Crussel v. State
| Decision Date | 26 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 16A01–1407–CR–304.,16A01–1407–CR–304. |
| Citation | 29 N.E.3d 746 |
| Parties | Marvin CRUSSEL, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
G. Allen Lidy, Roscoe Stovall, Jr., & Associates, Mooresville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Eric P. Babbs, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
, Judge.
[1] Marvin Crussel (“Crussel”) appeals, following a bench trial, his conviction for Class B misdemeanor reckless driving.1 Crussel concedes that he drove at an unreasonably high rate of speed but argues that we should reverse his conviction because the evidence presented was insufficient to show endangerment. Concluding that the trial court, acting as factfinder, could have reasonably inferred that Crussel's act of driving ninety-one miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone at around 10:30 p.m. in the dark of night on a portion of a country road that had houses and cross streets endangered the safety and property of others, we affirm his conviction.
[2] We affirm.
[3] Whether sufficient evidence supports Crussel's conviction.
[4] During the evening of October 16, 2013, Decatur County Sheriff's Deputy Rob Goodfellow (“Deputy Goodfellow”) was parked, in his marked police car, alongside and perpendicular to County Road 1100 South. The deputy was parked on a portion of the county road west of Westport. Main Street in Westport turns into County Road 1100 South. This county road is “fairly straight” but also has “some hills in it.” (Tr. 6
, 7 ). The portion of County Road 1100 South where the deputy parked was located in a “rural” part of Decatur County, but there were houses present and there were three roads intersecting the county road. These three roads had two-way stop signs, while County Road 1100 South had no stop signs.
[5] As the deputy was parked along the county road, it was “dark” outside, there was “[v]ery light traffic[,]” and “there was no rain and it wasn't snowing.” (Tr. 6
). At around 10:39 p.m., Deputy Goodfellow saw a car—later identified as Crussel's car—that was traveling westbound on County Road 1100 South from the direction of Westport. The deputy noted that the car “appeared to be at a higher rate of speed than fifty five” miles per hour, which was the speed limit for that road. (Tr. 8 ). Deputy Goodfellow saw Crussel's car from approximately one-half mile away on “a straight portion” of the road. (Tr. 7 ). There were no other cars traveling in that area at that time. The deputy had a radar device and clocked Crussel's speed at ninety-one miles per hour. Deputy Goodfellow then activated his lights and stopped Crussel.
[6] Thereafter, the State charged Crussel with Class B misdemeanor reckless driving and speeding, a Class C infraction. The trial court held a bench trial on May 5, 2014. Deputy Goodfellow testified to the facts above. On cross examination, the deputy confirmed that there were no pedestrians, bicyclists, or schools in the area. After the State rested, Crussel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that, under the circumstances presented, the State had failed to present evidence on the element of endangerment of property or people. The State argued that “evidence of the extreme speed would constitute evidence in and of itself of endangerment to the safety and property of others.” (Tr. 17
). The trial court denied Crussel's motion.
[7] Thereafter, Crussel testified that he was going from home to work when the deputy pulled him over for speeding. Additionally, he testified that the road condition was “dry[,]” that there was “no fog[,]” and that he could see clearly that night. (Tr. 21
). Crussel also testified that he had lived in the area for thirteen years and that his car was generally in an operational condition.
[8] When presenting its closing argument to the trial court, the State cited to Taylor v. State, 457 N.E.2d 594 (Ind.Ct.App.1983)
, to support of its argument that “speed alone can support a reckless driving conviction.” (Tr. 23 ). Crussel, on the other hand, cited to Jackson v. State, 576 N.E.2d 607 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), to support his argument that there was insufficient evidence of endangerment to support a conviction for reckless driving. The trial court took the matter under advisement to review the parties' cases.
[9] Subsequently, on May 13, 2014, the trial court entered a written order, in which it discussed the cases submitted by the parties and determined that “Crussel's operation of his vehicle at 91 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour speed zone was reckless and endangered the safety and property of others.” (App. 10). The trial court found Crussel guilty of the reckless driving and speeding, merged the speeding infraction into the reckless driving conviction, and imposed a $100.00 fine and court costs. Crussel now appeals his conviction.
[10] Crussel argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his Class B misdemeanor reckless driving conviction.
[11] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind.2007)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
[12] To sustain Crussel's conviction for Class B misdemeanor reckless driving, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Crussel “operate[d] a motor vehicle and ... recklessly ... dr[ove] at such an unreasonably high rate of speed ... under the circumstances as to ... endanger the safety or property of others[.]” I.C. § 9–21–8–52(a)(1)(A)
. The reckless driving statute does not require a showing of personal injury or damage to property by a driver in order to commit the offense. See
State v. Seymour, 177 Ind.App. 341, 346, 379 N.E.2d 535 (Ind.Ct.App.1978) ().
[13] Crussel does not challenge the elements that he recklessly drove his car at an unreasonably high rate of speed. Indeed, he acknowledges that he was driving “at a high rate of speed well in excess of the speed limits.” (Crussel's Br. 6). He, however, contends that “driving 91 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone does not support a finding that he endangered the property or safety of others.” (Crussel's Br. 8). He contends that this Court should reverse his conviction because the (Crussel's Br. 8). In support of his argument, he cites to Jackson, in which another panel of this Court reversed the defendant's reckless driving conviction based on insufficient evidence of endangerment.
[14] The State, as the prosecutor did below, cites to Taylor to support its argument that “driving at an unreasonably high speed may suffice to support a conviction” for reckless driving. (State's Br. 4). The State also asserts that, under the circumstances presented, the trial court could have concluded that Crussel's unreasonably high speed endangered the safety and property of others and that Crussel's arguments are merely a request to reweigh the evidence.
[15] In Taylor, the defendant was convicted of reckless homicide after he drove seventy miles per hour in a thirty mile-per-hour zone, ran a stop sign, and collided with another car, killing the two people inside. Taylor, 457 N.E.2d at 596–97
. On appeal, Taylor challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Id. at 597
. Another panel of this Court reviewed the reckless driving statute when considering whether the defendant acted recklessly when he drove forty miles over the speed limit. Id. at 598. When discussing the reckless driving statute, the Taylor Court stated:
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