Cruz v. BD. OF ED. FOR CITY OF TRINIDAD SCH. DIST.
| Decision Date | 05 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 80-K-902. |
| Citation | 537 F. Supp. 292 |
| Parties | Agnes M. CRUZ, Helen T. Puryear, Mary Gutierrez, and Teadora A. Corral, Plaintiffs, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR the CITY OF TRINIDAD SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Trinidad, Colorado and Sam Madrid, Alfredo Malespini, Mamie Rope, Harry R. Sayre, Faye Underwood, Anthony Abeyta, Carl DeBono, Louise Terry, and Jack Dalton, individually and in their official capacities as members of the Defendant Board of Education, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Israel Galindo, Susan E. Perry, Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs.
Gerald A. Caplan, Alexander Halpern, Caplan & Earnest, Boulder, Colo., for defendants.
This is an action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of national origin. This court has jurisdiction to hear these claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1337, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), respectively.
The plaintiffs, all of whom are of hispanic ancestry, claim that the defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination since 1974. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants repeatedly refused to hire them for teaching positions for which they were otherwise qualified and instead hired lesser qualified white persons. This case is now before me on the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to rule 56(b), F.R. Civ.P. The defendants advance three arguments in support of their motion: (1) All of the plaintiffs' claims filed beyond either the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's (hereinafter "CCRC") 180-day limitations period or the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (hereinafter "EEOC") extended 300-day limitations period, are time-barred; (2) This court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims that are not specifically within the scope of their charges before the EEOC; and (3) The plaintiffs' claims that the defendants discriminated against them by hiring Darlene Gill, a white person with lesser qualifications, for the position of bilingual supervisor, fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted since the named defendants did not make that employment decision.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
When congress enacted Title VII it included certain mandatory administrative procedures with distinct time limitations for bringing employment discrimination claims. Among those procedures is the requirement of timely filing of charges before the EEOC as a prerequisite to maintaining a Title VII action in federal district court. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); Romero v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 615 F.2d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 1980). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) provides that:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) further provides that:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.
These two statutory provisions together require that parties in states with statutory and administrative mechanisms for processing employment discrimination claims first seek relief through the state agencies. In such states, commonly referred to as "deferral" states, see Hall v. Bd. County Com'rs of Frederick County, 509 F.Supp. 841, 844 (D.Md.1981), an aggrieved party may not file a charge with the EEOC until 60 days after proceedings are commenced in the state unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated. Further, the extended 300-day filing or limitation period for filing charges before the EEOC is applicable in all deferral states. Colorado is such a deferral state, having its own fair employment practices agency, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission ("CCRC"). See C.R.S. Title 24, Art. 34 (1973) as amended.
These statutory provisions raise several questions about the interaction of the state and federal enforcement schemes. Recognizing that lay persons might be confused by the availability of dual enforcement mechanisms, the EEOC developed a procedure for referring complaints to state agencies while simultaneously holding them in "suspended animation" — ready to be formally filed as charges at the close of either the state proceedings or the 60-day period mandated by § 2000e-5(c). The Supreme Court specifically approved this procedure in Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972), over objections that it constituted a manipulation of the filing date not sanctioned by the applicable state statute or regulations. See E.E.O.C. v. Delaware Trust Co., 416 F.Supp. 1040, 1042 (D.Del.1976).
Further, the Supreme Court has held that an action is not deemed "filed" with the EEOC until the end of the state "deferral period" (either 60 days or at the close of state proceedings). Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980). Accordingly, a party's attempt to file charges with the EEOC before the end of the state deferral period does not toll the 300-day extended period for filing charges before the EEOC in deferral states. The Mohasco holding is directly contrary to the Tenth Circuit's previous rule which had permitted such tolling. See Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 455 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1972).
The instant controversy raises two additional questions about the proper interpretation of §§ 2000e-5(c) and (e) and the interaction of the state and federal enforcement schemes. First, the defendants claim that all of the plaintiffs' claims that were filed with the CCRC beyond the six month, presumably 180-day, state filing period, see C.R.S. § 24-34-307(15) (1973) recodified in 1979 as § 24-34-403 (1981 Cum.Supp.), are time-barred, regardless of whether they were filed with the EEOC within the 300-day extended filing period provided in § 2000e-5(e). Second, the defendants claim that the Supreme Court's holding in Mohasco should be given retroactive effect and should therefore bar the plaintiffs' claims that would otherwise be timely under the Tenth Circuit's previous "tolling" rule in Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 455 F.2d at 1224-25.
The plaintiffs had first attempted to file their charges with the EEOC instead of the CCRC. The EEOC therefore, transmitted the charges to the CCRC and then held the charges in "suspended animation" for 60 days to allow the state to act under the procedure approved in Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972). The following table reflects the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' various claims should be time-barred.
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