Crump v. Worldcom, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-CV-02982.,00-CV-02982.
• Parties: Tammy CRUMP, Pauline Rivers, Gary Morse, and Donna Chaplinski, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WORLDCOM, INC., and MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

128 F.Supp.2d 549

Tammy CRUMP, Pauline Rivers, Gary Morse, and Donna Chaplinski, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WORLDCOM, INC., and MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc., et al., Defendants.

No. 00-CV-02982.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

January 8, 2001.

As Amended February 26, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John S. Wilder, Sr., Wilder & Sanders, Somerville, TN, Charles J. Piven, Marshall N. Perkins, Law Offices of Charles J. Piven, Baltimore, MD, Steven A. Martino, Jackson Taylor Martino & Hedge, P.C., Mobile, AL, Andrew S. Johnston, Law Office of Andrew S. Johnston, Somerville, TN, for Tammy Crump, Pauline Rivers, Gary Morse, Donna Chaplinski, plaintiffs.

Samuel D. Lipshie, Paul A. Alexis, Boult Cummings Conners & Berry, Nashville, TN, Don M. Downing, Michael P. Downey, Stinson Mag & Fizzell, P.C., St. Louis, MO, Thomas F. O'Neil, III, William E. Smith, Worldcom, Inc., Washington, DC, for Worldcom, Inc., MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., A, B, and/or C, the persons, firms and/or legal entities who devised, had knowledge of, assisted, aided, and/or engaged in the deceptive trade practices of the defendants as alleged herein; all of whose true identities are otherwise unknown to the plaintiffs at this time but which will be added by amendments when ascertained, individually and jointly, defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND

DONALD, District Judge.

Before the court is Plaintiffs' motion for remand. Plaintiffs alleged in their class action complaint, filed in the Chancery Court for Fayette, County, Tennessee, five causes of action: violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, T.C.A. § 47-18-102, and analogous statutes of other states; misrepresentation; negligent monitoring; negligent supervision and/or training; and unjust enrichment and/or disgorgement. Plaintiffs essentially allege that Defendants made misrepresentations that affected the sale of long distance and other services to consumers. Defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court on October 16, 2000, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Defendants primarily rely upon the federal preemption and artful pleading doctrines as grounds for removal. Plaintiffs now respectfully move the court to remand this case back to the Chancery Court of Fayette County, Tennessee.

I. Background Facts

On September 8, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint in the Chancery Court of Fayette County, Tennessee for the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District at Somerville. On September 19, 2000, Plaintiffs filed in the Chancery Court Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Class Certification; Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Class Certification; and supporting papers. On that same date, the Chancery Court of Fayette County entered an Order of Conditional Class Certification.

On or about October 16, 2000, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal in this Court. On that same date, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal in Chancery Court for Fayette County, Tennessee.

II. Standard of Law

A case originally filed in state court may be removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Section 1441(a) provides that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant ... to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." If an action is removed, a federal court only may hear the case if the court has subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

The removing party carries the burden of showing that removal is proper, and that the federal court has original jurisdiction to hear the case. See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 540, 59 S.Ct. 347, 83 L.Ed. 334 (1939); Her Majesty the Queen v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir.1989). Any doubt as to whether the removal is proper should be resolved in favor of remand to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. CBS. Inc., 557 F.2d 84, 89 (6th Cir.1977).

III. Analysis

A. Removal from State Court

"The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and have a continuing obligation to examine their subject matter jurisdiction throughout the pendency of every matter before them." Robinson v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir.1990). A defendant in a state court action may remove a case to federal court on diversity or federal question grounds within thirty days after service. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and § 1446. An action removed to federal court may be remanded to state court if at any time before final judgment it appears that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Removal jurisdiction is a question of law for this court. Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.2000). The defendant has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 155 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S.Ct. 35, 37, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921)). Important federalism considerations regarding the relationship between the state and federal court systems caution against routinely finding removal jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 872, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941). The removal statute is to be strictly construed, and the exercise of jurisdiction is to be rejected in doubtful cases. Alexander v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir.1994); see also Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77, 62 S.Ct. 15, 20, 86 L.Ed. 47 (1941). Indeed, there is a "strong presumption" against removal, cf. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590-91, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938), and every doubt concerning whether removal was proper should therefore be resolved in favor of remand. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.1994); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992).

Plaintiffs, in this situation, have filed a motion for remand contending that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this controversy. Additionally, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants' removal was improper in the instant case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The Defendants, however, assert that the Plaintiffs' Complaint falls within the exception to the well-pleaded complaint doctrine as the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs are completely preempted by federal law. Finally, Defendants contend that because Plaintiffs' claims directly implicate the tariffs filed by WorldCom, the Plaintiffs cannot circumvent this Court's jurisdiction by artful pleading.¹

The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); see Davis, 226 F.3d at 510. Typically, the well-pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff the "master of the complaint," meaning a plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law for his or her cause of action. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. at 2429. Hence, with few exceptions, the plaintiff, as "master of the complaint," may select a state forum by choosing to rely on state-law claims only, even if the facts alleged also would support a claim under federal law. Tisdale v. United Assoc. of Journeymen, 25 F.3d 1308, 1311 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court.").

A defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim will be litigated. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 2433. Rather, "in order for `arising under' jurisdiction to attach, `a right or immunity created by the institution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action.'" Robinson, 918 F.2d at 585 (citations omitted); see also Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 78 F.3d 256, 259 (6th Cir.1996) ("Ordinarily, a defendant may remove a state court case to federal court only if [the case] could have been brought there in the first place; that is, if the federal court would have original jurisdiction over the case."). Thus, this court finds that based on the foregoing, Defendants have failed to assert a cause of action over which this court has original jurisdiction.

B. The Complete Preemption Doctrine

An exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the complete preemption doctrine, which arises where "the pre-emptive force of a statute is so `extraordinary' that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430. Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claims purportedly based upon state law will be treated as though they arose under federal law, regardless of how the plaintiff crafted the complaint. Id. The doctrine of complete preemption applies only when Congress has "so completely pre-empt[ed] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). Circumstances where federal law completely preempts state law, so as to support removal of a state-law claim to federal court, are extremely rare. See Robinson, 918 F.2d at 585 (identifying only...