Crusel v. Tierce
| Decision Date | 27 February 1922 |
| Docket Number | 22849 |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | CRUSEL v. TIERCE |
Original Opinion of January 31, 1921, Reported at 150 La 893.
O'NIELL J. PROVOSTY, C. J., dissents. OVERTON, J., recused. ST. PAUL J.
O'NIELL, J.
In the original decree of this court, the plea of prescription of 10 years, against this action to revive a judgment, was sustained against the judgment of $ 2,974.67 originally rendered by the district court. The plea was overruled as to the increase allowed by the decree of this court, increasing the judgment in the original suit to $ 8,809.70.
The defendant, appellant in this case, applied for a rehearing, complaining only, of course, of that part of our decree which had, in part, overruled his plea of prescription. The rehearing, as to that part of the decree, was granted.
The plaintiff, appellee in this case, also applied for a rehearing, complaining only, of course, of that part of our decree that had sustained the plea of prescription against the original judgment of $ 2,974.67 rendered by the district court. The application for a rehearing on that part of our decree was refused, and the decree, to that extent, was thereby made final.
That part of the judgment of this court which has become final has therefore settled the proposition that the language of article 3547 of the Code, "All judgments for money, * * * shall be prescribed by the lapse of ten years from the rendition of such judgments," means, not that the prescription shall run from the finality of such judgments, but that it shall run from the rendition of such judgments. In other words, we have adhered to the jurisprudence maintaining that the date of rendition of a judgment of a court of original jurisdiction, in so far as it marks the beginning of the 10-year prescription against an action to revive or to keep alive the judgment, is the date of the judgment itself, not the date on which it becomes final. This court is therefore committed to the doctrine that the statute must be construed literally, and that the running of the prescription in such case is not suspended by an appeal from the original judgment, or during the delay allowed for taking a suspensive appeal.
The same rule must be applied to a "judgment for money" rendered originally by an appellate court. Of course, the judgment appealed from, in such case, in so far as it has rejected the plaintiff's demand, is not a "judgment for money," and the prescription therefore does not run against it. But the judgment of the appellate court, in such case, reversing the judgment appealed from in so far as it has rejected the plaintiff's demand, is a "judgment for money" and, as the Code says, the 10-year prescription commences "from the rendition of such judgments." The judgment in this case was rendered when the decree was handed down, more than 10 years before the institution of the present suit to revive or keep alive the original judgment. It would seem anomalous to hold that, although the prescription of 10 years...
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