Cruz v. United Auto. Workers Union Local 2300, 3:18-CV-0048 (GTS/ML)
| Decision Date | 18 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | 3:18-CV-0048 (GTS/ML) |
| Parties | CARLOS LEONEL CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS UNION LOCAL 2300; TOMPKINS CONSOLIDATED AREA TRANSIT, INC.; JASON DAVID, President, UAW Local 2300; DOES 2-10; and FRANK HOWELLS, Union Representative, UWA Local 2300, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
TECHNOLOGY LAW GROUP, LLC
Counsel for Plaintiff
NEIL S. ENDE, ESQ.
ROBERT G. WELLS, ESQ.
KENNETH L. WAGNER, ESQ.
JOHN T. McCANN, ESQ.
EMILY MIDDLEBROOK, ESQ.
Currently before the Court, in this labor rights action filed by Carlos Leonel Cruz ("Plaintiff") against the United Automobile Workers Union Local 2300, Jason David, and Frank Howells, ("Union Defendants"), Tompkins Consolidated Area Transit ("TCAT"), and Does 2-10, are the following four motions: (1) the Union Defendants' partial motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; (2) Defendant TCAT's partial motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; (3) Plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude certain evidence; and (4) Plaintiff's motion to amend the Amended Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 51, 53, 55, 67.)1 For the reasons set forth below, the Union Defendants' motion is granted, Defendant TCAT's motion is granted, Plaintiff's motion in limine is denied, and Plaintiff's motion to amend is denied.
Generally, in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts ten causes of action. (Dkt. No. 45 [Pl.'s Am. Compl.].) First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant UAW Local 2300 breached its duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). (Id. at ¶¶ 50-61.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant UAW Local 2300's refusal to pursue his grievance against Defendant TCAT was (a) arbitrary and indefensible in that it was not the byproduct of a proper application of the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), union procedures, or a consideration of the facts, (b) made in bad faith and with discriminatory animus based on Plaintiff's race and/or ethnic origin, and (c) reckless, irrational, outrageous, willful, and malicious. (Id.)
Second, Plaintiff claims that Defendant TCAT breached the CBA in violation of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). (Id. at ¶¶ 62-70.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, when choosing to terminate Plaintiff's employment, Defendant TCAT failed to undertake a process of progressive discipline, including warnings and advanced notice, as required by the CBA . (Id.)
Third, Plaintiff claims that Defendants UAW Local 2300, David, and TCAT engaged in tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress by engaging a pattern of extreme and outrageous conduct including (a) failing and refusing to act in a forthright and honest manner, (b) misleading Plaintiff into believing he would be rehired, (c) terminating him on the basis of wrongdoing despite soliciting testimony from him to establish an absence of wrongdoing, (d) publishing a termination notice that falsely accused him of wrongdoing, (e) terminating him on short notice during the holiday season, (f) promising him they would pursue his grievance, and (g) physically threatening, intimidating, and being openly hostile to Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 71-78.)
Fourth, Plaintiff claims that the Union Defendants and Defendant TCAT engaged in tortious negligent infliction of emotional distress based on essentially the same conduct described with relation to his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at ¶¶ 79-84.)
Fifth, Plaintiff claims that Defendants TCAT and Does 2-10 engaged in defamation or defamation per se by publishing to numerous third parties the false statement that the accident that resulted in Plaintiff's termination was "preventable based on failure to observe Ms. Stedwell in the crosswalk." (Id. at ¶¶ 85-98.)
Sixth, Plaintiff claims that Defendants UAW Local 2300 and David engaged in intentional misrepresentation, fraud, and civil conspiracy by providing false or misleading statements to Plaintiff, including repeated promises to pursue his grievance if a settlement was not reached and failing to advise him of exhaustion requirements contained in the UAW Constitution. (Id. at ¶¶ 99-117.)
Seventh, Plaintiff claims that the Union Defendants engaged in negligent misrepresentation and civil conspiracy based on the same statements and omissions underlying his claim for intentional misrepresentation. (Id. at ¶¶ 118-37.)
Eighth, Plaintiff claims that the Union Defendants engaged in fraud by concealment by withholding critical information from Plaintiff about his rights and obligations under the CBA and the UAW Constitution, including his need to exhaust his remedies with the union before commencing legal action. (Id. at ¶¶ 138-54.)
Ninth, Plaintiff claims that Defendant UAW Local 2300 breached its equitable duty to represent Plaintiff by withholding critical information regarding his rights and obligations under the CBA and the UAW Constitution, including his need to exhaust his remedies under the Union agreements before commencing legal action. (Id. at ¶¶ 155-61.) More specifically, Plaintiff claims that it would be inequitable to allow Defendant Local 2300 to enforce any provision that requires exhaustion of remedies where it failed to disclose such requirement to Plaintiff, and that the commencement date for exhaustion should be tolled to allow Plaintiff to exhaust his remedies. (Id.)
Tenth, Plaintiff claims that Defendant UAW Local 2300 should be estopped from enforcing any provision of the UAW Constitution that requires exhaustion of remedies because the Union Defendants breached their duty to give truthful information and accurate advice when they "repeatedly made express and unqualified promises" that they would pursue a grievance. (Id. at ¶¶ 162-72.) As with his equitable estoppel claim, Plaintiff claims that the commencement date for exhausting his remedies should be tolled based on this breach. (Id. at ¶ 169.)
Plaintiff failed to submit a response to the Union Defendants' Statement of Material Facts as required by Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) and therefore the facts asserted in that Statement of Material Facts have all been deemed admitted to the extent they are supported by evidence. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3) ( )
1. Defendant Local 2300 represents a bargaining unit of approximately 85 bus operators, bus handlers, and mechanics employed by Defendant TCAT and it has approximately 1,200 members in total.
2. Defendant Local 2300 and Defendant TCAT have been parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements that cover the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees; the agreement that was in effect during the relevant events in this litigation was effective for the period from January 1, 2015, to June 30, 2018, and contained a grievance procedure that culminates in final and binding arbitration.
3. Plaintiff was employed as a bus operator by Defendant TCAT from 2010 until his termination from employment on November 16, 2016, and was a member of Defendant Local 2300.
4. On January 26, 2015, Plaintiff was involved in an accident while driving a TCAT bus, the result of which was that a pedestrian was killed.
5. Following an investigation, Defendant TCAT terminated Plaintiff's employment, citing its accident review committee's conclusion that the accident was preventable.
6. Defendant Local 2300 filed a grievance challenging Plaintiff's termination, which was processed in December 2016 and January 2017; a mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service assisted the parties in attempting to resolve the grievance and a tentative agreement on the principal terms was reached at the mediation session in January 2017.
7. A draft written settlement was circulated and revised over the course of several months; Defendants Local 2300 and TCAT agreed to the written terms, but Plaintiff ultimately declined to execute the agreement.
8. In the absence of Plaintiff's approval of the agreement, Defendant TCAT withdrew its offer and Defendant Local 2300 withdrew its grievance; in July 2017 (before the deadline set by Defendant TCAT for Plaintiff's execution of the agreement), Defendant Local 2300 had advised Plaintiff that it would not submit the grievance to arbitration.
9. The decision to withdraw (rather than arbitrate) Plaintiff's grievance was made by Defendant Local 2300's executive board; the question of whether to arbitrate his grievance was not put before the membership.
10. Defendant Local 2300 is an unincorporated association.
11. Membership in Defendant Local 2300 is voluntary for eligible workers employed by an employer that has a collective bargaining relationship with Defendant Local 2300; under Defendant Local 2300's by-laws, the executive officers of the Union include its president and financial secretary/treasurer and the executive board is empowered to act on...
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