Cruz v. Starbucks Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. C-10-01868 JCS |
| Parties | ROBERT CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Robert Cruz brought this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ("ADA") and California state law. Having prevailed in the action, Cruz now brings a Motion For An Award of Attorney Fees, Litigation Expenses and Costs ("the Motion") pursuant to § 505 of the ADA, California Civil Code Section 55 and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. Plaintiff requests $187,020.00 in attorney fees and costs. The Court finds that the Motion is suitable for determination without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Plaintiff is awarded $145,960.07 in attorneys' fees and $3,960.50 in costs.1
This action was initiated by Robert Cruz, who is physically disabled and requires the use of a wheelchair, based on the allegation that he was denied full and equal access to a Starbucks coffee shop, located at 4096 - 18th Street in San Francisco. He sought damages and injunctive relief andobtained both. In particular, Plaintiff's lawsuit resulted in: 1) a Consent Decree under which Defendants agreed to take remedial measures to ensure access; and 2) an agreement for Defendants to pay statutory damages in the amount of $43,000. See Declaration of Paul L. Rein in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Costs ("Rein Motion Decl.") ¶¶ 5-6.
The Consent Decree was entered by the Court on September 21, 2011 and the corrective measures set forth in it were to be completed by March 15, 2012. See Declaration of Terrie Tate in Support of Defendants' Motion to Continue Consent Decree Deadlines ("Tate Decl."), ¶ 5. After that deadline had passed, on March 22, 2012, Defendants informed Plaintiff, for the first time, that they would not be able to complete the construction on time because the corrective measures required more structural work than anticipated. Declaration of Shane Singh to Support Defendants' Motion to Continue Consent Decree Deadlines ("Singh Decl."). There is evidence in the record that Defendants had been aware of the problem in late January of 2012, when they received plans from their architects for the corrective work, but had not given Plaintiff timely notice as required under the Consent Decree. Tate Decl., ¶ 7.
In May 2012, Defendants brought a motion to continue the consent decree deadlines. At that point, Defendants anticipated that construction -- which had not yet begun -- would commence on August 5, 2012 and would be completed by the end of August. Tate Decl., ¶ 12. Plaintiff opposed the motion citing, inter alia, Defendants' failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Consent Decree. The Court granted the motion and continued the deadline for completion to August 31, 2012, but cautioned Defendants "to abide by all of the terms of the Consent Decree -- particularly those relating to notice -- and to timely notify both Plaintiff and this Court of any possible future delays within 15 days of their discovery and prior to the expiration of the August 31, 2012 deadline." Docket No. 69. As of December 31, 2012, the parties agreed that all of the corrective measures required under the Consent Decree had been completed. Declaration of Catherine Cabalo in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Costs ("Cabalo Motion Decl.") at 10.
In the Motion, Plaintiff seeks fees for work performed in this action by attorneys Paul Rein, Celia McGuiness, and Catherine Cabalo, and by paralegal Aaron Clefton. Motion at 24. In particular, Plaintiff requests the Court award fees as follows:
Id. Plaintiff has provided the declarations of Rein, McGuiness, Cabalo and Clefton, as well as their timesheets, in support of his request. In addition, he has provided declarations by civil rights attorneys Christopher Whelan and Sid Wolinsky addressing the reasonableness of the time and rates sought by Plaintiff in this action, as well as declarations by Larry Paradis, Brian Gearinger and John Burris that were submitted in other actions addressing the reasonableness of the rates sought by Plaintiff's counsel.
Plaintiff also seeks an award of the following litigation expenses:
In their opposition, Defendants outline the history of the case and suggest that Plaintiff unnecessarily increased the fees incurred in the action by opposing Defendants' request that the Consent Decree deadline be continued. Opposition at 4. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable fees and costs for the work of counsel and his experts on this case, whether incurred before or after the parties entered into the Consent Decree. However, they have submitted an expert report by James Schratz, whose firm conducts audits involving plaintiff fee requests in cases where fee-shifting is permitted, in which numerous specific objections to Plaintiff's fees and costs are raised. Declaration of James P. Schratz in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees ("Schratz Decl.") ¶¶ 1, 4, 5. Defendants incorporate the arguments of Schratz into their Opposition.
Schratz asserts that Plaintiff's fees should be reduced as follows:2
Schratz also asserts that Plaintiff is seeking $3,532.00 in litigation expenses and opines that this amount should be reduced to $647.50, to cover the process server fee and filing fee only because there is insufficient information provided as to: 1) copy costs (, the cost per page); 2) research and investigation (allegedly "lacks any supporting information as to date of service, matter researched, or its purpose or relationship to the case"); 3) Federal Express/overnight mail costs ("a showing of need for expedited service is helpful"); 4) local travel costs (generally not recoverable and sparsely documented). Id. at 35-36. Mr. Schratz does not address Plaintiff's request for fees incurred by access experts Peter Margen and Karl Danz.4
In his Reply, Plaintiff objects to the Schratz declaration and opposition brief on numerous grounds. As to the brief itself, Plaintiff notes that it is replete with factual representations but is unsupported by a sworn declaration verifying those facts. Reply at 1. Therefore, Plaintiff requests that all of the factual representations in the opposition brief be stricken.5 Id. Plaintiff asserts that the Schratz declaration is improper because Schratz has not demonstrated that he has experience with fee awards in disability access cases or familiarity with the prevailing rates for disability access attorneys practicing in the Northern District of California. Id. at 2. Further, Plaintiff contends the factual allegations in the Schratz declaration regarding the background of the instant action are improper because they are not based on personal knowledge. Id. Therefore, Plaintiffasks the Court to strike both the factual representations and the conclusions contained in the Schratz declaration.6 Id.
With respect to the proposed reductions set forth in the Schratz Declaration, Plaintiff argues that they should be rejected for the following reasons:
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