Crutchfield v. Adams

• Decision Date: 23 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. D-472,D-472
• Citation: 152 So.2d 808
• Parties: Gary Allen CRUTCHFIELD, a minor, by his father and next friend, Guy R. Crutchfield, and Guy R. Crutchfield, Individually, Appellants, v. Charles W. and Bessie ADAMS, his wife. Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 808

152 So.2d 808

Gary Allen CRUTCHFIELD, a minor, by his father and next friend, Guy R. Crutchfield, and Guy R. Crutchfield, Individually, Appellants, v. Charles W. and Bessie ADAMS, his wife. Appellees.

No. D-472.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First district.

April 23, 1963.

Rehearing Denied May 20, 1963.

Walter J. Smith, Tallahassee, for appellants.

Charles R. Timmel, Ft. Walton Beach, for appellees.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief Judge.

The plaintiffs, father and son, in an action for an attractive nuisance have appealed from an order and judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County, dismissing their amended complaint.

In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the court did not state its reasons therefor, but the grounds set forth by the defendants in their said motion are that the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action, and that the said complaint affirmatively shows on its face that the minor plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.

In the first count of their amended complaint the plaintiffs allege that the defendants are the owners of a certain lot and house and were in control of the said premises; that prior to April 19, 1962, the defendant Charles W. Adams installed an electrical water pump and well on the said premises and negligently failed to cover the said motor and the fan belt that operated the pump, both of which were openly exposed; that the defendants' attention had been called to the fact that the said machinery when in operation was extremely dangerous to children in the vicinity, and the plaintiff father had offered to furnish building materials and to help cover the pump, but the said defendant had declined the said plaintiff's offer to enclose the same, stating that he would do it himself.

The fourth paragraph of the first count, containing the crucial allegations regarding the defendants' knowledge, is an follows:

'4. That the defendants knew that the premises on which the said machinery and pump were operating was one on which children had in the past and were likely in the future to both trespass and to visit their premises by invitation to play with the defendants' five-year-old son, and although the defendants knew that the condition was one of which realized an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to children and although the defendants knew that the small children in the neighborhood, because of their youth, did not realize the risk involved in intermeddling in the said machinery or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and although the defendants knew that the maintaining of the condition was slight as compared to the risk to young children involved therein, the said defendants failed to enclose or place a guard over the revolving electric motor and fan belt, which in turn propelled the electric pump.'

The plaintiffs then allege that on April 19, 1962, the minor plaintiff, then three years old, was playing on the said premises with the defendants' five-year-old son, and was on the premises at the said son's implied invitation, along with other neighborhood children; that at this time the electric pump was in operation but the minor plaintiff was unaware of the risk involved in coming within the area of the pump and was attracted to and did catch his left hand in the fan belt, which was revolving, seriously and permanently injuring his hand; and that the injury occurred as a result of the defendants' negligence in failing to enclose the said dangerous mechanism and attractive nuisance.

In the second count of the amended complaint the plaintiff father re-avers the allegations of the first count, other than the damages suffered directly by the minor plaintiff, and seeks damages for the medical expenses he has incurred or will incur as a result of the said injuries to his son.

Since we are here considering whether a complaint states a cause of action, it is necessary to apply two basic rules in this endeavor: that all of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint must be considered; and that all well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true for this purpose.

The attractive nuisance doctrine prevails in Florida and has been recognized and applied in numerous Florida cases as well as cases in other jurisdictions. 'By a long line of decisions of the courts, both of this country and England, the doctrine of 'Attractive Nuisance' has been recognized and accepted, where children of immature age are lured to go upon dangerous machines or contrivances.' May v. Simmons, 104 Fla. 707, 140 So. 780 (1932).

The rule of liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine is clearly expressed in the following statement in Section 339 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, which was quoted with apparent approval by the Supreme Court of Florida in Cockerham v. R. E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So.2d 890 (1955):

'A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artifical condition which he maintains upon the land, if

"(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and

"(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and

"(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and

"(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved therein'.'

Applying this rule of liability to the allegations of the amended complaint involved on this appeal, we think and hold that those allegations fall squarely within the requirements of the rule of liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine, and thus the amended complaint states a cause of action against the defendants.

The appellate courts of Florida in numerous decisions have recognized and applied the attractive nuisance doctrine. While in many of these cases, the defendants happened to be corporate entities engaged in construction work, in other decisions the defendant was a landowner not so engaged. One of the numerous examples of the latter group is Ansin v. Thurston, 98 So.2d 87 (Fla.App.1957).

While we here hold that the amended complaint before us sufficiently states a cause of action under the doctrine of attractive nuisance, we also point out that, in our opinion, if the minor plaintiff was an invitee, a cause of action was therein alleged under the law of negligence without any need to invoke the said doctrine. This statement, we think, justifies an inquiry into, and a discussion of, the fundamental rules of landowners' liability for a child's injuries on their premises. The rule to be applied generally hinges on the status of the person injured--whether he is to be classed legally as an invitee, a licensee, or as a trespasser.

If the injured person is an invitee, the following rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Florida in Goldberg v. Straus, 45 45 So.2d 883 (1950), is applicable to guests injured on landowners' property:

'In such circumstances the rule is that the guest must take the premises as he finds them; subject to the exception, however, that the host will be held to liability for injuries caused to his guest by a natural or artificial condition on the premises, where the host has actual knowledge of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to his guest and has reason to believe that the guest will not discover the condition or realize the risk, by the exercise of reasonable care, yet despite such circumstances, permits the guest to enter or remain on the premises, without exercising reasonable care to make the condition reasonably safe, or to warn the guest of the condition and the risk involved therein [citting numerous authorities].'

See also McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So.2d 185 (Fla.1957); Cochran v. Abercrombie, 118 So.2d 636, 79 A.L.R.2d 986 (Fla.App.1960); and Lowery v. Rosenberg, 147 So.2d 321 (Fla.App.1962).

On the other hand, if the injured person is legally classified as a licensee or trespasser, a different rule of liability may be applicable. These distinctions were clearly delineated by the Supreme Court of Florida in McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So.2d 185 (1957), as follows:

'As between an owner or occupant of premises and persons who come thereon the law recognizes, in general, three distinct and separate relationships. Persons occupying such relationships are classified as either invitees, licensees, or as trespassers.

'The duty owed by the owner or occupant of premises to each class of persons is also distinct. The duty owed by the owner or occupant to the trespasser is to refrain from committing a wilful or wanton injury against him with the rule being softened after discovery by the landowner of peril to the trespasser. Byers v. Gunn, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 723.

'The duty owed a licensee is to refrain from wanton negligence or wilful misconduct which would injure him, or to refrain from intentionally exposing him to danger. City of Boca Raton v. Mattef, Fla.1956, 91 So.2d 644. There may be a further duty to the licensee to warn him of a defect or condition known to the owner or occupant to be dangerous when such danger is not open to ordinary observation by the licensee. Goldberg v. Straus, Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 883; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 35 g; Prosser, Torts, Sec. 77, p. 450; Restatement, Torts, Sec. 342, Comment d.

'A greater duty is owed to an invitee than to either of the other class of persons above mentioned. The owner or occupant owes an invitee the duty of keeping the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and, as plaintiff contends, also to guard...