Crystal v. Hubbard

• Decision Date: 05 October 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 63831,No. 4,4
• Citation: 414 Mich. 297,324 N.W.2d 869
• Parties: Larry CRYSTAL, Administrator of the Estate of Jackie Lynn Hubbard, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven Carl HUBBARD and Steven T. Komar, jointly and severally, Defendants- Appellees. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 869

324 N.W.2d 869

414 Mich. 297

Larry CRYSTAL, Administrator of the Estate of Jackie Lynn Hubbard, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven Carl HUBBARD and Steven T. Komar, jointly and severally, Defendants- Appellees.

Docket No. 63831.

Calendar No. 4.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 13, 1980.

Decided Oct. 5, 1982.

Bebout, Potere, Cox, Hughes & Cadieux by John D. Cadieux (P-11506), Rochester, for plaintiff-appellant.

Stiles, Fowler & Tuttle by Larry D. Fowler (P-13604), Lansing, for defendants-appellees.

RYAN, Justice.

We are required in this case to address the difficult question whether, in a wrongful death action, the deceased's siblings may recover damages for loss of the society and companionship of their sister.

We hold that they may.

Jackie Lynn Hubbard died when the automobile driven by her husband, defendant Steven Hubbard, in which she was riding, collided with another operated by defendant Steven T. Komar. Ms. Hubbard's father was named administrator of her estate, and he filed this action under the wrongful death provisions of M.C.L. Sec. 600.2922; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2922. His complaint sought damages for funeral and burial expenses, for Ms. Hubbard's pain and suffering preceding her death, and for the personal losses of society and companionship sustained by Ms. Hubbard's five surviving brothers and sisters, her father and her mother.

The defendants admitted liability, and the case was tried to a jury on the issue of damages. At trial, defendants objected to plaintiff's claims on behalf of Ms. Hubbard's siblings, asserting that the statute precluded them from recovering. The trial judge disagreed, permitted the plaintiff to submit evidence of the loss suffered by all family members and submitted a special verdict form to the jury which was returned after having been completed as follows:

"FORM OF VERDICT

"WE, THE JURY, FIND THE FOLLOWING DAMAGES:

                "1.   Funeral and burial expense         $ 1,433.55
                                                         -----------
                "2.   Reasonable compensation for
                      the pain and suffering by
                      Jackie Lynn Hubbard, while
                      she was conscious during the
                      time between her injury and
                      her death                          $10,000.00
                                                         -----------
                "3.   Loss of society, companionship
                      and nature suffered by her
                      father Larry Crystal as a
                      result of his daughter's death     $25,000.00
                                                         -----------
                "4.   Loss of society, companionship
                      and nurture as a result of
                      her daughter's death suffered
                      by her mother Delores Hess         $
                                                         -----------
                "5.   Loss of society and companionship
                      as a result of their sister's
                      death suffered by
                      Deborah Weis (sister)              $ 1,000.00
                                                         -----------
                      Larry Wayne Crystal (brother)      $ 1,000.00
                                                         -----------
                      Donald Crystal (brother)           $ 1,000.00
                                                         -----------
                      Cindy Tucker (sister)              $20,000.00
                                                         -----------
                      Kimberly Crystal (sister)          $20,000.00"
                                                         -----------
                

In conformance with this verdict, a judgment of $79,433.55 was entered in plaintiff's favor. ¹

Defendants appealed, claiming 1) that the damages awarded in item 5 of the verdict form are not permitted under Sec. 2922(2); 2) that use of a special verdict form apportioning damages among individuals is precluded by the apportioning provisions of Sec. 2922(2); and 3) that the $10,000 award for pain and suffering was excessive.

As to defendants' first claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that Sec. 2922(2) permitted only actual heirs at law and nearest of kin to seek recovery for a wrongful death and that since Ms. Hubbard's siblings were related under civil law only in the second degree, while her parents were first-degree kin, the plaintiff's judgment must be reduced by $43,000, the amount awarded to Ms. Hubbard's siblings.

In the dispositional part of its published opinion, ² the Court of Appeals stated:

"That portion of the judgment representing the claims of the siblings is shown by the jury's verdict to total $43,000. Taking into account the unchallenged post-judgment remittitur of $5,000, the amount of the greatest judgment supported by the law is $31,433.55. ⁹

As is evident from the quoted footnote, the Court of Appeals considered defendants' second claim of error and rejected the contention that the trial judge erred in submitting the special verdict form to the jury.

By the same token, the Court of Appeals statement that "the amount of the greatest judgment supported by law is $31,433.55" is at least an implicit indication of the Court's rejection of defendants' claim that the $10,000 award for pain and suffering was excessive and unreasonable.

Defendants have done nothing to pursue either of these latter two claims since the submission of their brief to the Court of Appeals. Contrary to the assertions made in their brief to this Court, nothing in our order granting leave precluded them from advancing those claims here. ³ Because they are not asserted here, we do not consider these claims. ⁴

I

We turn then to decide whether the brothers and sisters of a person suffering death wrongfully at the hands of another are entitled to seek damages for loss of society and companionship in cases where the decedent has left a surviving spouse and parent.

Resolution of the issue begins with an interpretation of the meaning of the following statutory passage from Sec. 2922:

"(2) Every such action shall be brought by, and in the names of, the personal representatives of such deceased person Our focus is directed primarily toward the emphasized damage entitlement and distribution language, creating a right to seek damages on behalf of that "class who * * * would be entitled to inherit * * * had [the deceased] died intestate" and providing for distribution of damages to the "surviving spouse and next of kin" who suffered injury "and in proportion thereto".

                and in every such action the court or jury may give such damages, as, the court or jury, shall deem fair and just, under all of the circumstances to those persons who may be entitled to such damages when recovered including damages for the reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which the estate is liable and reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by such deceased person during the period intervening between the time of the inflicting of such injuries and his death.  The amount of damages recoverable by civil action for death caused by the wrongful act, neglect or fault of another may also include recovery for the loss of the society and companionship of the deceased.  Such person or persons entitled to such damages shall be of that class who, by law, would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the deceased had he died intestate.  The amount recovered in every such action shall be distributed to the surviving spouse and next of kin who suffered injury and in proportion thereto.   Within 30 days after the entry of such judgment, the judge before whom such case was tried or his successor shall certify to the probate court having jurisdiction of the estate of such deceased person the amount and date of entry thereof, and shall advise the probate court by written opinion as to the amount thereof representing the loss suffered by the surviving spouse and all of the next of kin, and the proportion of such total loss suffered by the surviving spouse and each of the next of kin of such deceased person, as shown by the evidence.  After providing for the payment of the reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which the estate is liable, the probate court shall determine as provided by [414 Mich. 307] law the manner in which the amount representing the total loss suffered by the surviving spouse and next of kin shall be distributed, and the proportionate share thereof to be distributed to the surviving spouse and the next of kin.  The remainder of the proceeds of such judgment shall be distributed according to the intestate laws."   M.C.L. Sec. 600.2922(2);  M.S.A. 27A.2922(2).  (Emphasis added.)
                

The primary and generally understood meaning of that critical statutory language, construed in light of the effect of its practical application taken together with our assessment of the historical development of Sec. 2922, and the case law construing its evolving provisions, including the legislative reaction thereto, lead us to conclude that the Legislature's purpose would be defeated by the Court of Appeals interpretation of Sec. 2922. We are convinced that the Legislature never intended, in a case such as this one, to limit the right to seek damages for wrongful death to the actual "heirs at law" by which is meant those persons who are the nearest of kin actually surviving decedent who would be entitled to inherit pursuant to our law of descent and distribution.

A satisfactory answer to the stated issue is not plainly evident merely upon examination of the naked and somewhat opaque language of the statute. The critical language quoted and emphasized is abstruse and uninstructive, for although it identifies the persons who are entitled to damages for the wrongful death of another as "the class" who, by law, would be entitled to inherit had the decedent died intestate, it provides no enlightenment to determine when that class is to be identified. Does the statute itself establish the class? In other words, should the language be interpreted as establishing, at the time of enactment, a class of persons entitled to seek recovery which includes all those who, under the countless varying possibilities which...