Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins

• Decision Date: 16 September 1949
• Docket Number: 7134
• Citation: 116 Utah 314,209 P.2d 739
• Parties: CRYSTAL LIME & CEMENT CO. v. ROBBINS et al
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

209 P.2d 739

116 Utah 314

CRYSTAL LIME & CEMENT CO. v. ROBBINS et al

No. 7134

Supreme Court of Utah

September 16, 1949

E L. Schoenhals, Salt Lake City, Golden W Robbins, Salt Lake City, for appellants.

Cyrus G. Gatrell, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

Wolfe Justice. Wade and McDonough, JJ., concur. Pratt, Chief Justice (dissenting in part). Latimer, Justice (dissenting).

OPINION

Wolfe Justice.

Action by the plaintiff and respondent, Crystal Lime & Cement Co., against the defendants and appellants, Golden W. Robbins and his wife, Harriet J. K. Robbins to quiet title to the following described tract of real property: The Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter, the North half of the Northwest quarter, and lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section 34, Township one North, Range one East, Salt Lake Meridian, situated in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.

The defendants in their answer to the complaint put in issue the ownership of the above tract, and in what they denominated a counterclaim sought to recover a judgment quieting title in them to the land described in the complaint, and also the following described parcel: The West one-half of Southeast quarter of Section 28, Township one North Range one East, Salt Lake Meridian, situated in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.

The plaintiff replied to the counterclaim denying the defendants' ownership of the parcel immediately above described, but did not ask for any affirmative relief as to it. The defendants base their claim of title to both of the above described tracts on tax titles purchased from Salt Lake County. The plaintiff is the record title owner of both tracts. The defendants, H. J. Steiner and his wife Sophia R. Steiner, were impleaded by the defendants Robbins on the theory that they claimed some interest in the properties adverse to them. The Steiners entered a general denial of title in the Robbins, but claimed no title in themselves. Hereafter reference to the defendants will mean the defendants Robbins only. The court below quieted title to the first described tract, hereinafter referred to as the 145 acres, in the plaintiff and entered a decree declaring that the defendants Robbins have no right, title, or interest in the second described tract, hereinafter referred to as the 80 acres. No offer of reimbursement was made by the plaintiff for money expended by the defendants in paying the taxes on the properties, nor did the decree of the court require reimbursement, although proof was submitted as to the amount of these expenditures. The defendants contend, among other things, that the court erred in not requiring the plaintiff to reimburse them for the amount expended by them in paying the taxes on these properties.

It appears that the 145 acre tract described in the complaint was patented from the United States as the Consolidated Marble Placer Mining Claim, March 7, 1892, and the patent was recorded November 9, 1892. No contention is made that the 80 acre tract is or ever was a mining claim. Salt Lake County through its proper officers levied property taxes upon both tracts of land for a number of years. These taxes were paid by the plaintiff or by its predecessors in interest. Later, however, taxes levied by the county were not paid and the defendants purchased tax titles to both of the tracts at the May tax sale in 1943. Plaintiff was suspended as a corporation in 1943 for failure to pay the annual corporation tax but was reinstated July 25, 1946. The stock of the plaintiff corporation while it was suspended was purchased by the Steiners, and it was this group which secured its reinstatement. It appears that a majority of the stock in the corporation is owned by H. J. Steiner; his wife, Sophia R. Steiner; Dean R. Steiner; and Cyrus Gatrell.

The lower court quieted title to the 145 tract in the plaintiff apparently on the theory that it was a mining claim and therefore was subject to assessment by the State Tax Commission rather than by the Salt Lake County Assessor, under 80-5-3, U. C. A. 1943, then R. S. Utah, 1933, 80-5-3, which declares that:

"* * * all mines and mining claims, and the value of metalliferous mines based on three times the annual net proceeds thereof as provided in section 80-5-56, and all other mines and mining claims and other valuable deposits, including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons, nonmetalliferous minerals underlying land the surface of which is owned by a person other that the owner of such minerals, all machinery used in mining and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value of any surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or mining property for other than mining purposes; must be assessed by the state tax commission as hereinafter provided. All taxable property not required by the constitution or by law to be assessed by the state tax commission must be assessed by the county assessor of the several counties in which the same is situated. For the purposes of taxation all mills, reduction works and smelters used exclusively for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or mining claim though the same is not upon such mine or mining claim." (Italics added.)

We used the word "apparently" in the preceding sentence because the sale of both tracts was subject to the same defect, viz., the absence of auditor's affidavits in proper form on the assessment roll. Had title to the 145 acres been quieted in the plaintiff on account of this defect, the lower court, no doubt, under the general equity rule prevailing in this state, would have required the plaintiff to reimburse the defendants for the taxes on the property they have paid to the county. See Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Hallock, 41 Utah 378, 126 P. 394, and Bolognese v. Anderson, 87 Utah 455, 49 P. 2d 1034.

As to the 80 acres, it appears that the taxes were properly assessed, but that the auditor's "affidavit," although made in the exact language of Section 80-7-9 and 80-8-7, U. C. A. 1943, did not include a jurat when attached to the assessment book or roll. This defect existed in the years 1938 through 1941.

It will be noted that by Sec. 80-5-3, U. C. A. 1943, the value of any surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or mining property for other than mining purposes must be assessed by the State Tax Commission. Hence, it would seem that even if the surface were developed into residential property so long as the character of the subsurface were mineral, the State Tax Commission and not the county assessor must assess the surface value as well as the mineral or mining value of the subsurface. It is not here necessary to decide which of the two agencies would assess if the subsurface lost its character as mineral lands. All we now need hold is that until there is proof that the land has lost its character as mineral land or mining property it is assessable by the State Tax Commission. That furthermore, where title is derived from the Federal government by the issuance of a patent as mining property there is a presumption that it is property of that character until it is proved otherwise. 36 Am. Jur. 372. In the instant case, the plaintiff introduced the original patent which describes the property as mining premises. There is substantially nothing in the record to indicate a change in the use of the land from the date of the patent until the time of the trial below. There is some evidence that in recent years mining activity has not been carried on, but rather that sunflowers have been seeded and are now growing upon the property. This is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption that arises from the original patent. While we are not prepared to say that property which has originally been patented as mining property will always be mining property for the purposes of taxation by this state, there is no substantial evidence in the record to warrant a finding that this 145 acre parcel is no longer mining property. Nor is the plaintiff precluded from contending that this is mining property because it has not filed with the State Tax Commission a sworn statement giving the information required to be furnished to that commission by 80-5-59 and 80-5-60, U. C. A. 1943. The assessment of the property is not contingent upon the filing of this sworn statement.

It is contended by the defendants that even if the 145 acres was held by the lower court to be mining property, it should have required the plaintiff to reimburse them for the amount they expended in purchasing the tax title from the county as a condition to its entering a decree quieting title in the plaintiff. The plaintiff on the other hand, contends that while ordinarily reimbursement is required by the court as a condition to quieting title in the record owner, that reimbursement here was properly refused since there was not a valid assessment of the 145 acres during the years from 1938 to 1941 in that the State Tax Commission did not assess the property as required by statute; that the assessment made by the county assessor of Salt Lake County was void; and that the defendants in paying the taxes levied under these void assessments have not benefited the plaintiff in the least.

The plaintiff's contention must fail. This is not a case where taxes, under a void assessment, have been paid to a county other than where the property is situated, and as a consequence thereof, different governmental units have shared in the apportionment of the money thus paid than would have shared had the property been assessed in the proper county. It is important to note that in this case whether the 145 acres was assessed by the State Tax...