Crump v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co

• Decision Date: 04 February 1935
• Docket Number: 33166
• Citation: 183 La. 55,162 So. 800
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: CRUMP v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO

162 So. 800

183 La. 55

CRUMP v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO

No. 33166

Supreme Court of Louisiana

February 4, 1935

On Rehearing July 1, 1935

Judgment of Court of Appeal annulled, and judgment of the First City Court reinstated and made the final judgment of the Supreme Court.

James N. Brittingham, Jr., J. I. McCain, and Herman L. Midlo, all of New Orleans, for relator.

Spencer Gidiere, Phelps & Dunbar and Louis B. Claverie, all of New Orleans, for respondent.

ROGERS Justice. HIGGINS, J., recused.

OPINION

ROGERS, Justice.

Plaintiff sues on a policy of industrial life insurance. She alleges that on the death of the insured, who was her son, she was recognized as his sole heir and regularly placed in possession of his estate, including the right to the proceeds of the policy. She also alleges that under Act No. 193 of 1906, notwithstanding the nonpayment of premium, the policy was in force at the time of her son's death, because the reserve accumulated thereon resulted in extending the insurance beyond the date of the death of the insured.

The defendant admitted the issuance of the policy and the death of the insured, but excepted to plaintiff's right to sue in her individual capacity, because the policy provides for payment to the executor or administrator of the insured. Defendant also set up, alternatively, the same defenses which it set up in the suit of Succession of Frank Watson v Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 183 La. 25, 162 So. 790, this day decided.

The First city court for the city of New Orleans rendered judgment in plaintiff's favor for $ 237, the full amount of the policy. The Court of Appeal, maintaining defendant's exception that plaintiff was without a right of action, reversed the judgment and dismissed plaintiff's suit. The case is here on a writ of review.

It cannot be disputed that the proceeds of the life insurance policy involved here, which are not payable to a designated beneficiary, compose the insured's entire estate, and inure to the benefit of his legal heir, even though they would not be available for the payment of his debts, if he owed any debts, which he did not. Succession of Dumestre, 174 La. 482, 141 So. 35.

The heir who accepts is considered as having succeeded to the deceased from the moment of his death. Civ. Code, art. 947. He is of full right in place of the deceased for his rights as well as for his remedies. Civ. Code, art. 945.

It has been the practice in this state for many years to recognize heirs and by formal judgments to put them in possession of the successions to which they succeed. And the courts have repeatedly acknowledged the effect and admitted the validity of such judgments.

No question is made of plaintiff's heirship. From the time the judgment was signed recognizing her as the sole heir of her deceased son and sending her into possession as such, there was no succession to administer. No administration should be ordered in a succession which owes no debts and the heir of which has accepted unconditionally. Guillory v. Latour, 138 La. 142, 70 So. 66. Having accepted unconditionally, plaintiff represents the deceased both as to his rights and as to his obligations. An administration would only result in delay and expense in settling the insured's succession and would not effect more than can be effected by plaintiff as his heir in the matter of collecting and receipting for the proceeds of the life insurance policy. The insurance company would pay the administrator and the administrator would pay plaintiff. The same result can be attained more quickly, just as effectively, and with less expense and inconvenience by the company making the payment direct to the plaintiff herself.

But defendant contends that under the terms of the insurance contract the proceeds of the policy must be paid to the insured's administrator and not to his heir; that the administrator and not the heir is the only person who can maintain the action on the policy. Defendant cites some decisions from common-law states which seem to support its contention. Defendant also cites as supporting its contention decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and other federal courts, and Penny v. New Orleans G. N. R. Co., 135 La. 962, 66 So. 313, a decision of the Supreme Court of this state based on the federal decisions, holding that under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59) the right of action is in the personal representative and not in the beneficiary of the deceased employee. The Court of Appeal found the same analogy as found by the defendant between cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and cases arising on life insurance contracts payable to the insured's administrator or executor. And the Court of Appeal seems to have reached the conclusion that the analogy thus found was decisive of the question presented.

In none of the cases relied on by defendant had the insured's heir been recognized as such and been put in possession of the proceeds of the insurance policy by a formal judgment of a competent court. As a matter of fact, no such practice, as we understand it, prevails in the common-law states. So far as concerns the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the action thereunder is purely statutory, as all the decisions hold. Without the statutory provisions no action whatever would lie, and, hence, those provisions must be closely followed.

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