Crump v. Anderson
Decision Date | 15 June 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 19071.,19071. |
Citation | 122 US App. DC 173,352 F.2d 649 |
Parties | Raymond CRUMP, Jr., Appellant, v. Sam ANDERSON, Superintendent, District of Columbia Jail, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Jerome Shuman, Washington, D. C., with whom Mrs. Dovey J. Roundtree, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Allan M. Palmer, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge, and WASHINGTON and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.
The appellant after a hearing on November 9, 1964, was denied a writ of habeas corpus. It was developed at the hearing that Crump had been detained pursuant to an indictment, dated October 19, 1964, wherein the grand jury had charged him with murder in the first degree. He had been committed to jail on October 20, 1964. He has here contended that the indictment could not validly operate to deprive him of a preliminary hearing pursuant to the provisions of FED.R.CRIM.P. 5.
Attorney Roundtree having entered appearance for Crump on October 28, 1964, Crump was arraigned on October 30, 1964, a plea of not guilty was entered, and a trial date of January 11, 1965 was set on motion of defense counsel.
Then, on October 30, 1964, Crump filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, naming as respondent, Donald Clemmer, Director of the Department of Corrections. He filed an amended petition on October 31, 1964, directed against Sam Anderson, Superintendent of the D. C. Jail. He filed a further amended petition on November 3, 1964. He did not attack the validity of the indictment. Rather, he charged that, following his arrest on October 12, 1964, the police had beaten him and that there had been irregularities in the proceedings which antedated the indictment. When first presented before the United States Commissioner at 4:30 P.M. on October 12, 1964, Crump was advised of his rights, after which his hearing had been continued for the purpose of contacting the Legal Aid Agency. Under our Code,1 a coroner's inquest is mandatory in a situation such as existed here. The inquest was held on October 19, 1964, with Legal Aid counsel present but asking a continuance. The coroner pointed out that his office had given notice to Legal Aid counsel of the scheduled inquest.
On that same October 19, 1964, a grand jury had returned its indictment charging Crump with the murder of one Mary Pinchot Meyer.
Crump again appeared before the Commissioner later in the day of October 19, 1964 at which time the Government offered to proceed at once with a preliminary hearing but Crump requested and was granted a continuance until October 23, 1964. He again appeared before the Commissioner on October 23, 1964, at which time the Commissioner was informed of the indictment of October 19, 1964. Crump's counsel informed the habeas court, "the Commissioner found no reason to hold any proceeding, reasoning that because of the indictment it was unnecessary and that it the Commissioner's hearing would be moot."
In its return and answer to the rule to show cause the Government had denied that Crump had been mistreated by police and that he had been illegally detained. The Government further answered that since Crump had been indicted, arraigned and had been committed by the District Court pursuant to the indictment, Crump was detained on that account and in regular course. The answer also averred that Crump was not in custody of the Superintendent of the Jail by virtue of an order of either the coroner or the Commissioner. Accordingly, since Crump was thus lawfully detained as the Government contended, it was prayed that the District Court dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and discharge the rule to show cause.
A hearing was held on November 9, 1964. The District Judge specifically found2 that Crump had been committed to the custody of the jailer pursuant to the indictment and arraignment thereunder in criminal case No. 930-64. The District Judge further found that the petitioner's request for subpoenas to compel the attendance of certain witnesses at his preliminary hearing was properly denied in that Crump had been unable to state any facts to support his assertions as to what evidence he might have expected to adduce through such witnesses, and his counsel "had not contacted the witnesses sought and was unable to represent to the court the nature of these witnesses' testimony." The District Court concluded that (1) the petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of proving that his custody was illegal, and on the contrary, (2) petitioner "is legally detained."
At no time has this appellant attacked the validity of the indictment. Rather, he here contends that he was entitled as a matter of right to a preliminary hearing before the Commissioner, pursuant to "the legislative mandate expressed in Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
It is fundamental in our law that no person shall be held to answer to a charge of crime unless there be probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person charged has committed it. The Supreme Court has told us in Ex Parte United States:
"It reasonably cannot be doubted that, in the court to which the indictment is returned, the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to answer." (Emphasis added.)3
Part III of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure deals with "indictment and information." Rule 9(b) (1) provides that a warrant shall command that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court. Rule 9(c) (1) requires that the officer bring the arrested person promptly before the court to which the officer shall also make his return of execution. There is not the slightest suggestion that one accused by way of indictment shall be accorded a preliminary hearing before a commissioner for the simple reason that the grand jury has already determined the existence of probable cause.
Even if all the evidence before the grand jury was in the nature of "hearsay," an indictment may not be quashed, and surely no United States Commissioner is empowered to pass upon the merits or the substance of, or the support for the indictment.4 Mr. Justice Black dealt with the problem thus:
5
So it is that our federal courts uniformly have held that there is no necessity for a preliminary hearing after a grand jury has returned an indictment.
6
Again, in Boone v. United States, we find:
"On the other point argued by the appellant, that he did not have a preliminary hearing before the United States Commissioner, there is no necessity for such hearing after a grand jury has returned an indictment, as was the case here."7
The principle so stated after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is thus seen to differ in no respect from its pronouncement and application before the promulgation of the Rules. See, e. g., Barber v. United States, where Judge Parker wrote:
8
To like effect the law was so stated in this court (Groner, Edgerton, Rutledge, JJ., sitting) in Clarke v. Huff9 which reviewed a District Court order discharging a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant argued that his rights were violated in that he had been indicted by a grand jury without a warrant having been issued for his arrest prior to the indictment and without a preliminary hearing having been afforded to him.
(Emphasis added.)
Recently the Supreme Court had before it for construction, the effect of the language in the statute of limitations on the felony of willfully attempting to evade federal income taxes. The Court pointed out that an indictment must be returned within six...
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