Csibi v. Fustos

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before PREGERSON and CANBY; LUCAS
• Citation: Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1982)
• Decision Date: 26 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-4100,81-4100
• Parties: Marcella CSIBI, Ludovic Csibi, Aurora Csibi and Maria Csibi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gizela FUSTOS, etc., Defendants-Appellees.

Page 134

670 F.2d 134

Marcella CSIBI, Ludovic Csibi, Aurora Csibi and Maria Csibi Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gizela FUSTOS, etc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-4100.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 14, 1981.

Decided Feb. 26, 1982.

John R. Vintilla, Cleveland, Ohio (argued), for plaintiffs-appellants; Rose M. Fanucchi, San Francisco, Cal., on brief.

Eva Voisin, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before PREGERSON and CANBY, Circuit Judges, and LUCAS, ^* District Judge.

LUCAS, District Judge.

This is an action involving the claims of two women, each of whom claim to be the surviving spouse of Antal Csibi, who died intestate in California in 1975. Plaintiff-appellant Marcella Csibi, who claims to be Antal's first wife, and her three children brought the instant diversity action to establish their rights in Antal's estate. The district court, prior to any discovery, ordered appellants to submit an offer of proof establishing their claims. On the basis of material submitted, the district court concluded that the appellants could not prevail and dismissed the action. Marcella and her children appealed. We hold that appellants' action is within the historic domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, and therefore, that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. The district court's order of dismissal is vacated, and the action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Marcella Csibi and her three children, citizens of Rumania, filed this diversity action ¹ in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to establish their status as heirs of Antal Csibi. Marcella alleges that she married Antal Csibi in Rumania in 1946 and that her marriage was never dissolved. Antal left Rumania in 1969 and emigrated to the United States, making his home in San Francisco. Antal married Gizela Fustos in 1970 and lived with her until his death. Gizela contends that even if Antal was already married to Marcella, she is entitled to inherit his estate under California law as a good faith putative spouse. ² Marcella argues that Gizela knew that Antal was married to another; thus, Gizela's relationship was meretricious and Gizela is not entitled to inherit Antal's property.

Approximately ten months after the suit was filed, after defendant had answered, but before any discovery was taken, the district court ordered plaintiffs to submit an offer of proof setting forth facts "from which a trier of fact could determine that plaintiffs are entitled to prevail." (R 8-9). Applying a complex series of presumptions found in California community property law, the district court held that the factual material submitted by appellants in response to the court's order did not sustain plaintiff's burden of disproving Gizela's putative status. The court found that Gizela was a good faith putative spouse entitled to inherit all Antal's community property. The court also found that the Csibi children had not shown that the estate contained any separate property which would descend to them under Section 221 of the California Probate Code. Therefore, the district court reasoned, Gizela was entitled to the entire estate. Appellants' action was dismissed.

Marcella and her children appealed, objecting to the summary disposition of their claims on the court's own motion. Neither the parties nor the district court raised the issue of whether the court lacked jurisdiction over this action due to the domestic relations exception, an historical exclusion of domestic matters formerly settled in ecclesiastical courts from federal court subject-matter jurisdiction. This court raised the issue of whether or not the domestic relations exception should be applied in this case on its own motion. ³ The parties were asked to submit further briefing on the issue.

The domestic relations exception arose from early judicial construction of the diversity statute now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332. ⁴ The statute, as originally enacted in 1789, conferred jurisdiction over " 'suits of a civil nature in law or in equity.' " 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3609 at 663 (1975). That statutory description was construed to exclude domestic relations and probate matters which were heard in ecclesiastical courts at the time the diversity statute was drafted. Cf. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84, 50 S.Ct. 154, 155, 74 L.Ed. 489, 498 (1930) (Statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over suits against foreign consuls was given construction similar to the diversity statute; the grant was interpreted to refer only to ordinary civil proceedings, and "not to include what formerly would have belonged to the ecclesiastical courts.")

The Revised Judicial Code of 1948, Act of June 25, 1948, § 1331, 62 Stat. 869 at 930, substituted the broader term "civil actions" in its description of diversity jurisdiction. ⁵ The domestic relations exception has persisted, however, because the courts have found it to be supported by sound policy. States have an interest in family relations superior to that of the federal government, and state courts have more expertise in the field of domestic relations. "Domestic relations is a field particularly suited to state regulation and control and particularly unsuited to control by federal courts." Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968).

As a jurisdictional limitation, the domestic relations exception has been narrowly confined. Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981). Only those cases most closely resembling historically ecclesiastical actions have been considered absolutely outside federal court jurisdiction. These cases, at the core of the domestic relations exception, are cases where a federal court is asked to grant a divorce or annulment, determine support payments, or award custody of a child. The cases are in agreement that there is no subject-matter jurisdiction over these types of domestic disputes. See, Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir. 1980); Sutter v. Pitts, supra, 639 F.2d at 843.

There is another class of cases also involving domestic relations which federal courts have jurisdiction over, but often refrain from adjudicating. This second class of cases consists of those where domestic relations problems are involved tangentially to other issues determinative of the case. Federal courts may exercise their discretion to abstain from deciding such cases. See Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474, 475 (2d Cir. 1976) (federal courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters "on the verge" of the domestic relations exception if the interests of justice would be served by state court resolution). Cases where jurisdiction has been considered discretionary are those requesting a federal court to enforce a defaulting spouse's obligations under a state support decree, to enforce a final state divorce decree under the Full Faith and Credit clause, to invalidate a state divorce decree obtained without personal jurisdiction, to award damages in a suit between two spouses for breach of contract, and to determine the rights of spouses under federal statutes. ⁶

This Circuit's test for subject-matter jurisdiction in domestic relations cases was articulated in Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968). In Buechold, the plaintiffs were German mothers seeking to establish paternity and obtain child support from United States Armed Service members formerly stationed in Germany. The Court in Buechold stated that the federal courts "must decline jurisdiction of cases concerning domestic relations when the primary issue concerns the status of parent and child or husband and wife." 401 F.2d at 372. The Buechold "primary issue" test was formulated in a case involving paternity and child support, a type of historically ecclesiastical matter traditionally considered altogether outside federal court jurisdiction. This fact, and the use of the word "must", ⁷ indicate that the Buechold test is a test for the limit of the federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction, in domestic relations cases.

An application of the Buechold test to the facts of the case at bar compels the conclusion that the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over this domestic relations dispute. This case turns on a determination of the marital status of Antal Csibi, Marcella Csibi and Gizela Fustos. Marcella Csibi must establish her own status as Antal's legal spouse, and disprove Gisela's status as good faith putative spouse in order to recover. Accordingly, part of Marcella's prayer for relief is a request for an annulment of Antal's marriage to Gizela. ⁸ Thus, the primary issue in the instant case concerns the status of husband and wife, and federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction under the test announced in Buechold.

This case is factually similar to Welker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 502 F.Supp. 268 (C.D.Cal.1980) (per Tashima, J.). In Welker, a woman claiming to be the putative spouse of a decedent brought an action to recover the life insurance proceeds that Metropolitan had paid to the decedent's first, legal spouse. Using the Buechold test, the court held that it had no jurisdiction, noting that the plaintiff sought to establish her status as putative spouse and that "all relief plaintiff seeks from this action is subsidiary to and dependent upon that status." 502 F.Supp. at 270. Similarly, in the case at bar, all recovery hinges upon a determination of marital status.

We are not persuaded by plaintiffs' assertion that there is diversity jurisdiction over this dispute because the complaint alleges a tort claim for wrongful interference with inheritance. Even if such a tort cause of action exists under the applicable law, the primary issue is still the marital status...