Crumm v. Oce'-Bruning, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:93CV725SNL.,4:93CV725SNL. |
| Citation | 892 F. Supp. 1236 |
| Parties | George Stacy CRUMM, Plaintiff, v. OCE'-BRUNING, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
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Mary Anne Sedey, William E. Moench, Kathryn S. Render, Mary Anne Sedey, P.C., St. Louis, MO, Stephen M. Ryals, Kessler and Soffer, Clayton, MO, Richard W. Noble, Kansas City, MO, Gregory M. Dennis, Perry and Hamill, Overland Park, KS, for plaintiff.
Michael P. Burke, Anne J. Erwin, Bryan Cave, St. Louis, MO, Patrick W. Ritchey, Scott W. Kezman, David J. Kolesar, Pittsburgh, PA, for defendant.
Plaintiff has filed this employment discrimination action alleging that he was terminated from his position as a copier sales representative on the basis of age. He contends that his discharge was in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), § 213.010 R.S.Mo. This matter is before the Court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment (# 33), filed August 12, 1994. Responsive pleadings have been filed. This case is set for trial on the Court's trial docket of July 31, 1995.
Courts have repeatedly recognized that summary judgment is a harsh remedy that should be granted only when the moving party has established his right to judgment with such clarity as not to give rise to controversy. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 554 F.2d 896, 901 (8th Cir.1977). Summary judgment motions, however, "can be a tool of great utility in removing factually insubstantial cases from crowded dockets, freeing courts' trial time for those that really do raise genuine issues of material fact." Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988).
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 488, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). The burden is on the moving party. Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 273. After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in its favor to allow a jury to return a verdict for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir.1983). The court is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir.1976). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to an examination of the facts.
Plaintiff began his employment with Bruning Company in 1970 as a field sales representative of photocopying machines and supplies. Over the next twenty (20) years, plaintiff received several promotions and was regularly recognized as one of the top sales representatives in the St. Louis sales district. He exceeded his sales quotas at least eight (8) times during these years, thereby earning membership in the "100 Club"1 Plaintiff was a member of the "100 Club" from 1984-1989.
From August 1987 through July 31, 1991 G.B. Richardson was Bruning's St. Louis District Manager and plaintiff's direct supervisor. As a district manager, Richardson supervised the field sales representatives and made the personnel decisions for his district. A district manager's compensation is tied to the sales performance of his district.
Sales quotas are set for each field sales representative within a district. The quotas are divided into two categories: Pressure Diazo machines (PD) and Plain Paper machines (PPC). Bruning Co.'s fiscal year ran from August 1 through July 31; e.g. Fiscal Year 1989 (FY89) ran from August 1, 1988 through July 31, 1989, FY90 from August 1, 1989 through July 31, 1990, etc.
Late in FY89 Richardson counseled the plaintiff about below performance standards in his machine sales. In a written memorandum, dated June 26, 1989, he reiterated to plaintiff that Bruning's minimum sales standard was 80% in table top placements and 80% in all other categories combined. Defendant's Exhibit C. Plaintiff's sales performance was running at 61%. Richardson set out five (5) performance goals for plaintiff to meet in order to improve his sales performance before the fiscal year ended. Following receipt of this memorandum, plaintiff finished out FY89 by satisfying 70.6% of his quota for PD machines and 27.5% of his quota for PPC machines. His sales quota for FY90 improved to 71.4% for PD machines and 93.4% for PPC machines. Defendant's Exhibits D and E.
However, in FY91 plaintiff's sales began to again decline. As of March 1991, the first seven (7) months of FY91, plaintiff had sold only one 9036 PPC machine. On March 6, 1991 Richardson sent plaintiff another memorandum counseling him about his below minimum sales performance. Defendant's Exhibit F. Richardson set out new performance goals, including the sales of two 9036 PPC machines by May 1st, to assist plaintiff in improving his sales quotas. Richardson further warned plaintiff that failure to sell at least two machines by May 1st would be cause to put him on probationary status. Defendant's Exhibit F, Plaintiff's Deposition, pg. 66.
Plaintiff sold at least one PPC machine in April2 but failed to sell any machines in May or June of 1991. He completed FY91 by satisfying only 55.2% of his sales quota for PD machines and 35.9% of his sales quota for PPC machines. Defendant's Exhibit G. He ranked last in machine sales for FY91 of all St. Louis district field sales representatives. Plaintiff was not placed on probationary status.
In July 1991 defendant Oce' acquired the Bruning Co. Oce'-Bruning's fiscal years were changed to run from December 1 through November 30th. The transitional period, August 1, 1991 through November 30, 1991, was considered Stub Year 92; FY92 then ran from December 1, 1991 through November 30, 1992.
On August 1, 1991 Richardson was replaced by Edward Turner. Mr. Richardson left the St. Louis sales district and went to Indianapolis as a field sales representative. Plaintiff's Deposition, pg. 60. On August 20, 1991 Turner sent a memorandum to all of the St. Louis district field sales representatives informing them of the minimum job requirements and minimum sales goals for Stub Yr 92. Defendant's Exhibit I. He expressed his dissatisfaction with FY91 machine sales:
He further warned the St. Louis District field sales representatives that job performance would be reviewed on a thirty (30) day basis, and failure to achieve satisfactory performance levels was cause for termination. Defendant's Exhibit I. The minimum sales performance level for Stub Yr 92 was set at one (1) PPC machine sale and two (2) PD machine sales per month.
Approximately thirty (30) days later, Turner completed plaintiff's FY91 job performance appraisal. Defendant's Exhibit J. Plaintiff was rated "# 2" (meets expectations) in most of the performance evaluation categories. However, in the category "sells balanced product line — sell Category I, II, and III, as well as IV and V" (these categories refer to PD machines, PPC machines, resale, supply margin, and plotter supplies, respectively), plaintiff was rated a # 3 (below expectations). Defendant's Exhibit J.
On October 28, 1991 Turner informed plaintiff, by letter, that he had been placed on a 90-day probation period, effective November 1, 1991 through January 31, 1992. Defendant's Exhibit L, Plaintiff's Deposition, pg. 71. In this letter, Turner reviewed plaintiff's deficient FY91 machine sales, reminding him that his two (2) 9036 PD sales for the entire FY91 fell short of the goals set by Richardson back in March 1991. Turner avers that this failure should have been cause for implementation of probationary procedures; however, they were not implemented. He then points out that plaintiff is behind in sales for Stub Yr 92 to date, having made only 1.5 placements, instead of the expected 3.0 placements. Defendant's Exhibit L. Finally, he sets out certain performance goals for plaintiff to meet during his probation period. He clearly informs plaintiff that "failure to meet the minimum performance standards listed below will result in termation sic of employment sic with Oce'-Bruning." Defendant's Exhibit L. These performance goals included, but were not limited to, placing one (1) PD machine and one (1) PD machine per month.3
In response to his probation letter, plaintiff wrote Turner and informed him that he should be credited with an additional 1.5 PPC machines. Defendant's Exhibit M. Turner responded by saying that upon investigation of the matter, it was true that plaintiff had sold 3.5 PPC machines in FY91 and that the additional 1.5 machines were reflected in the total sales dollars on plaintiff's computerized commission statements. Although the sales had not yet made it into defendant's local office's closed order file, they were reflected in plaintiff's commission statements, thus his percentage to quota for FY91 machine sales was...
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