Cruz v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 17 November 2022
• Docket Number: 16668,Index No. 33774/18E,Case No. 2021–03821
• Citation: 210 A.D.3d 523,179 N.Y.S.3d 25
• Parties: Angel CRUZ, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants–Respondents. City of New York et al., Third–Party Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. Komatsu America Corp., et al., Third–Party Defendants, Miller UK Ltd. et al., Third–Party Defendants–Appellants, HydraForce, Inc., et al., Third–Party Defendants–Respondents. [And Other Third-Party Actions]
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

210 A.D.3d 523

179 N.Y.S.3d 25

Angel CRUZ, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants–Respondents.

City of New York et al., Third–Party Plaintiffs–Respondents,

v.Komatsu America Corp., et al., Third–Party Defendants,Miller UK Ltd. et al., Third–Party Defendants–Appellants,HydraForce, Inc., et al., Third–Party Defendants–Respondents.

[And Other Third-Party Actions]

16668

Index No. 33774/18E

Case No. 2021–03821

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Entered November 17, 2022

Littleton Park Joyce Ughetta & Kelly LLP, New York (Michael H. Bai of counsel), for appellants.

Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for Angel Cruz, respondent.

Gerber Ciano Kelly Brady LLP, Garden City (Brendan T. Fitzpatrick of counsel), for City of New York, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and Delta Air Lines, Inc., respondents.

Gartner + Bloom, P.C., New York (Susan P. Mahon of counsel), for Hydraforce, Inc. and Hydraforce Hydraulic Systems (Changzhou) Co., Ltd., respondents.

Kern, J.P., Scarpulla, Rodriguez, Pitt, Higgitt, JJ.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), entered on or about April 13, 2021, which, to the extent appealed from, denied the motion of third-party defendants Miller UK Ltd (Miller UK) and Miller International Ltd. (Miller International; together, Miller parties) to dismiss the third-party complaint as against them for lack of personal jurisdiction, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the third-party complaint as against the Miller parties.

Plaintiff was injured when, while working on the Terminal D rehabilitation project at LaGuardia Airport, the bucket of an excavator, which was hoisting rebar and bundles, detached or decoupled and fell, striking him. He commenced this action in Bronx County and asserted Labor Law and common-law negligence claims, as well as a strict products liability claim. Defendants, in turn, commenced a third-party action against the Miller parties, among others, alleging, as relevant here, that the Miller parties defectively manufactured the coupler in the excavator that failed, and asserting claims for indemnification and contribution. As relevant here, the Miller parties’ co-third-party defendants, HydraForce, Inc. and HydraForce Hydraulic Systems, (Changzhou) Co., Ltd. (together, HydraForce parties), allegedly designed, manufactured, or sold a defective spool valve that was used in the Miller coupler, and which also failed at the time of plaintiff's accident.

The Miller parties’ motion to dismiss should have been granted on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction. As an initial matter, defendants have failed to establish general jurisdiction over the Miller parties. General jurisdiction exists over a corporate entity only in the state(s) in which it is incorporated and has its principal place of business (see Aybar v. Aybar, 37 N.Y.3d 274, 289, 156 N.Y.S.3d 104, 177 N.E.3d 1257 [2021] ; Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 24 N.Y.3d 149, 160 n. 4, 996 N.Y.S.2d 594, 21 N.E.3d 223 [2014], citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137–138, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 [2014] ). As Miller UK is a United Kingdom company with its principal place of business in the United Kingdom and Miller International is a Gibraltar company with its principal place of business in Gibraltar, there is no general jurisdiction over the Miller parties.

Defendants have also failed to establish specific jurisdiction over the Miller parties pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), CPLR 302(a)(3)(i) or CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). Although the Miller parties might have placed the coupler involved in plaintiff's accident into the stream of commerce, and while they tout having a global customer base and business model, the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that "the ‘fortuitous circumstance’ that a product sold in another state later makes its way into the forum jurisdiction through no marketing or other effort of [the] defendant," or " ‘the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum[,]’ cannot establish the requisite connection between [the] defendant and the forum" to...