Crystal v. Inch

• Decision Date: 03 November 2021
• Docket Number: 3:20cv5565-LC/MAF
• Parties: JEFFERY TODD CRYSTAL, Petitioner, v. MARK INCH, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

JEFFERY TODD CRYSTAL, Petitioner, v. MARK INCH, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 3:20cv5565-LC/MAF

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division

November 3, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On June 12, 2020, Petitioner Jeffery T. Crystal, a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. On September 30, 2020, Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits. ECF No 8. Petitioner filed a reply on November 25, 2020. ECF No. 10.

The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Northern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). The undersigned has determined no evidentiary hearing is required for disposition of this case. See Rule 8(a), R. Gov. § 2254 Cases in U.S Dist. Cts. For the reasons stated herein, the pleadings and attachments show Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief, and the § 2254 petition should be denied.

Background and Procedural History

By information filed January 15, 2014, in Okaloosa County Circuit Court Case 2013-CF-2963, the State of Florida charged Petitioner Jeffery Todd Crystal with two counts in connection with events that took place on or about June 30, 2011 involving a vehicle from Porsche of Destin: (1) grand theft a first degree felony, contrary to section 812.014(1)(a)-(b) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes; and (2) delivery of a worthless check for services, goods, or things of value, a third degree felony, contrary to section 832.05, Florida Statutes. Ex. A at 13.^[1] In particular, Crystal tendered a check to Porsche of Destin on June 30, 2011, in the amount of $109 588.74, for a 2011 Porsche Panamera, and Crystal took possession of the vehicle. See id. at 57; Ex. B at 193-95. The sales manager, Robert Graubman, subsequently called the financial institution to verify the available funds, and he learned Crystal's account had insufficient funds to cover the check; he immediately called Crystal, who did not return any of his calls that day or for the next several days. Ex. B at 187, 197-201. Crystal returned the car to Porsche of Destin on Friday, July 8, 2011, having put over 2000 miles on it. Ex. B at 201-02.

Crystal proceeded to a jury trial on October 6, 2014. Ex. B (trial transcript). He did not testify. Ex. B at 263-66. On October 7, 2014, the jury found him guilty as charged on both counts. Ex. A at 70; Ex. B. On December 8, 2014, the trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to thirty (30) years in prison on the grand theft count. Ex. A at 140. The trial court vacated the worthless check count due to double jeopardy concerns. Ex. A at 126-28.

Crystal appealed his judgment and sentence to the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA), assigned case number 1D14-5844. Ex. A at 129. The initial brief raised two points: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal; and (2) the trial court erred in denying Crystal's motion in limine regarding the mileage on the returned vehicle. Ex. C. The State filed an answer brief. Ex. D. On October 2, 2015, the First DCA affirmed the case, per curiam, without a written opinion. Ex. E; Crystal v. State, 174 So.3d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (table). The mandate issued October 20, 2015. Ex. E. The First DCA denied Crystal's motion to recall the mandate. Ex. F.

On November 3, 2016, Crystal filed in the First DCA a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, assigned case number 1D16-5053. Ex. G. The State filed a response. Ex. H. Crystal filed a reply. Ex. I. On September 25, 2017, the First DCA denied the petition. Ex. J; Crystal v. State, 234 So.3d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). The First DCA denied Crystal's motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc, Ex. K, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined discretionary jurisdiction, Ex. L.

On December 14, 2016, Crystal filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Ex. M. The state court struck the motion and provided Crystal an opportunity to file an amended motion correcting the deficiencies. Ex. N. Ultimately, Crystal filed a Fourth Amended Motion, which alleged ten claims. Ex. O at 694-700. The state post-conviction court summarily denied relief by order on October 18, 2018. Ex. O at 318-34 (exclusive of attachments).

Crystal appealed the denial of post-conviction relief to the First DCA, assigned case number 1D18-5136, and he filed an initial brief. Ex. P. The State filed a notice that it would not file an answer. Ex. Q. On July 2, 2019, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the case without a written opinion. Ex. R; Crystal v. State, 279 So.3d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (table). The mandate issued September 26, 2019. Ex. R.

On July 26, 2019, Crystal filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Ex. S at 17-27. By order rendered September 26, 2019, the state trial court denied the motion. Id. at 28-30. Crystal appealed to the First DCA, assigned case number 1D19-3824. Id. at 31; Ex. T. On May 27, 2020, the First DCA affirmed the case, per curiam, without a written opinion. Ex. T; Crystal v. State, 295 So.3d 1157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (table). The mandate issued June 24, 2020. Ex. T.

On December 19, 2019, Crystal filed another motion for post-conviction relief in the state trial court. Ex. U at 18-42. By order rendered February 10, 2020, the state court denied the motion as an untimely, facially insufficient, and successive Rule 3.850 motion, also noting that “the motion does not present any cognizable claim for postconviction relief.” Id. at 47; see id. at 43-48. Crystal appealed to the First DCA, assigned case number 1D20-708, Ex. U at 76, and filed an initial brief, Ex. V. The State filed a notice that it would not file an answer. Ex. W. On August 28, 2020, the First DCA issued a written opinion that included a warning to Crystal not to file frivolous motions. Ex. X. The mandate issued September 25, 2020. See online docket for 1D20-708 at www.1dca.org.

As indicated above, Crystal filed a § 2254 petition in this Court on June 12, 2020. ECF No. 1. In his petition, Crystal raises thirteen (13) grounds, eight (8) of which allege claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by appellate or trial counsel:

(1) Trial Court Error - Judgment of Acquittal: “[T]he trial court erred when it denied Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Grand Theft. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice - actual innocence.” ECF No. 1 at 7.

(2) Trial Court Error - Motion in Limine “[T]he trial court erred when it denied defense counsel's Motion in Limine regarding the mileage on the vehicle when it was returned.” Id. at 9.

(3) IAC/Appellate Counsel - Judgment of Acquittal: “Appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to argue on direct appeal the trial court erred by denial of Appellant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal based on lack of intent. Based on Giglio violations entered into evidence to prove intent. Violation of U.S.C.A. 5th, 6th, and 14th Due Process Clause, right to counsel obligatory upon states.” Id. at 10.

(4) IAC/Appellate Counsel - Prosecutor's Statement: “Appellate Counsel was ineffective after he failed to raise that assistant State Attorney Bernhardt made improper statement the Crystal Group was a shell corporation in the presence of the jury. In violation of U.S.C.A. 5th, 6th, and 14th Due Process Clause, confrontation clause.” Id. at 12.

(5) IAC/Appellate Counsel - Charging Information: “Appellate Counsel rendered ineffective assistance upon his failure (to raise on direct appeal, the failure) of the Okaloosa County State Attorney Office, to timely file its charging information within 175 days after Crystal being arrested on November 3, 2011 thus beginning his custody on the Okaloosa County cause. In violation of U.S.C.A. 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment U.S. Constitution: Right to a fast and Speedy Trial-Due Process Clause, right to effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 14.

(6) IAC/Appellate Counsel - Hearsay: “Appellate Counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to raise on direct appeal that the Trial Court erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce into evidence hearsay testimony from an unnamed Porsche of Destin employee referred to during trial as ‘title clerk.' In violation of U.S.C.A. 5th, 6th, and 14th Confrontation Clause and Due Process Clause U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 15.

(7) IAC/Appellate Counsel - Fair Market Value: “Appellate Counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to raise on direct appeal the failure of the prosecution to establish fair market value-cost of the 2011 Porsche Panamera (s) sold June 30, 2011 with 70 miles roughly (90) days prior to introduction of 2012 models in September 2011. In violation of U.S.C.A. 5th, 6th, and 14th Of the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 16.

(8) Trial Court Error - Evidence Favorable to Defendant: “Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the Defendant evidence favorable to the Defendant. (Giglio Violation) In violation of U.S.C.A. 5th, 6th, and 14th of the U.S. Constitution due process clause, equal protection under the law Giglio violations. Petitioner has been deprived of his Federal Constitutional rights to due process, equal protection under the law. The Defendant alerts this Honorable Court to the fact that he is asserting this claim under the United States Constitution.” Id. at 17.

(9) IAC - Phone Records: “Defense counsel was ineffective when he failed to file motion to seek court's permission to subpoena phone

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