Crummel v. State, S
| Decision Date | 06 March 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. S,S |
| Citation | 174 N.W.2d 517,46 Wis.2d 348 |
| Parties | James Lee CRUMMEL, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. tate 135. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
On August 31, 1967, a criminal warrant was issued for James Lee Crummel, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, charging him with two counts of sexual perversion and aggravated battery. On the same day he was arrested. On September 1, 1967, defendant was brought before the magistrate, bail was set and counsel appointed for him. On September 15, 1967, following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over to the circuit court for trial. On October 20, 1967, notice was given by the district attorney that defendant's confession would be offered in evidence at the trial. Defense counsel moved to suppress the confession and additionally to dismiss the action on the ground that the preliminary hearing had not been held within the time prescribed by sec. 954.05(1), Stats. Following a Goodchild 1 hearing, these motions were denied. On October 27, 1967, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charges of sexual perversion and the charge of aggravated battery. After determining that the plea was voluntary and that the defendant understood the consequences of a conviction of a sex crime, the trial court accepted the plea of guilty. On the finding of guilt, the defendant was ordered committed to the Department of Health and Social Services for a presentence examination, pursuant to sec. 959.15(2), Stat. The defendant was found to be in need of specialized treatment as a sex deviate and committed to the department for treatment on the two counts of sex perversion. Defendant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on the charge of aggravated battery. A writ of error was issued on December 5, 1968, to review the judgment entered on December 27, 1967.
Ralph J. Huiras, Port Washington, for plaintiff in error.
Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., Betty R. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Walter J. Swietlik, Ozaukee County Dist. Atty., Port Washington, for defendant in error.
The defendant makes two claims in support of his argument that he should be relieved of his plea of guilty: one concerns the voluntariness of his confession, the other concerns the time limitation in sec. 954.05(1), Stats.
THE CONFESSION.
The defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding, following a Goodchild hearing, that his confession was admissible. The sequence of events leading up to the confession is as follows:
On August 28, 1967, at about 2 p.m., a fourteen-year-old boy was hitchhiking on West North Avenue in the city of Milwaukee. He was picked up by the defendant and driven to two different isolated areas in Ozaukee county where acts of sexual perversion were committed upon him by the defendant. Following the second act of perversion, the perpetrator beat the boy on and about the head. The boy, by then unconscious, was pushed off the top of a hill by the defendant. The defendant then left the scene. The next morning the boy was found at the foot of the hill and taken to the hospital where he was found to be suffering from skull fractures.
On August 31, 1967, a warrant was issued for defendant's arrest, charging him with two counts of sexual perversion and one of aggravated battery. At about 9 p.m. that evening, the defendant was arrested in a Brookfield residence by the chief of police of Mequon and one of his officers. The chief, Robert Milke, informed defendant he had a warrant for his arrest and informed him of his rights, as required by the Miranda decision. 2 The defendant stated that he was caring for a young boy at his home. At defendant's request, the police chief telephoned the boy's older brother. When the brother came to the home, the defendant was taken to the Brookfield police station where he was booked. No questions were asked concerning defendant's guilt of the sexual perversion and aggravated battery charges until the defendant asked, in fact insisted, that the chief do so. The defendant thereupon denied that he was involved in the perversions or the battery. The defendant was then taken to the Mequon police station, where he gave some additional background information about himself. He then started crying, and stated:
After again being advised of his rights under Miranda, he signed both a waiver and a confession, detailing the acts of perversion, his fear that the boy would relate these occurrences to the authorities, his beating the boy about the head and, while the boy was unconscious, rolling him down the hill. The trial court found that the defendant had been properly advised of his rights. He was. The trial court found the confession to be completely voluntary and admissible. It was. In fact, it was a completely volunteered confession, subsequently reduced to writing. In the light of the enormity of the offense, leaving an innocent boy for dead, it is apparent that the defendant was overcome by remorse at what he had done and 'couldn't keep it inside me.' In all except the most hardened of offenders and most skillful of dissemblers, remorse is an understandable human response or reaction. Here the very spontaneity of the remorseful remarks corroborates rather than erodes the complete voluntariness of the statements made. It is not a function of police authorities to protect a perpetrator of crimes against the promptings of his own conscience. That it was prompted by remorse does not taint in any way the voluntariness and admissibility of defendant's confession of what he had done.
THE STATUTE.
The second claim of the defendant is that the magistrate, in adjourning the preliminary hearing, violated sec. 954.05(1), Stats., and thereby jurisdiction was lost both over the person of the defendant and the subject matter: the two counts of sexual perversion, based on sec. 944.17, Stats., and the charge of aggravated battery, brought under sec. 940.22, Stats.
An initial weakness in this argument is that the statute referred to was not in any way violated.
Defendant argues that the legislature has created a maximum time interval of ten days, except for consented-to adjournments, arguably between the time of arrest and the preliminary, at least between the first appearance before the magistrate and the preliminary. Reading the statute referred to is enough to make clear the complete lack of merit in this contention. Sec. 954.05, Stats., in material part, provides:
This statute does not relate, directly or indirectly, to the fact or date of arrest. To read into it a procedural requirement that the time interval between date of arrest and date of the preliminary may not, without consent of the defendant, exceed ten days is to read into it something that is not there. Nor does the ten-day limit on adjournments of the preliminary hearing relate to an initial appearance of a defendant before the magistrate, limited as it was here to...
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