Csx Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth

• Decision Date: 12 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-73615.,98-73615.
• Citation: 92 F.Supp.2d 643
• Parties: CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PLYMOUTH and Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

92 F.Supp.2d 643

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PLYMOUTH and Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Defendants.

No. 98-73615.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

April 12, 2000.

George Pappas, Vicki Margolis, Kevin B. Collins, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Jack O. Kalmink, Dirk H. Beckwith, Detroit, MI, Cynthia Craig-Johnson, CSX Transportation, Inc., Jacksonville, FL, for plaintiff.

Michael Frezza, Asst. Attorney General, John W. Martin, Detroit, MI, Daniel Saphire, Washington, DC, for defendants.

OPINION & ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S JURY DEMAND; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE BRICKEY AFFIDAVIT

EDMUNDS, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff, CSX Transportation, Inc.'s, ("CSXT") motion for summary judgment and on Defendants City of Plymouth and the Attorney General of the State of Michigan's cross-motions for summary judgment. Also before the Court are Plaintiff's motion to strike the Attorney General's jury demand and to strike the Brickey Affidavit. The Association of American Railroads has filed an amicus curiae memorandum in support of the positions taken by CSXT in its motion.

As discussed below, CSXT challenges a Michigan state statute which limits the amount of time a train can block a grade crossing to five minutes. CSXT argues that the state law is preempted by federal statutes and regulations and that it unduly burdens interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The Court finds that the state statute is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20101, et seq., and the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA"), 49 U.S.C. § 10101, et seq., and is unconstitutionally violative of the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8, cl. 3. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment are DENIED. Plaintiff's motion to strike the Brickey Affidavit is DENIED, and its motion to strike the Attorney General's jury demand is DENIED AS MOOT.

I. Background

Plaintiff, CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT") operates interstate trains throughout Michigan which cross the City of Plymouth's streets. The trains also cross numerous intersections in Wayne County.

A Michigan statute prohibits the railroad from blocking vehicular traffic at an intersection for longer than five minutes at any one time. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 462.391 ("state statute" or "statute"). The statute contains two exceptions to the five minute time limit: (a) if the train is continuously moving in the same direction at not less than 10 miles per hour for not longer than seven minutes; or (b) if the railroad can show that the incident occurred as a result of a verifiable accident, mechanical failure, or unsafe condition. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 462.391(1)(a)(b). A fine of $500 is imposed for a violation. CSXT has been issued numerous citations for having violated the statute.

CSXT filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration that the state statute is unconstitutional as applied. CSXT argues the statute is (1) expressly preempted by the Federal Railway Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20101, et seq.; (2) preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA"), 49 U.S.C. § 10101, et seq., and (3) unduly burdensome of interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

The instant lawsuit represents round two in a bout of litigation between CSXT and the City of Plymouth. A few years ago, CSXT brought a similar declaratory action in federal court against the City of Plymouth seeking to invalidate, on similar grounds, a Plymouth city ordinance which imposed a five minute intersection time limit on the railroad similar to the state statute's time limit at issue here.¹

The case reached the Sixth Circuit in 1996. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 86 F.3d 626 (6 th Cir.1996)("Plymouth I"), the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge LaPlata's grant of summary judgment for CSXT, finding that the city ordinance was preempted by the FRSA. The FRSA contains an express preemption clause which provides:

Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or order -

(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard;

(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government; and

(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.

49 U.S.C. § 20106.

Only the first sentence of the preemption clause was at issue in Plymouth I. Under that sentence, the Court of Appeals determined that the city ordinance was preempted because it "related to railroad safety." Although the ordinance did not make express reference to railroad safety, the Sixth Circuit held that "[i]t is on the basis of potential safety aspects of compliance with the ordinance that the challenged ordinance relates to railroad safety ... [I]t appears that compliance with the challenged ordinance would require either shorter or faster trains." Plymouth I, 86 F.3d at 629. Because evidence offered in the case demonstrated that requiring either shorter or faster trains would affect accident rates, the ordinance "related to railroad safety" and was thus preempted.

The Court of Appeals did not address the two "savings clauses" which it held apply only to state statutes. The first savings clause applies to state statutes which regulate railroad safety when the Secretary has not covered the subject matter of the state requirement. The other applies where the state law addresses a local safety hazard, is not in conflict with federal law, and does not unduly burden interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 20106. The savings clauses were not at issue in Plymouth I. They are at issue here because this case involves the application of a state statute.

II. Facts

The material facts are not in dispute. CSXT's brief contains a detailed explanation of the various ways in which its trains block intersections in violation of the state statute. See Pl.'s Br. at 5-26. In sum, CSXT describes three scenarios by which it blocks grade crossings² in Wayne, and four scenarios by which it blocks grade crossings in Plymouth. The primary reasons for the blocked crossings are due to the trains' length, the trains' speed limit, which is determined by the class of track maintained by CSXT, the performance of two types of federally-mandated air brake tests, and the coupling and uncoupling of cars. See Pl.'s Exb. 2, Jenkins Aff. at ¶¶ 20-64.

Since August of 1997, the violations have resulted in 607 citations by Plymouth, amounting to fines of $303,500 and 285 citations by Wayne, amounting to fines of $142,500. Pl.'s Exb. 2, Jenkins Aff. at ¶ 9.³

III. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(c). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The movant has an initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265. Once the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant; a "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The court must believe the non-movant's evidence and draw "all justifiable inferences" in the non-movant's favor. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The inquiry is whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying the relevant evidentiary standard could "reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

IV. Analysis

A. Federal Preemption

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST., Art. VI, cl. 2. Thus where a state law conflicts with or frustrates a federal law, the former must yield. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).

The United States Supreme Court has explained that the Supremacy Clause preempts state law in three circumstances. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d...