Crumpacker v. Adams
| Decision Date | 20 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 8160,8160 |
| Citation | 426 P.2d 781,77 N.M. 633,1967 NMSC 60 |
| Parties | Paul CRUMPACKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. P. G. ADAMS, d/b/a Lovington Ready Mix Concrete Company, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
The defendant, P. G. Adams, has appealed from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Paul Crumpacker, for a balance found to be due under parol contracts for the furnishing of equipment and services principally in crushing and loading rock.
The firm of Crumpacker & Hough orally contracted to crush rock or caliche and, in addition, on what was known as the 'Railroad Job,' to load the crushed caliche ballast on railroad cars. The trial court found that the partnership was dissolved after completion of the contract and that by virtue of the dissolution, this cause of action became the property of Paul Crumpacker.
Defendant asserts that the action is barred by § 67--16--14, N.M.S.A.1953, the pertinent portion of which reads:
'No contractor as defined by section 3 of this act shall * * * bring or maintain any action in any court of the state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act for which a license is required by this act without alleging and proving that such contractor was a duly licensed contractor at the time the alleged cause of action arose(,)'
because of plaintiff's failure to allege or prove that the partnership held a contractor's license. Defendant contends a license issued to Paul Crumpacker, one of the partners, fails to satisfy the statutory requirement. It is well established that the contractors' license law and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto compel partnerships required to be licensed to hold a license in the partnership name. Nickels v. Walker, 74 N.M. 545, 395 P.2d 679. However, it is axiomatic that a defendant, seeking to invoke the statute prohibiting an unlicensed contractor from maintaining an action, must establish that the plaintiff was in fact required by § 67--16--2, N.M.S.A.1953, to be licensed. We find neither a finding of any fact by the court nor evidence in the case to support a finding that Crumpacker & Hough performed work requiring them to be licensed.
Section 67--16--2, N.M.S.A.1953, defines those required to be licensed as:
'* * * a person, firm, copartnership, corporation, * * * who for either a price, fee, or percentage, undertakes * * * to construct, alter, repair, add to or improve any building excavation, or other structure, project, development or improvement, * * *.'
This was neither a 'project, development or improvement' such as the mining operation in Salter v. Kindom Uranium Corp., 67 N.M. 34, 351 P.2d 375, relied upon by defendant. The statute expressly excludes those merely furnishing materials or supplies, saying:
'* * * the term contractor * * * shall not include anyone who merely furnishes materials, or supplies without fabricating the same into, or consuming the same in the performance of the work of the contractor * * *.'
The fact that the trial court may have erroneously concluded that a license held by Paul Crumpacker individually satisfied any license requirement does not require reversal. It is not the function of an appellate court to merely correct errors. A correct decision will not be disturbed or reversed because the court gave a wrong or insufficient reason therefor. Lockhart v. Wills, 9 N.M. 344, 54 P. 336; Atma v. Munoz, 48 N.M. 114, 146 P.2d 631; Heron v. Garcia, 48 N.M. 507, 153 P.2d 514; Armijo v. Shambaugh, 64 N.M. 459, 330 P.2d 546; Mountain View Corp. v. Horne, 74 N.M. 540, 395 P.2d 676. In our view, materials were furnished which were neither fabricated into nor consumed in the performance of the work, and, accordingly, these services fell within an exception to the contractors' license law.
Defendant argues that an allowance of wages for time spent in operating equipment by Crumpacker & Hough, as an expense of operation was contrary to the agreement between the parties. He points to plaintiff's testimony that the plaintiffs originally agreed to furnish the crushed rock for compensation computed on an hourly basis, but that at the commencement of the railroad job, the parties each agreed to furnish certain equipment and to divide the profits, after deducting the expenses of operation, obtained from a contract between defendant and the...
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Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay Const. Co.
...for that of the trial court as to the credibility of any witness or as to the weight to be given his testimony. Crumpacker v. Adams, 77 N.M. 633, 426 P.2d 781 (1967); Arretche v. Griego, 77 N.M. 364, 423 P.2d 407 (1967); Bell v. Kenneth P. Thompson Co., 76 N.M. 420, 415 P.2d 546 (1966). It ......
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...for that of the trial court as to the credibility of any witness or as to the weight to be given his testimony. Crumpacker v. Adams, 77 N.M. 633, 426 P.2d 781 (1967); Arretche v. Griego, 77 N.M. 364, 423 P.2d 407 (1967); Bell v. Kenneth P. Thompson Co., 76 N.M. 420, 415 P.2d 546 (1966). It ......
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