 694; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (). And the complaint "must include some factual basis for the...
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