Cruz v. Jackson Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs.

Decision Date23 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 2010–CA–01119–SCT.,2010–CA–01119–SCT.
Citation133 So.3d 335
PartiesIn Interest of R.J.M.B., a minor: Cirila Baltazar Cruz v. Jackson County Department of Human Services.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Monica Ramirez, Michelle R. Lapointe, Vanessa Judith Carroll, Amanda Jane Proctor, William R. Wright, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.

Courtney A. Schloemer, M. Earl Scales, Jackson, Kurt Steven Saul, Jr., attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

WALLER, Chief Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. After being separated from her newborn infant for more than a year, Cirila Baltazar Cruz received an award of full legal and physical custody of her child from the Youth Court of Jackson County. The youth court further ordered that its proceedings and records remain confidential and that those present at the final hearing refrain from speaking to the media about the case. We find that the youth court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the youth-court records remain confidential; however, the youth court failed to apply the proper legal standard when it issued the gag order. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse and render in part.

FACTS

¶ 2. Cirila Baltazar Cruz is from Oaxaca, Mexico. Her native language is Chatino. The Chatino language predates European arrival in the New World and is spoken by less than 40,000 people in the world. Other than Chatino, Cruz speaks a very limited amount of Spanish and almost no English.

¶ 3. On November 16, 2008, Cruz gave birth to Baby Doe 1 at Singing River Hospital in Pascagoula, Mississippi. During her hospital stay, Cruz tried to communicate with medical personnel through a Spanish interpreter. The interpreter understood Cruz to have said several alarming things. She purportedly said that her husband had abandoned her; that she was living with an Asian woman and the Asian woman's sixteen-year-old daughter; that she was having sex in exchange for rent; and that she might put her newborn child up for adoption. Cruz's statements, it turned out, had been misinterpreted. Nevertheless, based on this information, the hospital contacted the Jackson County Department of Human Services (JCDHS).

¶ 4. A JCDHS social worker and an interpreter contacted Cruz at the hospital. During their interview with her, they understood Cruz to reiterate what she had told hospital personnel. Following this interview, the JCDHS social worker filed a minor's complaint report. On November 18, 2008, the Youth Court of Jackson County ordered that Baby Doe be taken into the custody of JCDHS.

¶ 5. Cruz did not regain physical custody of Baby Doe until one year later, on November 19, 2009. She did not receive full legal and physical custody until March 5, 2010.

¶ 6. At the final hearing, the youth court stated that it wanted its final order to reflect that the proceedings were to remain confidential. The court added that it did not want anyone present at the hearingto talk to the press about the matter. Cruz, at that point, reserved her objection to any continuation of confidentiality.

¶ 7. Weeks later, on March 23, 2010, the youth court entered an order of confidentiality. The order stated, in pertinent part, that:

ON THIS THE 19th DAY OF February, 2010 THIS MATTER comes before the Court Ex mero motu and the Court finds that [Baby Doe] is under the jurisdiction of this Court and that venue is proper; and further upon considering the nature of the proceedings, the welfare, safety and best interest of [Baby Doe], that there is no legitimate interest in allowing public access to these proceedings and that this Youth Court case and all proceedings heard herein shall remain confidential pursuant to U.R.Y.C.P. 5(b) and Miss.Code Ann. 43–21–261, and further this Court Orders that no one in the hearing this date shall disclose information concerning this case to the Media.

Cruz responded by filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. She requested that the order of confidentiality be set aside: She wanted to be able to discuss the case publicly and to share documents and transcripts from the proceedings. The youth court denied her motion. The court said that none of the parties had objected to the confidentiality order and found that it was not in Baby Doe's best interest to set aside that order absent some reason under Section 43–21–261 of the Mississippi Code.

¶ 8. Cruz now requests that this Court vacate the confidentiality order.

DISCUSSION

¶ 9. To succeed on a Rule 59(e) motion, the movant must show: (i) an intervening change in controlling law, (ii) availability of new evidence not previously available, or (iii) need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.” Brooks v. Roberts, 882 So.2d 229, 233 (Miss.2004) (citing Bang v. Pittman, 749 So.2d 47, 52–53 (Miss.1999), overruled on other grounds by Cross Creek Prod. v. Scafidi, 911 So.2d 958, 960 (Miss.2005)). A trial court's denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Roberts, 882 So.2d at 233 (citing Bang, 749 So.2d at 52).

¶ 10. The youth court's confidentiality order had two effects. First, it required that Doe's youth-court records remain confidential. Second, it prohibited those present at the final hearing from speaking to the media about the case. Cruz argues that she either waived record confidentiality, or that it is now moot. Further, she contends that the order's speech restriction violated her First Amendment rights.

I. Record confidentiality neither has been waived, nor is it moot.
A. Youth-court records are confidential under Mississippi law.

¶ 11. Youth-court records include the general docket, papers, pleadings, social records, the minute book, proceedings, evidence, and any information obtained by the youth court from the Administrative Office of Courts. Miss.Code Ann. § 43–21–251(1)(a)(f) (Rev.2009). These records “and the contents thereof shall be kept confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in Section 43–21–261.” Miss.Code Ann. § 43–21–251(2) (Rev.2009).

¶ 12. Section 43–21–261 governs the disclosure of youth-court records. Miss.Code Ann. § 43–21–261 (Rev.2009). This statute provides that [r]ecords involving children shall not be disclosed, ... except pursuant to an order of the youth court specifying the person or persons to whom the records may be disclosed, the extent of the records which may be disclosed and the purpose of the disclosure.” Miss.Code Ann. § 43–21–261(1) (Rev.2009). Orders for disclosure, furthermore, must be “limited to those instances in which the youth court concludes, in its discretion, that disclosure is required for the best interests of the child, the public safety or the functioning of the youth court.” Id.

¶ 13. Even when the youth court determines that disclosure is warranted, the information can be provided only to certain persons or agencies. Miss.Code Ann. § 43–21–261(1)(a)(g) (Rev.2009). The minor, the minor's parents, and the parents' attorney also have the right to copy and/or inspect youth-court records. Miss.Code Ann. § 43–21–261(3)(4) (Rev.2009). Once disclosed, the person or agency must keep the records confidential unless the youth court's order allows otherwise. Miss.Code Ann. § 43–21–261(2) (Rev.2009).

¶ 14. None of Section 43–21–261's exceptions apply here. Essentially then, the youth court's order that Baby Doe's youth-court records remain confidential was redundant. Her records would have remained confidential regardless, unless the youth court had ordered otherwise.

B. Cruz has not waived record confidentiality.

¶ 15. Cruz argues that the confidentiality of youth-court records may be waived and asserts two reasons why a waiver is proper here. First, Cruz asserts that she, as Baby Doe's parent, has the constitutional right to direct the upbringing of her daughter. This includes, she argues, the right to waive record confidentiality if she determines that such a waiver is in her daughter's best interest. Second, Cruz contends that she waived record confidentiality by filing a civil suit in federal district court over JCDHS's handling of the custody matter.2

1. Cruz does not have a parental right to expressly waive the confidentiality of Baby Doe's youth-court records.

¶ 16. Cruz argues that she has a parental right to waive the confidentiality of Baby Doe's youth-court records. Yet, the cases she cites as support—Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)—are unpersuasive. In Pierce, the United States Supreme Court held that an Oregon law requiring children ages eight to ten to attend public schools “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” Pierce, 268 U.S. at 529, 534–35, 45 S.Ct. 571. In Meyer, the Court struck down a Nebraska law requiring every subject to be taught in English and forbidding the teaching of any language except English before the eighth grade. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400, 43 S.Ct. 625. While Pierce and Meyer affirm parents' rights to direct and control the upbringing and education of their children, neither supports that this right includes a right to waive the confidentiality of their child's youth-court records.

¶ 17. Cruz cannot waive the confidentiality of Baby Doe's youth-court records just because she is Doe's parent and wishes to do so. Under Section 43–21–261(1), a youth court can disclose youth-court records only if it determines that “disclosure is required for the best interests of the child, the public safety or the functioning of the youth court....” Miss.Code Ann. § 43–21–261(1) (Rev.2009). Anyone seeking disclosure under Section 43–21–261(1), including a parent, must prove one of these conditions. Parental status alone is not sufficient.

2. Cruz did not waive confidentiality by filing a related...

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1 books & journal articles
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    • United States
    • University of Georgia School of Law Georgia Law Review (FC Access) No. 56-1, 2021
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