Crum v. Forward Air Sols.

• Decision Date: 06 February 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:20-cv-00449-MHH
• Parties: HAMP CRUM, III, Plaintiff, v. FORWARD AIR SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

HAMP CRUM, III, Plaintiff,
v.
FORWARD AIR SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00449-MHH

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

February 6, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MIADELINE HUGUES HAIKALA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Hamp Crum III seeks overtime wages from Forward Air Solutions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In its second motion for summary judgment, FAS asserts that because Mr. Crum regularly loaded and unloaded trucks in his work as a dock supervisor, the Motor Carrier Act, rather than the FLSA, governs FAS's relationship with Mr. Crum and exempts FAS from the FLSA's overtime provision. (Doc. 41). Mr. Crum contends that FAS wrongly classified him as a loader exempt from FLSA wage and hour requirements and argues that FAS has not adequately addressed evidence critical to this Court's assessment of the application of the MCA loader exemption to him. (Docs. 47, 54). This opinion resolves FAS's second motion for summary judgment.

By way of background, FAS first moved for summary judgment on May 12,

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2021. (Doc. 29). The Court denied that motion without prejudice because it “[did] not have enough information in the parties' [] submissions to determine whether FAS [could] carry its burden with respect to the MCA exemption.” (Doc. 39, p. 12). In particular, the Court noted that FAS incorrectly relied on Department of Labor regulations in its motion and advised that if FAS renewed its motion for summary judgment, the company should focus on regulations or guidance from the Department of Transportation, not the Department of Labor. The Court also directed FAS to consider the “Small Vehicle Exception to the MCA exemption” and to discuss “whether the predominantly intrastate operation of trucks loaded during the third shift is relevant to application of the MCA exemption.” (Doc. 39, p. 12). FAS has complied with these instructions in its renewed motion for summary judgment.

The Court begins this opinion by reciting the applicable summary judgment standard. Then, applying that standard, the Court presents the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Crum. Finally, the Court examines the evidence under the law concerning the MCA exemption to the FLSA.

I.

A district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). To demonstrate a genuine dispute as to a material fact that precludes summary judgment, the party opposing a motion for

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summary judgment must cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).

“A litigant's self-serving statements based on personal knowledge or observation can defeat summary judgment.” United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) (“To be sure, Feliciano's sworn statements are self-serving, but that alone does not permit us to disregard them at the summary judgment stage.”). Even if a district court doubts the veracity of certain evidence, the court cannot make credibility determinations; that is the work of jurors. Feliciano, 707 F.3d at 1252 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)); see also Buending v. Town of Redington Beach, 10 F.4th 1125, 1130 (11th Cir. 2021).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court must view the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015). Therefore, in this opinion, the Court views the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Crum.

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II.

Using box trucks and tractor-trailer trucks, Forward Air Solutions transports “goods and property for third parties for compensation.” (Doc. 30-4, p. 1, ¶ 2). FAS is registered with the Department of Transportation. (Doc. 30-4, p. 1, ¶ 7). Mr. Crum worked at FAS's terminal in Montgomery, Alabama. (Doc. 30-4, p. 1, ¶ 3). Vendors deliver goods to FAS's Montgomery terminal. FAS employees unload the goods from the vendors' trucks and load the goods on trucks for delivery to retailers. (Doc. 30-4, p. 1, ¶ 6).

While Mr. Crum worked for FAS, FAS assigned employees at its Montgomery terminal to one of three shifts. During the first shift, FAS employees unloaded inbound trucks. (Doc. 30-1, p. 17, tpp. 67-68). The employees placed boxes of product on a conveyor belt and scanned the boxes. (Doc. 30-1, p. 17, tpp. 67-68). FAS nicknamed the first shift the “Burlington shift” because most of the product unloaded during the first shift was bound for Burlington retail stores. (Doc. 30-1, p. 17, tp. 68). FAS employees packaged Burlington's products on pallets for shipping to retail locations. (Doc. 30-1, pp. 17-18, 20, tpp. 67-69, 80; Doc. 35, p. 19, ¶ 15).

During the second shift, FAS employees unloaded inbound trucks and loaded outbound vehicles, typically eighteen-wheel tractor-trailers which sometimes

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traveled interstate. (Doc. 30-1, p. 19, tpp. 73-76; Doc. 35, p. 19, ¶ 16). FAS employees would load eighteen-wheeler trailers with boxes manually “from the floor to the ceiling, from the front to the back, from the nose to the tail.” (Doc. 30-1, p. 22, tpp. 85-88; see also Doc. 30-1, p. 25, tpp. 98-99). FAS employees would put heavy boxes on the floor of the trailer to build a base. (Doc. 30-1, p. 26, tp. 104). FAS instructed employees to “put as much as possible” on a truck “and ship it out.” (Doc. 30-1, p. 21, tpp. 82-83; see also Doc. 30-1, pp. 21, 25, 27, tpp. 83-84, 97, 107; Doc. 30-1, p. 107).

The third shift was twelve hours long. (Doc. 30-1, p. 24, tp. 94). During the third shift, FAS employees loaded outbound vehicles, typically box trucks for local delivery to Burlington stores. (Doc. 30-1, pp. 19, 21, 26, tpp. 75, 82, 103). Occasionally, the third shift would load an eighteen-wheeler for Burlington, and that truck would travel across state lines. (Doc. 30-1, p. 31, tp. 124).

Mr. Crum worked for FAS from October 2018 to April 2020. (Doc. 30-1, p. 8, tp. 32). Initially, Mr. Crum worked on the first shift as a dock lead. He unloaded boxes from trucks, scanned boxes, loaded Burlington pallets and shrink-wrapped them, and loaded the pallets on a forklift. (Doc. 30-1, p. 18, tp. 71). Mr. Crum arrived an hour before the other employees on his shift, using that time to gather scanners and organize the terminal. (Doc. 30-1, p. 29, tp. 113).

In January or February of 2019, FAS moved Mr. Crum to the second shift

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where he continued to work as a dock lead. (Doc. 30-1, pp. 15, 19, tpp. 58-59, 7376; Doc. 35, p. 19, ¶ 16). In April 2019, FAS made Mr. Crum a second-shift dock supervisor and changed his compensation from hourly wages to a salary. (Doc. 422, p. 8, tp. 26-27). Mr. Crum testified that when his job title changed, his job duties remained the same; he “worked as a cargo handler.” (Doc. 30-1, p. 34, tp. 134; Doc. 30-1, p. 36, tp. 141). Mr. Crum testified that he spent more than three hours every day loading trucks and that “[n]inety percent of my job was as a cargo handler.” (Doc. 30-1, pp. 23-24, tp. 92-93). FAS did not train Mr. Crum on the proper way to load a truck. (Doc. 30-1, p. 25, tp. 98).

When he became dock supervisor, Mr. Crum often worked more than 40 hours each week, and as “a direct result of not being eligible for overtime compensation, [he] lost between $300-$400 dollars per week.” (Doc. 35, p. 19, ¶ 9; see also Doc. 30-1, p. 34, tp. 136). At the end of 2019 or the beginning of 2020, FAS made Mr. Crum dock supervisor for the third shift. (Doc. 30-1, p. 30, tp. 119). Mr. Crum remained on third shift until FAS laid him off on April 3, 2020, because of a reduction in force caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 30-1, p. 47, tpp. 18687).

III.

Mr. Crum contends that his compensation as a dock supervisor violated the FLSA. Under the FLSA, employers ordinarily must pay hourly employees an

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overtime rate for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The FLSA exempts certain employees from the statute's overtime wage provision. Courts must give those exemptions a “fair reading.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S.Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018).^[1] An employer “has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to the benefit of an exemption . . . .” Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep t of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562, 1566 n.5 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Walters v. American Coach Lines of Miami, Inc., 575 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009). “Whether employees are exempt from the requirements of the [FLSA] is primarily a question of fact.” Hodgson v. Klages Coal & Ice Co., 435 F.2d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Hodgson v. Colonnades, Inc., 472 F.2d 42, 47 (5th Cir. 1973).^[2]

As noted, the exemption at issue here is the FLSA's Motor Carrier Act exemption. That exemption, found at 29 U.S.C. § 213(b), provides that § 207 “shall not apply with respect to - (1) any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of [the Motor Carrier Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1);

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Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 424 (1947) (explaining that the overtime requirements of § 207 of the FLSA do not apply to employees who are exempt under the Motor Carrier Act). “Congress created this exemption to...