Crunk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CALLOW; DOLLIVER; GOODLOE; DORE
• Citation: Crunk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 719 P.2d 1338, 106 Wn.2d 23 (Wash. 1986)
• Decision Date: 05 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 51053-9
• Parties: , 1 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1283 Fredrick W. CRUNK and Alice Crunk, Respondents, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Petitioner.

Page 23

106 Wn.2d 23

719 P.2d 1338, 1 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1283

Fredrick W. CRUNK and Alice Crunk, Respondents, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Petitioner.

No. 51053-9.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

June 5, 1986.

Reed, McClure, Moceri, Thonn & Moriarty, William Hickman, Karen Southworth Weaver, Heather Houston Reeve, Seattle, for petitioner.

Baker, Lane & Rothschild, John Rothschild, Seattle, for respondents.

CALLOW, Justice.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company petitions for review of the holding of the Court of Appeals reported as Crunk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 38 Wash.App. 501, 686 P.2d 1132 (1984). The insurer asserts that the homeowner's policy involved was unambiguous and that a cashier's check constitutes "money" within the terms of a special limit of liability provision in the policy.

Fredrick and Alice Crunk were insured under a Homeowners Policy issued by State Farm. They entered into a contract with George K. Wright, d/b/a G & G Construction Company, for a $37,769.62 remodeling job on their home. The Crunks secured a cashier's check for $18,884.91 from a bank, endorsed it and gave it to the contractor on July 8, 1981 as the initial payment on the home improvements the contractor was to make under the contract. The contractor cashed the check and departed for sunny climes. He was arrested later in Florida and returned to King County for trial where in December 1981 he pled guilty to the first degree theft of the cashier's check stating that:

from November 1980 and July 1981, I was working as a building contractor. I had several jobs: Fellhauer, Crunk, Pearsons and Persons. I got behind in the Fellhauer job and then everything snowballed. I tried to catch up and I couldn't. I used the money from one job for another job in hopes of catching up. I used money advanced to me by the Crunks and Persons for purposes other than the work I was hired to do and never started their work.

The insured presented a claim to the insurer under Coverage B of the homeowner's policy. Coverage was provided under the provisions of the policy which read in pertinent part:

Coverage B--UNSCHEDULED PERSONAL PROPERTY.

This policy covers unscheduled personal property usual or incidental to the occupancy of the premises as a dwelling and owned or used by an Insured, while on the described premises and, at the option of the Named Insured, owned by others while on the portion of the premises occupied exclusively by the Insured.

This coverage also includes such unscheduled personal property while elsewhere than on the described premises, anywhere in the world:

(1) owned or used by an Insured; or

(2) at the option of the Named Insured;

(a) owned by a guest while in a residence occupied by an Insured; or

(b) owned by a residence employee while actually engaged in the service of an Insured and while such property is in the physical custody of such residence employee or in a residence occupied by an Insured;

(3) but the limit of this Company's liability for the unscheduled personal property away from the premises shall be an additional amount of insurance EQUAL to 10% of the amount specified for Coverage B, but in no event LESS THAN $1000.

PERILS INSURED AGAINST

COVERAGE B--UNSCHEDULED PERSONAL PROPERTY against direct loss to the property covered by the following perils AS DEFINED AND LIMITED, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE EXCLUDED:

* * *

10. Theft, MEANING ANY ACT OF STEALING OR ATTEMPT THEREAT, INCLUDING LOSS OF PROPERTY FROM A KNOWN PLACE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A PROBABILITY OF THEFT EXISTS.

* * *

SPECIAL LIMITS OF LIABILITY

* * *

b. UNDER COVERAGE B, THIS COMPANY SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR LOSS IN ANY ONE OCCURRENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN:

(1) $100 IN THE AGGREGATE ON MONEY, BULLION, NUMISTATIC PROPERTY AND BANK NOTES;

(2) $500 IN THE AGGREGATE ON SECURITIES, ACCOUNTS, BILLS, DEEDS, EVIDENCES OF DEBT, LETTERS OF CREDIT, NOTES OTHER THAN BANK NOTES, PASSPORTS, RAILROAD

AND OTHER TICKETS OR STAMPS, INCLUDING PHILATELIC PROPERTY;

The following issues are before us: (1) whether the acts of the contractor constitute theft as defined in the policy, and (2) whether a cashier's check is money, a bank note or an evidence of debt under the special limits of liability clause contained in the policy.

An ordinary check is a bill of exchange drawn by an individual on a bank, payable on demand. It is an order upon a bank purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds for the payment of a sum certain to a person named or to order or bearer on demand. The drawer of the ordinary check has the power of countermanding his order for payment at any time before the bank has paid it or committed itself to pay it. A cashier's check differs in that it is a bill of exchange drawn by the bank upon itself and is accepted by the act of issuance. A cashier's check is the primary obligation of the remitting bank. See RCW 62A.4-211(1)(b). The right to countermand as applied to ordinary checks does not exist as to cashier's checks. Drinkall v. Movius State Bank, 11 N.D. 10, 88 N.W. 724 (1901). An ordinary check is considered as merely a promise to pay, but a cashier's check is regarded substantially as money, which it represents. The gift of such a check is completed upon delivery of the check. Pikeville Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 150, 135 S.W.2d 426, 126 A.L.R. 919 (1939). See also Scott v. Seaboard Sec. Co., 143 Wash. 514, 255 P. 660 (1927), which quoted with approval extensively from Drinkall and then quoted from Hathaway v. Delaware Cy., 185 N.Y. 368, 78 N.E. 153 (1906) as follows:

"That by reason of the peculiar character of cashiers' checks and their general use in the commercial world they were to be regarded substantially as the money which they represented."

(Italics ours.) See also Duke v. Johnson, 127 Wash. 601, 221 P. 321 (1923); Bunge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 65 Misc.2d 829, 318 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1971), and Foreman v. Martin, 6 Ill.App.3d 599, 286 N.E.2d 80 (1972). As stated in 10 Am.Jur.2d Banks § 544, at 518- 19 (1963):

Issuance and nature of cashiers' checks.

A cashier's check is a bill of exchange, drawn by the bank upon itself, and is accepted by the act of issuance. While the only apparent basic or factual difference between a cashier's check and the ordinary check is that the ordinary check is drawn on one other than the drawer, while in a cashier's check both the drawer and the drawee are the same, there are certain differences, some radical, in the incidents and consequences of the two types of checks. A cashier's check is a primary obligation of the bank, rather than the depositor, as in the case of an ordinary check, and a promise to pay which ordinarily cannot be countermanded. It is issued by the authorized officer of a bank, directed to another person, evidencing the fact that the payee is authorized to demand and receive from the bank, upon presentation, the amount of money represented by the check. Cashiers' checks, from their peculiar character and general use in the commercial world, are regarded substantially as the money which they represent, a rule that is not extended to ordinary checks of the depositor drawn on his bank.

(Footnotes omitted.)

In the understanding that a cashier's check generally, and under Washington law in particular, is treated the same as money, we inquire as to the way in which the contractor converted $18,884.91 of the Crunks' funds to his own use. First of all, he acquired it from them legally, and it was their intent to deliver it to him. Secondly, it is apparent that he cashed the check and then, by his own statement, he spent the money and other monies in his possession and never did the work he was to do for the Crunks under their remodeling contract. We must inquire whether the insurance policy covers the Crunks' loss.

The intent of the parties to an insurance policy is determined by considering the entire policy as a whole and giving effect to each clause in the policy. Neer v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 103 Wash.2d 316, 692 P.2d 830 (1985) citing State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash.2d 477, 484, 687 P.2d 1139 (1984) and Morgan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 86 Wash.2d 432, 545 P.2d 1193 (1976). "The question is one solely of law", Rew v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co., 41 Wash.2d 577, 581, 250 P.2d 956 (1952). The matter being solely an issue of law and the interpretation of an insurance policy which is before us and there being no disagreement as to the facts, we are in as good a position as the lower courts to ascertain the extent of coverage, if any, under the policy.

In 7A J. Appleman, Insurance, § 4501-.02, at 255, (1979), we find:

The personal comprehensive liability policy occasionally is sold separately but it most frequently is found as a part of a package fire or home policy, popularly known as the homeowners' policy. This type of coverage is simply a combination of the many property and liability coverages desired by the average person. It is comparatively low in cost, and is primarily a non-business and non-automobile policy. The court will take cognizance of the intent and reasonable expectation of the parties in entering into the insurance contract.

(Footnote omitted.) 13A G. Couch, Insurance § 48.143, at 143, (2d ed. 1982), states:

Notwithstanding the presence of an "all-risks" provision in an insurance policy, the loss will not be covered if it comes within any specific exclusion contained in the policy.

As we read the policy, it insured personal property on or off the premises with certain restrictions against theft but with the limitation of liability to $100 with respect to money and bank notes. As we read the entire policy in the light of the limitation of liability set forth, we hold that it was not the intent of the contract nor could it be the understanding of the parties that coverage was to be provided for more than $100 when something as liquid and...