Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8318.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1944
• Docket Number: No. 8318.,8318.
• Citation: 140 F.2d 182
• Parties: CRUME v. PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

140 F.2d 182 (1944)

CRUME v. PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

No. 8318.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

February 1, 1944.

E. R. Elliott and Harry C. Alberts, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Orville J. Taylor and Whitney Campbell, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Before MAJOR and KERNER, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.

MAJOR, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court, allowing defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint charging defendant with copyright infringement. The copyrighted material relied upon consists of four pamphlets, each of which discloses a plan or method by which insolvent life insurance companies may be reorganized through mutualization and readjustment of liabilities. They are titled "Illinois Life Insurance Company Mutualization and Readjustment Plan," "Detroit Life Insurance Company Mutualization and Readjustment Plan," "Federal Union Life Insurance Company Tentative Mutualization and Readjustment Plan," and "Mutualization and Readjustment Plan Agreement." No question is raised but that the pamphlets relied upon were duly copyrighted in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.

The complaint alleges that the defendant caused to be published, printed and distributed a certain instrument called a "Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement," dated July 22, 1936, wherein and whereby the defendant appropriated and pirated many clauses, paragraphs and parts of the pamphlets relied upon; that the defendant, in addition to printing such pamphlets, circulated or caused the same to be circulated and distributed throughout the United States; and that defendant has on hand a large number of copies of said agreement that it intends to and will distribute unless restrained by the court from so doing. In addition to an injunction, damages are sought for the alleged infringement. Defendant by its motion to dismiss attacks the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto upon numerous grounds which generally may be stated as follows: (1) That the alleged infringing work is not a copy in whole or in part of plaintiff's copyrighted pamphlets (in other words, it is disclosed upon the face of the complaint, in connection with the copyrighted and accused pamphlets, that the latter do not infringe); (2) that plaintiff's pamphlets contain nothing more than a proposed plan for the reorganization of an insurance company, which is common property and therefore not the subject of a valid copyright; and (3) that plaintiff's cause of action, if any, does not lie against the defendant but lies against the Insurance Commissioner of the State of California, who in the year 1936 promulgated and published the alleged infringing work, pursuant to the provisions of the California Insurance Code and pursuant to orders of the Superior Court of California in and for the County of Los Angeles.

The District Court in a memorandum opinion stated, among other things, that the plan, system or idea embodied in plaintiff's copyrights was not the subject of valid copyrights but, even if so, there was no infringement. Also, the court, while not deciding, expressed doubt that plaintiff's cause of action, if one existed, could be maintained against the instant defendant.

In view of our conclusion that the complaint was properly dismissed on the ground of non-infringement, we need not discuss or decide other questions raised by defendant's motion to dismiss. However, the matter of infringement is so closely related to, if not actually dependent upon, the extent of protection to which plaintiff was entitled by virtue of his copyrights as to require some consideration of the latter. In the recent case of Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 7 Cir., 139 F.2d 98, decided November 15, 1943, we attempted to discuss the extent of protection afforded the owner of a copyright. Our discussion was predicated largely upon the rationale of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L.Ed. 841. Without repeating what we said in the Taylor case, it is sufficient to observe that a copyright protects only to the extent of that which is taught or explained. Unlike a patent, the information disclosed is lodged in the public domain, where its use is unrestricted. As was said in the Baker case, supra (101 U.S. at page 103, 25 L.Ed. 841): "The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book. And where the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public; not given for the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical...