Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1447,81-1447 |
| Citation | 672 F.2d 1248 |
| Parties | 10 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 321 Vicki CRUMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONFEDERATION LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. Summary Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Locke, Purnell, Boren, Laney & Neely, Larry M. Lesh, Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Wilson, Berry, Jorgenson & Fuqua, Dean Jorgenson, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before BROWN, POLITZ and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Vicki Crumpton, the beneficiary of an accidental death policy, sued Confederation Life Insurance Co. (Confederation) for the benefits under the policy. From a jury verdict and judgment in favor of the beneficiary, Confederation appeals. The asserted errors are twofold: (1) improper admission of prejudicial evidence of the character of the insured; and (2) incorrect denial of motions for j.n.o.v. or new trial since as a matter of law the death of the insured was not accidental. Finding no error by the District Court, we affirm.
The facts in this suit on an insurance policy are unusual for that genre of cases. The insured, Titus Crumpton (Crumpton), was shot by Joanne Petton, a neighbor who lived just a little more than a block away. While Confederation's defense to the policy was that Crumpton's death was not accidental, the focus of the trial was on the alleged rape of Ms. Petton by the deceased insured. Thus we find it necessary briefly to summarize the circumstances claimed to have led to Crumpton's death.
On the afternoon of November 8, 1978, Ms. Petton, a housewife with three children, was allegedly raped and beaten in her home by Crumpton. The assailant apparently threatened to kill Petton's children if she informed the police or anyone about the rape. Ms. Petton did report the incident to the police five days later, on the morning of November 13, 1978, stating that the attack had occurred on the morning of November 8 and that she could not identify her assailant. Between the time of the alleged rape and her report to the police, Ms. Petton did inform her parents and her husband, but she never revealed to her husband that the assailant had made threats against her. On November 13, Ms. Petton was also examined by her physician who found multiple bruises on Petton's body "more consistent with a sex assault than just would be a general beating of some sort".
At approximately 9 p.m. on November 13, 1978, Ms. Petton asked her husband to pick up some medication at the drug store. After he left, Ms. Petton then delivered to her next door neighbor a sealed envelope containing a handwritten note stating "Mr. Crumpton attacked and raped me in afternoon not morning". Subsequently, Ms. Petton, with a pistol in her possession, went out to the garage at which time she observed Crumpton standing out on the street. Apparently, he proceeded toward her so she pulled out the gun and, without any verbal warning, shot Crumpton at close range.
Titus Crumpton was insured by Confederation as part of a group policy obtained by his employer to cover accidental death and dismemberment. The policy, in the amount of $150,000, designated Vicki Crumpton as the beneficiary. The policy provided benefits for accidental death, defined as "death resulting from ... accidental bodily injury visible on the surface of the body or disclosed by an autopsy."
Vicki Crumpton brought this suit seeking recovery of the proceeds of this policy, claiming that her father, Titus Crumpton, died of gunshot wounds inflicted by another person. Confederation, while admitting that Crumpton was insured under the policy denied coverage, asserting that Crumpton's death did not result from an accidental bodily injury within the meaning of the policy. Specifically, Confederation, while not disputing the death, contended that Crumpton had raped his neighbor who fatally shot him in the belief that he had returned to inflict further harm on her or her children. For this reason, Confederation asserted that Crumpton should have anticipated that his actions would result in bodily injury, and thus his death was not accidental under the meaning of the policy.
The beneficiary denied that the rape occurred or alternatively asserted that Crumpton could not reasonably have anticipated his death five days after the rape. The case was tried to a jury to whom one special interrogatory was submitted: "Did plaintiff Vicki Crumpton prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the bodily injuries of T. B. Crumpton which resulted in his death were accidental?" The jury responded that "Plaintiff did prove." The District Court entered judgment awarding the beneficiary the benefits under the policy as well as statutory penalties and attorney's fees. Confederation's subsequent motion for j.n.o.v. or for new trial was denied. From this denial, Confederation appeals.
Confederation's primary assertion of error concerns the admission by the District Court of evidence regarding Crumpton's character. Prior to trial, Confederation by motion in limine sought an order prohibiting the admission into evidence of "any fact regarding or relating to T. B. Crumpton's character or reputation in the community." This motion was denied by the District Court judge who found that under the peculiar fact circumstances, Crumpton's character was at issue. Also, the District Court determined that the evidence would be admissible in a criminal case under F.R.Evid. 404(a), which rule, although appearing to apply only to criminal cases, should properly apply to the type of case at hand. 1
At the trial Vicki Crumpton called as witnesses several persons who testified to Crumpton's "character". The witnesses included the pastor of a church, who testified that Crumpton did not have a violent temper, did not use profanity, and did not make passes at women; the church secretary who testified similarly; a "good friend" who testified that Crumpton did not use profanities or make obscene gestures or indecent proposals to women, was not violent, and did not drink; Crumpton's sister-in-law who testified similarly; and the beneficiary who testified that her father was not violent and did not use threats.
Confederation contends that the admission of this testimony not only violated F.R.Evid. 404 but was also prejudicial, constituting "virtually the only direct evidence adduced to satisfy the Beneficiary's burden ...." The propriety of the admission of evidence of character depends in part on the purpose for which that evidence is offered. Generally this type of evidence is offered for one of two purposes: (1) when a person's possession of a particular character trait is an operative fact in determining the legal rights and liabilities of the party and thus is one of the ultimate issues in the case; or (2) to prove circumstantially that a person acted in conformity with his character on a particular occasion. 2
The use of character evidence for the first purpose above is generally referred to as "character at issue". When used for such a purpose, it is not within the scope of F.R.Evid. 404 which applies instead to the second use, that of showing that the person acted in conformity with his character. Reyes v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 589 F.2d 791, 793 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979). F.R.Evid. 404(a) governs the admission of character evidence when used for the circumstantial purpose and generally excludes such evidence unless within one of the three exceptions. 3 These exceptions are formulated in terms of whose character is being offered as evidence. They allow the admission of character evidence to prove action in conformity with character of the accused, of a victim in certain circumstances, and of a witness. With these exceptions, character evidence is generally excluded because it is viewed as having slight probative value and yet may be very prejudicial. Reyes, supra, at 793-94 n.6. Where character is part of the ultimate issue of a case, F.R.Evid. 404(a) is not relevant. 4
The District Court, in denying the motion to exclude evidence of Crumpton's character, based the decision first on a finding that character was at issue. We agree with this conclusion. While the evidence of Crumpton's character might create an inference that he acted in accordance with that character on the night of the shooting, his character is also a fact upon which the liabilities of the parties turn. Crumpton's character was at issue given the defense raised by Confederation that Crumpton should have anticipated bodily injury because he committed a violent criminal act. Since his character was at issue and therefore not within Rule 404(a), the admission of the evidence was within the discretion of the trial court. 5 Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1374 (5th Cir. 1981); Young v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 618 F.2d 332, 337 (5th Cir. 1980). Given the unusual nature of this case, the decision whether to admit the evidence of character, although perhaps a close call, was reached after carefully weighing all factors. We thus find no abuse of discretion by the District Court in admitting such evidence.
Even if the evidentiary ruling were erroneous, reversal would not be necessary since the evidence of Crumpton's character was not prejudicial to the rights of Confederation. As discussed later in this opinion, there was sufficient evidence-aside from this testimony concerning Crumpton's character-from which the jury could find that Crumpton's death was accidental under the terms of the policy. Even if the jury believed Ms. Petton's claim that Crumpton had raped her previously, the jury did not necessarily have to find that Crumpton would reasonably anticipate Ms. Petton's delayed response. Absent a showing that substantial rights of the party were adversely affected, reversal...
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