Crumpton v. State

• Decision Date: 19 May 1910
• Citation: 167 Ala. 4,52 So. 605
• Parties: CRUMPTON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

52 So. 605

167 Ala. 4

CRUMPTON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 19, 1910

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Walker County; T. L. Sowell Judge.

Mal Crumpton was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Reversed.

The exceptions to evidence sufficiently appear in the opinion. The following charges were refused to the defendant: (1) "The court charges the jury that the defendant did not provoke or bring on the difficulty, and that if the deceased turned towards the defendant, and put his right hand in his hip pocket in such a manner as to indicate to a reasonable man that his purpose was to draw a weapon and use it, the defendant was authorized to anticipate him and shoot first." (2) "The court charges you that the burden was on the state to show that the defendant was in fault in bringing on or provoking the difficulty." (3) "The court charges you that the burden is on the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in fault in bringing on or provoking the difficulty." (4) "The court charges you that the burden is on the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable means of escape open to defendant without increasing his peril, if you believe from the evidence that he was free from fault in bringing on or provoking the difficulty, and that it reasonably appeared necessary to the defendant to shoot at that time to save himself from death or great bodily harm." (5) "The court charges the jury that no theories, however fine, should persuade them to find the defendant guilty, unless the evidence in this case is so strong would cause the conscience of mankind to respond to it." (6) "The danger that will excuse one for killing another need not be real or actual. It may now be known that all the appearances of danger were false, and that Odom never intended to do the defendant any harm, and that he did not even have a pistol; yet, if the jury believe from all the evidence in this case that the appearance of danger surrounding the defendant at the time was such as to produce a reasonable belief in the mind of a reasonable man that his life was in danger, or that he was about to suffer great bodily harm, and that there were no other reasonable means at the time open to defendant to avoid the danger, but by taking Odom's life, defendant being without fault at the time the law holds him harmless, and the jury must acquit him whether in fact Odom had a pistol or not." (8) "The court charges the jury that if the defendant did not provoke or encourage the difficulty, but approached the deceased in an orderly and peaceful manner, and deceased turned towards the defendant and placed his hands behind him or in his hip pocket in such a manner as to indicate to a reasonable man that his purpose was to draw a pistol and fire, the defendant was authorized to anticipate him, and draw a pistol and fire and shoot him, if there was no reasonable means of escape without increasing his peril, and the rule in such cases would not be varied if it should turn out that the deceased was in fact unarmed, as the law of self-defense does not require the defendant to wait until the weapon is presented ready for deadly execution." (9) "The court charges the jury that in the criminal department, the same as in the civil, our law and its enforcement are ordained to produce practical results, not to vindicate theories of right." (10) "The court charges the jury that, in determining whether or not the defendant is guilty of the offense charged in the indictment, they are not simply to look at the morals of the act, or even at its practical enormity; but they are to consider whether or not to punish the defendant will as a judicial rule promote on the whole the public peace and good order." (11) "The court charges you, gentlemen of the jury, if there is a reasonable doubt that the defendant was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, that Odom made demonstrations which were calculated to lead a reasonably prudent man to the belief." (12) General affirmative charge. (13) "The court charges you gentlemen of the jury, that the danger which will justify the taking of human life need not be actual; but it is sufficient if there is actual apparent danger at the time the shooting took place." (14) "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if the defendant shot the deceased in self-defense, as defined to you by the court, then he did not kill him voluntarily, in the sense used in the Code in defining murder, and you should acquit him." (16) "The court charges you, gentlemen of the jury, that you should find the defendant not guilty, unless the evidence against him should be such as to exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but that of his guilt." (15) "The court charges the jury that the policy of the law is that no man should suffer the punishment unless he deserved it in pure retributive justice, aside from all collateral consideration, unless presumably it will contribute to the public good." (17) "That there was actual or apparent danger, which was calculated to produce death or great bodily harm, and that the defendant shot in pursuance to the danger, and had no reasonable means of escape without increasing his peril, that is, apparent means of escape, which would lead a reasonable man to the belief that he could safely escape without increasing his peril, then, gentlemen of the jury, you cannot convict the defendant of any offense, and you should acquit him."

Leith & Gunn, Bankhead & Bankhead, Acuff & Cooner, and L. D. Gray, for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SIMPSON J.

The appellant was indicted for murder in the second degree, and convicted of manslaughter in the first degree.

A witness for the state, Mrs. Green, who witnessed the shooting, and who testified that just before the firing Odom (the man who was shot) was standing with his hand in his hip pocket, and seemed to be moving his hand, was asked on cross-examination if said Odom did not, on the day before he was killed, get a pistol from her husband. The state objected, and the objection was sustained. There was no error in sustaining this objection. There was no evidence or offer to prove that the defendant knew of the circumstance referred to. Robinson v. State, 108 Ala. 14, 15, 16, 18 So. 732; Wilson v. State, 140 Ala. 43, 50, 37 So. 93.

The cases of Wiley v. State, 99 Ala. 146, 13 So. 424, Linehan v. State, 113 Ala. 71, 82, 83, 21 So. 497, and Naugher v. State, 116 Ala. 463, 466, 23 So. 26, all relate to threats brought to the knowledge of the defendant, or to facts known by him.

There was error in overruling the objection to the question to the witness Davidson as...