Crumrine v. Washington County Housing Authority
| Decision Date | 11 January 1954 |
| Parties | CRUMRINE. v. WASHINGTON COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Action for damages for condemnation of land. The Court of Common Pleas, Washington County, at No. 42, August Term, 1951, Carl E. Gibson, J., entered order granting new trial unless landowner filed remittitur, and landowner appealed. The Supreme Court, No. 232, March Term, 1953, Arnold, J., held that since case was fully presented at trial and full and complete charge was given jury, and evidence supported award trial court had no power to enter such order.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Crumrine & Pireaux, Frank E. Pireaux, Thomas L Anderson, Washington, for appellant.
P. Vincent Marino, Washington, for appellee.
Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.
Plaintiff-owner appeals from an order of court granting a new trial in a land damage case.
The defendant, Washington County Housing Authority, took by eminent domain 8.9 acres comprising about 1/3 of the frontage of the plaintiff's 26.2 acres, located about one-half mile from Fredericktown. The owner intended the land to be used for the building of homes, and plotted most of the area for that purpose. The portion taken includes buildings, which rented for $25 per month, and most of the level part of the premises, the remainder being not very suitable for building lots. The sole dispute between the parties is the value of the land,-or the loss suffered by the owner.
The viewers awarded $22,700 and the Housing Authority appealed. The jury, after testimony taken and after a view, returned a verdict of $25,070. Plaintiff fixed the value of $40,000 before condemnation, with a loss of $35,000, and his expert witnesses determined the loss to be $31,000, $33,000 and $35,000 respectively. Defendant's expert witnesses respectively gave their opinion that the loss was $8,100 and $12,500.
The defendant's motion for a new trial was disposed of by the court as follows: That since the various witnesses' estimates of loss ranged from $8,100 to $35,000, it could not say ‘ that the verdict is contrary to or not supported by evidence.’ The court determined, however, The court then ordered that if the plaintiff would file a remittitur of all in excess of $20,000 a new trial would be refused; otherwise it would be granted. Here, then, we have a case where the court in its order granting a new trial fully accredits the testimony of the plaintiff as to the damages sustained, and gives no reason for reducing the verdict $5,000 by an alternative decree. The plaintiff declined to file the remittitur, order for new trial was entered, and the plaintiff appealed.
The only question here is whether this was an abuse of discretion by the court below. In the first place it must be kept in mind that the only question before the jury was the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff for the taking of his land. This is not a case where, as in personal injury cases, the jury considers pain and suffering and loss of earning power, and where no evidence can be taken to fix the dollar value of the loss. The simple question here is: Under the evidence taken, what was the loss to the plaintiff for the taking of his land? We repeat: the court stated that it could not find ‘ that the verdict is contrary to or not supported by evidence.’ It did not say that it found against the credibility of the plaintiff's witnesses. It did say that ‘ while it is not in * * * [the court's] province to determine the amount which should be awarded, * * * [it] should, rather than simply grant a new trial, give the parties an opportunity to arrive at an adjustment by making an alternative decree,’ and that it was ‘ not disposed at this time to analyze further the evidence or * * * reasons for reaching this conclusion.’
Upon our review of the record we are constrained to find that the evidence amply supported the verdict, and that there were no matters allowing the court the right to grant a new trial. The matter was fully presented at trial and a full and complete charge was given by the court. There were no errors of law and there are no facts in dispute other than the value of the land. While we are hesitant to reverse judgment where the court reduces the verdict, ‘ the power and duty to review such action have never been abdicated.’ Martin v. Arnold, 366 Pa. 128, 131, 77 A.2d 99, 101.
The wide disparity in the figures of the opinion evidence may peculiarly call for the exercise of common sense on the part of the jury, but if its judgment is based upon a view and all of the testimony, it will not be disturbed. Leaf v. Pennsylvania Co., 268 Pa. 579, 112 A. 243. Here the verdict is practically the same as a viewers' award (after allowing 6% for detention). That is a circumstance tending to show the verdict is not excessive.
Determination of value and loss depended upon the testimony of experts, i. e. opinion evidence only. Opinion testimony " may be of value and it may be of no value, just as it appeals to * * * [the jury].' * * * In all such matters the jury must be left to the free exercise of its own judgment. It cannot be bound by the opinion of the witness or the instruction of the court . * * * [It] may reject in toto [or in part] the opinion of any witness [it disbelieves], and this whether that opinion is contradicted or not.' Ray, to Use of Miller v. Philadelphia, 344 Pa. 439, 441, 442, 25 A.2d 145, 146. (Italics supplied.) The three judges of the court en banc, none of whom viewed the premises and only one of whom heard the testimony, have indicated that they believe that the award, including detention money, should be $20,000. Since the jury had only the opinion evidence, supported by a view of the premises,-and the court had only the opinion evidence and did not participate in the view,-and since no capricious disregard of testimony by the jury is shown, there is no justifiable basis for the court's order. In fact, the court itself held that the verdict was not contrary to, but was supported by, the evidence. As in Ray v. Philadelphia supra, the learned court below ‘ took from the jury its exclusive right to determine the credibility of the testimony and the weight and effect [to which] it was entitled.’ However good the intentions of the court may have been, it cannot usurp the power of the jury. The verdict bore a reasonable resemblance to damages proved, and it is not the function of the court below, nor of this Court, to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. See Paustenbaugh v. Ward Baking Co., 374 Pa. 418, 97 A.2d 816.
The lower court states that it ‘ feels' that the amount awarded by the jury is to some extent excessive,-which is language that fails to come up to the standard heretofore laid down in the cases: Bellettiere v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 638, 81 A.2d 857. This Court said in Beal v Reading Co., 370 Pa. 45, 49, 87 A.2d 214, 216, in a personal injury case: ...
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