Csx Transp., Inc. v. Madison Group, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 2:98-0140.,CIV. A. 2:98-0140. |
| Citation | 42 F.Supp.2d 624 |
| Parties | CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. MADISON GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Andrew S. Zettle, Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, Huntington, WV, for plaintiff.
Jerry W. Cook, Cook & Cook, Madison, WV, for defendants.
Pending is Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, which has been fully briefed. After careful consideration, the Court GRANTS the motion.
Plaintiff CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT") operates a railway line that lies along the Spruce Fork of the Little Coal River in the vicinity of Madison, Boone County, West Virginia. CSXT assumed ownership of the land upon which the track lies in a condemnation proceeding in 1906. CSXT owns 33 1/3 feet on each side of the center of the railroad track.
In 1906, a road crossed Spruce Fork by means of a low-water crossing and proceeded to intersect an area known as Miller Hill. At the time, the road was the principal route from Madison to Logan. It was maintained as a public road.
In 1933 the West Virginia Legislature authorized a statutory system of state roads under the jurisdiction of the State Highway Commission. Because the statutory scheme replaced the jurisdiction of county courts over roads, the Highway Commission prepared a formal inventory of the state roads that would be adopted into its jurisdiction. Neither the preliminary map nor the final 1937 map included the Madison to Logan road. In 1996 CSXT subsequently removed the road crossing from its tracks and right of way.
Defendants Douglas White and A.T. Miller, Jr. own land on the area known as Miller Hill. This property was accessed by the old Madison to Logan road.1 With other land owners in the area, White and Miller pooled funds to build a bridge to span Spruce Fork, to gain access to Miller Hill without using the low-water crossing. After an unsuccessful first attempt, they built a second bridge that stands today at a location west from the low-water crossing. If one used the bridge to reach Miller Hill, the driver would cross Spruce Fork, make a sharp left turn, drive parallel to the railroad tracks, and then make a sharp right turn to cross the tracks at the location of the old Madison to Logan road.
Defendants' engineer for the project, Mustafa Kol, advised Defendants of the need to apply for and receive several permits, including one from CSXT because the proposed bridge's abutment would lie within CSXT property. Defendants were not granted a permit by CSXT.
CSXT moves for summary judgment, arguing first that Defendants unlawfully placed the bridge abutment on CSXT property; second, Defendants have no lawful right to use the old road's crossing point because the road was abandoned by the State.
Defendants argue genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the bridge abutment is on CSXT property and whether Defendants placed fill on CSXT property. Second, they argue the cemetery's location gives them a perpetual easement and removal of the old crossing effectively denied access to the cemetery. Consequently, the bridge and fill should be allowed to remain.
Our Court of Appeals has often stated the settled standard and shifting burdens governing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment:
Rule 56(c) requires that the district court enter judgment against a party who, "after adequate time for ... discovery fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the [movant] must demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact has been raised, we must construe all inferences in favor of the [nonmovant]. If, however, "the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law," we must affirm the grant of summary judgment in that party's favor. The [nonmovant] "cannot create a genuine issue of fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." To survive [the motion], the [nonmovant] may not rest on [his] pleadings, but must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. As the Anderson Court explained, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff[.]"
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Packer, 60 F.3d 1116, 1119-20 (4th Cir.1995) (citations omitted); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813, 115 S.Ct. 67, 68, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994); see also Cabro Foods, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 962 F.Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.W.Va.1997); Spradling v. Blackburn, 919 F.Supp. 969, 974 (S.D.W.Va.1996).
Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Advertising, L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir.1995).
It is undisputed that CSXT owns 33 1/3 feet on either side the center of the track. Engineer Kol flagged CSXT's property line on schematics that called for steel pilings to be placed on the railroad's property. See Ex. 8 to Ex. E, Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.; Kol's Depo., Ex. E at 39, id. At his deposition, Kol explained his notation:
It's marked on my plans, if the railroad looked at it, "inside right-of-way, 10." This is railroad right-of-way, which is 33 feet from the center line of track.... This is something that I'm saying that you are inside of — 10 feet inside of railroad right-of-way, assuming that this is still a railroad right-of-way, which is questionable, I think. We mentioned that to Jerry [Defendants' attorney].
Kol's Depo., Ex. E at 13, id. Kol drafted form letters for Defendants' use to secure necessary permits, including one to the railroad seeking to "relocate the existing crossing and to perform the work within the railroad's rights of way." Ex. 5 to Ex. E, id. Kol testified that when he is dealing directly with the railroad, he is "very, very nervous about it" and "never do[es] anything before [he] get[s] a permit from the railroad company." Ex. E at 42, id.
Defendant Douglas White was also aware of CSXT's ownership of the land thirty-three and a third feet from the center of the tracks. Douglas White Depo. at 25, Ex. D, Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. He stated placement of the bridge on CSXT property would be "improper" because they did not have permission. Id. at 31.
Defendants contest only factual issues whether the bridge actually stands on CSXT's property and whether Defendants placed the fill material on CSXT's property. As to the first issue, CSXT introduced an affidavit and supporting photos by a trained and experienced engineer, Robert Campbell, who fixes the actual position of the bridge and fill as of July 10, 1997; April 8, 1998; and September 22, 1998. This evidence demonstrates the bridge's steel supports are placed on CSXT property, which is further supported by Kol's schematics and deposition testimony.
In rebuttal, Defendants offer only a survey made in 1996, without an accompanying affidavit to support or explain the purpose of the survey.2 The survey and photographs are not necessarily inconsistent, however. The survey may purport to show only the concrete structure of the bridge which, the photographs show, does not encroach upon CSXT property. Considering all the evidence and construing all inferences in favor of Defendants, they have nonetheless failed to put forward evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for them.
As to their responsibility for placing fill on CSXT property, Defendants argue any number of persons may have placed fill on the property in question. They rely solely upon Defendant Douglas White's testimony 1) unknown third persons use the bridge despite his blockade efforts and, therefore, may have placed the fill and 2) he heard about a family who may have caused the City of Madison to place the fill to enable them to reach the cemetery. As our Court of Appeals has stated, a nonmovant "`cannot create a genuine issue of fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.'" Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 60 F.3d at 1119-20 (citations omitted). Defendants have failed to put forward evidence upon which a jury may reasonably find for them.
In their counterclaim, Defendants allege CSXT unlawfully removed the crossing that had first been created as part of the old Madison to Logan road. CSXT argues the road was abandoned by the State when it did not include it in the inventory of State roads within the jurisdiction of the State Highway Commission. Defendants do not dispute the road's exclusion. Instead, they respond only that cemetery lot owners are entitled to a "perpetual easement" and that removal of the crossing effectively denied them access to the cemetery, justifying the continued location and use of the bridge and fill.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has recognized that a road is not a public road unless the State has taken steps to authorize it...
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...public funds expended on the road's maintenance are insufficient to prove it a public road today." CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Madison Group, Inc., 42 F.Supp.2d 624, 628 (S.D.W.Va. 1999). 4. We note, however, that our decision is not intended to affect the parties' settlement with Mr. ...