Cruz v. Jimenez Constr.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20-1978 (EGS) |
| Parties | CARLOS N. ANTUNEZ CRUZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JIMENEZ CONSTRUCTION LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Carlos N. Antunez Cruz (“Mr. Cruz”) and Ruth Nicolle Lopez Villalta (“Ms. Villalta”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”); the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act, D.C. Code § 32-1001 et seq. (“DCMWRA”); and the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Wage Collection Law, D.C. Code §§ 32-1301 et seq. (“DCWPWCL”). See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. They have sued two groups of defendants to recover unpaid wages and for damages: Jimenez Construction LLC, Arian Jimenez, Dennise Vasquez-Martinez (collectively, the “Jiminez Defendants”); and Mid-Atlantic Military Family Communities LLC and Mid-Atlantic San Diego LLC (collectively, the “Mid-Atlantic Defendants”). See id. The Court refers to the Jiminez Defendants and the Mid-Atlantic Defendants collectively as the “Defendants.”
Pending before the Court is the Mid-Atlantic Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, see Mot Dismiss Pls.' Compl., ECF No. 10; to which the Jimenez Construction Defendants “consent”, see Co-Defendants' Response, ECF No. 12. Upon careful consideration of the motion, the opposition, and reply thereto, the applicable law, the entire record herein, and for the reasons explained below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
The Court assumes the following facts alleged in the complaint to be true for the purposes of deciding the Motion to Dismiss and construes them in Plaintiffs' favor. See Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs allege that they were hired by Defendants to work on projects that were covered by the Davis-Bacon Act (“DBA”), 40 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 12. Mr. Cruz alleges that he was hired to be a “Painter” and that he also performed duties of a “Carpenter,” but that Defendants never paid him the DBA wages for a “Painter” or for a “Carpenter.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. Ms. Villalta alleges that when she worked for Defendants, she performed work as a janitor or a “Painter,” but that Defendants never paid her the DBA wages for a “Painter.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.
Aside from the allegations regarding Defendants' failure to pay applicable DBA wages, Plaintiffs also allege the non-DBA hourly rates they were actually paid. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. With regard to the non-DBA rates, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the FLSA, the DCMWRA, and the DCWPWCL by failing to pay them all the overtime they were owed and failing to pay them for all of the hours they worked. Id. ¶¶ 29, 36, 42.
The Davis-Bacon Act is “a minimum wage law designed for the benefit of construction workers.” United States v. Binghamton Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 178 (1954). It “was ‘designed to protect local wage standards by preventing contractors from basing their bids on wages lower than those prevailing in the area.'” Univs. Rsch. Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 773 (1981) (quoting H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., Legislative History of the Davis-Bacon Act, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (Comm. Print 1962)). Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary of Labor sets “prevailing” minimum wage rates for various classes of workers, which contractors must pay on federally- and District of Columbia-funded contracts in excess of $2,000. 40 U.S.C. §§ 3142(a)-(b). The DBA authorizes the Department of Labor (“DOL”) to withhold accrued payments to contractors as “necessary to pay to laborers and mechanics employed by the contractor or any subcontractor on the work the difference between the rates of wages required by the contract to be paid . . . and the rates of wages received.” Id. § 3142(c)(3). DOL regulations set forth an administrative process through which workers may obtain unpaid wages and damages, see 29 C.F.R. § 5.11; and the statute provides a right of action for workers “if the accrued payments withheld under the terms of the contract are insufficient to reimburse” them, 40 U.S.C. § 3144(a)(2).
The FLSA provides, among other things, that “no employer shall employ any of his [covered] employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). An employee's “regular rate” is “deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee, but shall not be deemed to include” various items such as gifts, vacation and sick pay, various insurance payments, and certain other exempted items. Id. § 207(e). Employers who violate §§ 206 and 207 are liable “in the amount of [the employee's] unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Id. § 216(b). Finally, the FLSA authorizes a private right of action for aggrieved employees: “An action to recover the liability prescribed in the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” Id.
The DCMWRA mirrors the FLSA. Subject to certain exemptions, the DCMWRA prohibits any employer from “employ[ing] any employee for a workweek that is longer than 40 hours, unless the employee receives compensation for employment in excess of 40 hours at a rate not less than 1 times the regular rate at which the employee is employed.” D.C. Code § 32-1003(c). Violators are subject to steep penalties: “[A]ny employer who pays any employee less than the wage to which that employee is entitled under this subchapter shall be liable to that employee in the amount of the unpaid wages, statutory penalties, and an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to treble the amount of unpaid wages.” Id. § 32-1012(b)(1). The DCMWRA also creates a private right of action for aggrieved employees. See id. §§ 32-1012(a), 32-1308.
The DCWPWCL requires employers to pay employees “all wages earned” on regular paydays. D.C. Code § 32-1302. It defines “wages” as “all monetary compensation after lawful deductions, owed by an employer, whether the amount owed is determined on a time, task, piece, commission, or other basis of calculation.” Id. § 32-1301(3). “Wages” include “[o]ther remuneration promised or owed ... [p]ursuant to District or federal law,” as well as pursuant to “a contract for employment, whether written or oral” or “a contract between an employer and another person or entity.” Id. § 32-1301(3)(E); see also id. § 32-1301(3)(A)-(D) (further defining wages to include bonuses, commissions, fringe benefits paid in cash, and overtime premiums). The DCWPCL provides that, “[i]n enforcing the provisions of this chapter, the remuneration promised by an employer to an employee shall be presumed to be at least the amount required by federal law, including federal law requiring the payment of prevailing wages, or by District law.” Id. § 32-1305. The DCWPCL authorizes a private right of action and, like the DCMWA, there are steep consequences for violations, including treble damages. Id. § 32-1308.
On September 9, 2020, the Mid-Atlantic Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See generally Mot. Dismiss Pls.' Compl., ECF No. 10; Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Pls.' Compl. Failure State Claim (“MTD”), ECF No. 10-1. The Jimenez Defendants consented to the Motion to Dismiss. See Co-Defs.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Pls.' Compl., ECF No. 12. Plaintiffs filed their opposition, see Pls.' Mem. in Opp'n to Mid-Atlantic Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Compl. (“Opp'n”), ECF No. 14; and the Mid-Atlantic Defendants thereafter filed a reply, see Reply in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Pls.' Compl. Failure State Claim (“Reply”), ECF No. 15. The motion is ripe and ready for adjudication.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, [the Court] may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the...
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