La Cruz v. Irizarry

Citation946 F.Supp.2d 244
Decision Date12 April 2013
Docket NumberCivil No. 12–1837 (JAF).
PartiesMaricarmen DE LA CRUZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Yanitsia IRIZARRY, Waddy Mercado, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Alberto Acevedo–Colom, Alberto Acevedo Law Firm, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOSÉ ANTONIO FUSTÉ, District Judge.

In this case, a group of fathers and mothers, as well as their spouses and domestic partners, bring suit against Idalia Colón–Rondón, Secretary of Puerto Rico's Department of the Family; and Rosabelle Padín–Batista, Administrator of Puerto Rico's Child Support Administration.1 (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs style their suit as a writ of mandamus and a purported class action. ( Id. at 1–2.) Plaintiffs allege violations of the federal Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–485, 102 Stat. 245 (as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667); the Special Child Support Act of Puerto Rico, 8 L.P.R.A. §§ 501 et seq. (1988); and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Docket No. 1 at 5–6.) Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), claiming that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims.2 (Docket No. 10.) Plaintiffs oppose. (Docket No. 11.) For the following reasons, we grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I.Allegations

Plaintiffs are a group of fathers and mothers, as well as their spouses and domesticpartners, who are affected by the administration of child support in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs argue that under 42 U.S.C. § 667, Puerto Rico's Department of the Family and the Child Support Administration are obligated to “review” their child support guidelines every four years. (Docket No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, as directors of these agencies, have failed to comply with this obligation. ( Id.) Plaintiffs state that the last time these agencies reviewed their child support guidelines was on April 24, 2006.3 ( Id.) In particular, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' failure to review the child support guidelines violates a federal requirement that each state determine appropriate child support award amounts to be paid by non-custodial parents. ( Id. at 6.)

Plaintiffs allege that during the previous administration they made a request to Irizarry and Mercado, the former heads of the Department of the Family and Child Support Administration, to review the child support guidelines. ( Id.) Plaintiffs state that Irizarry and Mercado initiated a review of the guidelines in 2012, but then suspended the review, and failed to complete the process before they left their positions. (Docket No. 1 at 6.)

Plaintiffs further allege that in the new administration, Colón–Rondón and Padín–Batista have needlessly delayed the review process of the 2006 guidelines. (Docket No. 52.) Plaintiffs attach a newspaper article, published on March 20, 2013, in El Vocero newspaper, in which Padín–Batista states that it may take more than a year to finish the review process. 4 (Docket No. 52–1, translation at Docket No. 55–1.) Padín–Batista also states that her administration will have to assess all of the studies performed by the previous administration, and possibly hold public hearings. (Docket No. 52–1, translation at Docket No. 55–1.)

Plaintiffs argue that the Department of the Family's failure to review the guidelines since 2006, in addition to violating § 667, deprives them of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Docket No. 1 at 6–7.) Plaintiffs argue that because other states have complied with the requirement to review their child support guidelines every four years, while Puerto Rico has not, they are deprived equal protection of the laws relative to citizens of other states. ( Id. at 7.)

II.Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Standard

A defendant may move to dismiss an action against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are obligated to resolve questions pertaining to subject-matter jurisdiction before addressing the merits of a case. Acosta–Ramirez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 712 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2013) (citing Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir.2002)). Moreover, it is “black-letter law that a federal court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own subject matter jurisdiction.” McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2004) (citations omitted).

“When faced with motions to dismiss under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), a district court, absent good reason to do otherwise, should ordinarily decide the 12(b)(1) motion first.” Northeast Erectors Ass'n of BTEA v. Secretary of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 62 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir.1995) (citing 5A Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350, at 210 (1990)); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1945) (“Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.”). “It is not simply formalistic to decide the jurisdictional issue when the case would be dismissed in any event for failure to state a claim. Different consequences flow from dismissals under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6): for example, dismissal under the former, not being on the merits, is without res judicata effect.” Northeast Erectors, 62 F.3d at 39 (citing 2A James Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice 12.07, at 12–49 & n. 3 (1993)).

“When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, ‘the party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence.’ Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.1995)). Subject-matter jurisdiction is properly invoked when a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or law of the United States is pled. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Usually, a claim arises under federal law if a federal cause of action emerges from the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted).

Rule 12(b)(1) provides a “large umbrella, overspreading a variety of different types of challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction.” Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362–63 (1st Cir.2001). A movant may base a challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction solely on the pleadings. Id. at 363. In that case, we take the plaintiff's “jurisdictionally-significant facts as true” and “assess whether the plaintiff has propounded an adequate basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 363;see Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 197 (1st Cir.2000). On a motion under 12(b)(1), we may review materials outside the pleadings to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281 (1st Cir.2002) (citations omitted). When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) because of failure to state a federal constitutional claim, dismissal is proper only if a court determines that the claim is “frivolous” or “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 702, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (citations omitted). Such a determination must be “very plain” from the complaint. Id. (citations omitted).

III.Analysis

Defendants argue that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the merits of Plaintiffs' claim. (Docket No. 10.) Plaintiffs respond that this court should invoke its mandamus power under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. (Docket No. 11.) Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100–485 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 652, 660, 667), confers jurisdiction on this court. (Docket No. 11 at 2.) For the reasons discussed below, we find there is no jurisdiction under either of these avenues.

This is not the end of our inquiry, however. Although neither party presented arguments under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), it appears that Plaintiffs' claim fits squarely within this jurisdictional doctrine. Plaintiffs seek an injunction from this court that would require Defendants to comply with § 667.5 (Docket No. 1 at 10–11.) This appears to be well within the court's jurisdiction under Ex Parte Young. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (a “federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury.”) Because neither party has raised the issue, we will grant leave to the parties to brief the question of whether jurisdiction exists under Ex Parte Young. First, though, we consider whether any of the Plaintiffs' other arguments for jurisdiction are availing.

We begin our analysis with the statute that Plaintiffs seek to enforce. 42 U.S.C. § 667 provides:

Each State, as a condition for having its State plan approved under this part, must establish guidelines for child support award amounts within the State. The guidelines may be established by law or by judicial or administrative action, and shall be reviewed at least once every 4 years to ensure that their application results in the determination of appropriate child support award amounts.

Id.

The word “plan” refers to a plan under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program (“TANF”), administered by the United States Department of...

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