Cruz v. State
| Decision Date | 28 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D17-4284 |
| Citation | 262 So.3d 244 |
| Parties | Richard Delgado CRUZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard Delgado Cruz, pro se.
No appearance for appellee.
Richard Delgado Cruz timely appeals a final order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief, which he filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm the postconviction court's order to the extent it denies relief on grounds one and three of the motion without further discussion. We reverse the denial of relief on ground two and remand for further proceedings.
Mr. Cruz was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery while in actual possession of a firearm, robbery with a firearm while in actual possession of a firearm, three counts of kidnapping to facilitate a felony, and three counts of sexual battery with a firearm while in actual possession of a firearm following a jury trial. Ultimately, Mr. Cruz received eight consecutive life sentences for his offenses, with mandatory minimum ten-year terms imposed on each of the offenses for which he actually possessed a firearm, to run concurrently. We affirmed Mr. Cruz's appeal from his judgment and sentences.1
Cruz v. State, 160 So.3d 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Thereafter, he filed the instant motion for postconviction relief.
"When reviewing the summary denial of a motion for postconviction relief, this court applies de novo review and ‘must accept the movant's factual allegations as true to the extent that they are not refuted by the record.’ " Martin v. State, 205 So.3d 811, 812 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (quoting Jennings v. State, 123 So.3d 1101, 1121 (Fla. 2013) ). "[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient." Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000) ; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f).
The purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. To plead a facially sufficient claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must plead sufficient facts to establish that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced thereby. Martin, 205 So.3d at 812 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). With respect to the deficiency prong, a defendant must overcome a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. With respect to the prejudice prong, the defendant Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If a claim fails on either the deficiency or prejudice prong, the postconviction court can deny the claim. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In ground two of his motion, Mr. Cruz alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely and adequately object when the State's DNA expert, Robyn Ragsdale, testified regarding the statistical analysis of a DNA match for a profile she developed from evidence taken from the crime scene. He alleged that at trial, the DNA evidence was the primary basis for identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the offenses. Mr. Cruz pointed out that his counsel objected to Ms. Ragsdale's testimony about the statistical component prematurely, before the State qualified her and laid the predicate for the admission of that testimony, and the trial court overruled the objection. Thereafter, he alleged, the State failed to elicit testimony from Ms. Ragsdale to demonstrate that she was qualified to testify about the statistical component of the DNA testing or to lay the predicate for the admission of her testimony about her statistical analysis. More specifically, the State never elicited testimony from Ms. Ragsdale to demonstrate that she had sufficient knowledge of the DNA database or what formula was used to perform the statistical analysis.
Mr. Cruz asserted that had defense counsel made a timely and adequate objection, the court would have required the State to establish the proper predicate for the admission of her testimony. If it could not do so, he alleged, the trial court would have precluded Ms. Ragsdale from testifying about the statistical component of the DNA match and the outcome of the trial would have been different. Citing to Perdomo v. State, 829 So.2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), Mr. Cruz requested an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proper predicate could be laid for Ms. Ragsdale's testimony about the statistical analysis. Thereafter, the postconviction court could determine whether his convictions should stand or whether he was entitled to a new trial.2
The postconviction court denied relief on ground two, observing that when Ms. Ragsdale began to testify about the statistical component of the DNA analysis, trial counsel made an objection that Ms. Ragsdale was not an expert in statistical analysis and the objection was overruled. Thereafter, "Ms. Ragsdale went on to explain that statistical analysis is commonly done and that she has been conducting such analysis since 1996." The postconviction court found that a subsequent objection along the same lines would not likely have been successful. Thus, it concluded that Mr. Cruz failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice.
The postconviction court's legal conclusion that the foregoing testimony was sufficient to establish the admissibility of Ms. Ragsdale's testimony about the statistical analysis of the DNA profile she developed is incorrect and fails to refute Mr. Cruz's claim that his counsel's performance was deficient. In addition, the record does not conclusively refute Mr. Cruz's claim of prejudice, in that as a result of his trial counsel's failure to properly object, the State never established the proper predicate for the admission of the primary evidence used to obtain his conviction, thereby undermining confidence that Mr. Cruz received a fair trial with a just and reliable outcome.
In Florida, DNA testing is a two-step process that includes a biochemical component and a statistical component. Butler v. State, 842 So.2d 817, 827 (Fla. 2003). A biochemical analysis is employed to determine whether two DNA samples look alike, then a statistical analysis is employed to determine the frequency of that profile in the population. Id. at 827-28 (citing Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1997) ). Simply establishing that two patterns match without offering any scientifically valid estimate of the frequency with which such matches might occur by chance in the population is meaningless. Brim, 695 So.2d at 270. Because a juror's understanding about how unusual a DNA profile is could be wrong, testimony about DNA analysis must go beyond a simple statement of the occurrence of a match and must provide the trier of fact with expert guidance about its probative value. Id.
In order for testimony about the statistical component of DNA to be admitted, the judge must determine that the witness is qualified to present the testimony. Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 164 (Fla. 1997) (citing Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 1995) ). Although a witness need not be a statistician or a mathematician to testify about the statistical significance of a DNA match, Perdomo, 829 So.2d at 283, the witness must demonstrate "a sufficient knowledge of the [population] database grounded in the study of authoritative sources," Butler, 842 So.2d at 828 (quoting Murray, 692 So. 2d at 164). In addition, the witness must identify the method used to calculate the frequency statistics so that the judge may determine whether the method used is generally accepted in the scientific community in accordance with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).3 Butler, 842 So.2d at 827-28 ; Murray, 692 So.2d at 161-62 ; Brim, 695 So.2d at 271-72. It is the burden of the proponent of the evidence to establish that the witness is qualified to report the frequency statistics and that frequency statistics satisfy the requirements of Frye. Murray, 692 So.2d at 161, 164.
The record attachments to the postconviction court's order reflect that when Ms. Ragsdale began to testify about her statistical analysis, counsel objected because the State had "not established through the testimony that she's an expert in statistical analysis." That objection was not entirely accurate because a witness need not be a statistician or mathematician to testify about the statistical significance of a DNA match. Perdomo, 829 So.2d at 283. The trial court overruled the objection. Ms. Ragsdale proceeded to testify that she was "familiar with the type of statistical analysis," that it was "something that is commonly done" in her profession, that she had been "performing statistical analysis ... since 1996," and that it is "part and parcel of what" she does. Thereafter, Ms. Ragsdale provided the statistical data for the DNA profiles that she developed in the case without further objection.
Although the record...
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