Crutcher v. Vickers
| Decision Date | 05 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. CV-10-S-01176-NE |
| Parties | COURTNEY ORLANDO CRUTCHER, Plaintiff, v. RANDY VICKERS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Courtney Orlando Crutcher originally commenced this action as a pro se plaintiff.1 He alleged multiple violations of his constitutional rights by Athens, Alabama Police Officer Randy Vickers ("Officer Vickers") during a traffic stop conducted on December 8, 2008, that resulted in plaintiff's arrest.2 Originally, plaintiff also asserted the same claims against Officer Vickers' employer, the City of Athens Police Department, and his supervisor, Athens Police Chief Wayne Harper.3 After this court denied the motion to dismiss filed by Officer Vickers, but granted the motions filed by the Athens Police Department and Athens Police Chief Wayne Harper,4 plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the remaining original defendant, Officer Vickers, as well as the new municipal defendant, the City of Athens, Alabama ("the City").5 It should be noted that the Amended Complaint, as well as the "Second Amended Complaint" filed the following month,6 were drafted by the attorney who first appeared on behalf of the plaintiff after commencement of this action: i.e., Everett Wess of the Birmingham, Jefferson County Bar Association.7 Plaintiff discharged Mr. Wess on May 17, 2011, however,8 and replaced him with Christopher L. Burrell of the Birmingham Bar, who appeared of record on June 9, 2011.9 That relationship did not last; on May 4th of the following year, Mr. Burrell asked for leave to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff, stating that an "adversity" had developed between him and his client.10 This court did not immediately rule upon that motion, because of two requests by plaintiff for additional time in which to retainsubstitute counsel,11 but finally granted the motion on July 26, 2012.12 Thus, Courtney Orlando Crutcher again appears before the court as a pro se litigant.
The court now will address defendants' motions to dismiss all claims asserted in plaintiff's amended and second amended complaints.13 For the reasons explained below, this court will grant that motion in all respects, except for plaintiff's excessive force, assault and battery, and outrage claims.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for, among other reasons, "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a), which requires that a pleading contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 544 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).
"Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). The principle underlying this liberal construction standard is "to give a pro se plaintiff a break when, although he stumbles on a technicality, his pleading is otherwise understandable." Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998). However, such "leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "a litigant's pro se status in civil litigation generally will not excuse mistakes he makes regarding procedural rules." Thompson v. United StatesMarine Corp., No. 09-16523, 2010 WL 3860578, at *3 (11th Cir. October 7, 2010) (per curiam) (); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 829, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (same).
For many years, the Eleventh Circuit applied a heightened pleading standard to claims asserted under § 1983 against individual police officers. See, e.g., GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 1998) (). The Circuit's opinion in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010), backed away from that position, and held that utilization of such a pleading standard is no longer warranted, in light of the plausibility requirement articulated in Iqbal.
Randall, 610 F.3d 709-10 (bracketed alterations and emphasis supplied).
Upon finding the pleaded facts inadequate, a court may dismiss the complaint either with or without granting leave to amend. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) instructs that courts "should freely give leave when justice so requires." Nevertheless, because plaintiff has already filed two amended complaints with the aid of retained counsel, this court is not inclined to allow him a third attempt to plead a viable claim.
Plaintiff alleges a long history of personal conflict with Officer Vickers.15 In December of 2008, for example, while Officer Vickers was engaged in training another officer,16 he allegedly waited in the middle of the road for plaintiff to pull out of his girlfriend's mother's house and pulled him over.17 When plaintiff asked why, Officer Vickers replied that it was for a routine traffic stop.18 During the course of the stop, Officer Vickers asked plaintiff's girlfriend "why was she wit[h] a person like [him]," and repeatedly asked plaintiff "what am I going to do for him."19 However, Officer Vickers did not write a ticket for any violations.20
On the evening of December 8, 2008, plaintiff was leaving his grandmother's house in Athens in a truck when he passed a police patrol vehicle traveling in the opposite direction driven by Officer Vickers.21 After observing Officer Vickers turnhis vehicle around, plaintiff pulled into the parking lot of a convenience store and walked inside, where he purchased a "piece of gum."22 When plaintiff walked out of the convenience store, Officer Vickers stepped out of his patrol vehicle and asked plaintiff for his driver's license.23 Plaintiff refused Officer Vickers' request, saying "come on man[, I] just left my grandma [sic] house going home . . . ." 24 Officer Vickers then asked plaintiff to sit in the backseat of his patrol vehicle "for police safety."25 Plaintiff initially complied.26
At that point, plaintiff admits that he and Officer Vickers "exchanged ugly words a couple of times . . . ."27 During these exchanges, plaintiff got out of the patrol vehicle and approached Officer Vickers.28 It appears from plaintiff's allegations that Officer Vickers then directed plaintiff to return to the patrol vehicle and plaintiff complied.29 Officer Vickers asked plaintiff where the "tag receipt" for his vehicle (a term for a registration document that all motorists are required by Alabama Code §40-12-260(b)(1) to have in their possession when operating an automobile)...
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