CSX Transp. v. Gen. Mills

Decision Date17 February 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 1:14-CV-201-TWT
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
PartiesCSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MILLS, INC., Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This is a breach of contract action. It is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc 183] and the Defendant's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 187]. The Parties have filed additional motions in the intervening time, including the Defendant's Motion to Exclude Opinion Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert Samuel Gualardo [Doc. 235], the Defendant's Motion to Exclude Standard-of-Care Opinion Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert Brian Heikkila [Doc 236], the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 237], and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 238]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Defendant's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 187] and denies all of the remaining motions as moot.

I. Background

This case arises out of a workplace accident in which Douglas Burchfield, an employee of the Defendant General Mills, Inc. (General Mills), sustained serious injuries at a General Mills processing plant in Covington, Georgia. (Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 8-9.) On the day of the accident, Mr. Burchfield and a fellow employee, Rodney Turk, were using a General Mills trackmobile to move, or “switch, ” railcars at the Covington plant. After the pair moved railcar AEX 7136 into position and uncoupled it from the trackmobile, it rolled down the sidetrack, collided with the trackmobile and another railcar, and then ran over Mr. Burchfield. On June 1, 2007, Mr. Burchfield filed a personal injury lawsuit against CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) and the owner of railcar AEX 7136. (Id. ¶ 10.) General Mills was not a party to the Burchfield litigation[1] and made only limited appearances related to discovery undertaken in the case. (Id. ¶ 11.) By letter dated June 18, 2007, CSX tendered the defense of the lawsuit to General Mills, but the latter refused this demand. (Id. ¶ 12.)

The first trial in 2009 resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of CSX. The judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and the case was remanded for a new trial. On April 19, 2012, a second jury returned a verdict finding that Mr. Burchfield was not a contributing cause of his injuries, that Mr. Burchfield was zero percent negligent, and CSX was 100 percent negligent in causing the accident. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 5.) The jury awarded Mr. Burchfield a total of $20, 559, 004. Judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Burchfield. While on appeal, the case was settled for $16 million. (Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 21.) During the trial, CSX presented evidence and argued that Mr. Burchfield was negligent because he (1) failed to set the handbrake on railcar AEX 7136, (2) failed to perform a “push-pull” or “bump” test with the trackmobile, (3) failed to use chocks/blocks or set derailers, and (4) allowed Mr. Turk to operate the trackmobile even though he had not completed classroom training. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4.) The Court had previously ruled on summary judgment that CSX could not raise General Mill's negligence as a defense because it was untimely and not properly supported by expert testimony. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 3.)

After the second Burchfield verdict, CSX made a demand for indemnification from General Mills for the full amount of the judgment pursuant to the Parties' Private Sidetrack Agreement (“Sidetrack Agreement”). (Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 17, 20, 22.) Executed on February 9, 1989, the Sidetrack Agreement specifies the terms for the construction, maintenance, and use of a private sidetrack for the tender and receipt of rail freight traffic at the Covington plant. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) Section 15.1 provides General Mills “the right to switch with its own trackmobile or locomotive power over [its] segment of the sidetrack.” (Am. Compl., Ex. A.) General Mills further agreed in this section to:

assume[] all risk of loss, damage, cost, liability, judgment and expense, (including attorneys' fees) in connection with any personal injury to . . . any persons . . . that may be sustained or incurred in connection with, or arising from or growing out of, the operation of [General Mills'] trackmobile or locomotive power upon said Sidetrack.

(Id. (emphasis omitted).) Section 11, meanwhile, contains a general indemnity provision, which states in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided herein, any and all damages, claims . . . causes of action suits, expenses . . . judgments and interest whatsoever . . . in connection with injury to . . . any person . . . arising out of or resulting directly or indirectly from the . . . use . . . of the Sidetrack shall be divided between the parties as follows:
(A) Each party shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless from all losses arising from the indemnifying party's willful or gross negligence, its sole negligence and/or its joint or concurring negligence with a third party.
(B) The parties agree to jointly defend and bear equally between them all losses arising from their joint or concurring negligence.

(Id.) Mr. Burchfield's accident occurred after General Mills began conducting its own switching operations with its own trackmobile at the Covington plant. (Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 7-8.)

Ultimately, General Mills refused each of CSX's demands for indemnification. On January 23, 2014, CSX instituted this breach of contract action against General Mills. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20, 23, 24.) CSX originally claimed that it should be indemnified under Section 15 of the Sidetrack Agreement “without regard to who ultimately was determined to be at fault” for the accident. (Compl. ¶ 56.) However, the Court rejected this argument, holding that Section 15 “does not require [General Mills] to indemnify [CSX] for a judgment where the latter, but not the former, was found negligent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 2015 WL 468682, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 3, 2015), rev'd on other grounds, 846 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2017); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 2017 WL 4472787, at *7 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 6, 2017). CSX's two remaining claims-Counts II and III of the Amended Complaint-both require some negligence on the part of General Mills to trigger indemnification under the Sidetrack Agreement. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64-65, 74.)

Now pending are the Parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment, which ask the Court to apply the “vouchment” rule to the Burchfield judgment. Vouchment is a procedure by which a defendant calls upon a third party-often an indemnitor-to defend against the plaintiff's claims, as CSX did by its June 18, 2007 letter to General Mills. According to CSX, because General Mills was vouched into the Burchfield case, it is estopped from raising the issues of CSX's litigation strategy and decision to settle with Mr. Burchfield in this case. (Pl.'s Br. in Supp of Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 2.) Therefore, CSX argues that the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Affirmative Defenses should fail as a matter of law. (Id.) On the other hand, General Mills argues that CSX is bound by the Burchfield judgment that CSX was 100 percent negligent, Mr. Burchfield was zero percent negligent, and General Mills was zero percent negligent in causing the accident. (Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Def.'s Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 2-3.) If General Mills is correct in its application of the vouchment rule, then it would be impossible for CSX to succeed on its remaining claims, and the Court thus takes General Mills' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment under consideration first.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court should view the evidence and draw any inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

III. Discussion

Relying on the vouchment rule, General Mills argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all facts passed upon and settled in the Burchfield lawsuit, including the relative negligence of CSX, Mr. Burchfield, and General Mills. (Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Def.'s Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 2.) This is General Mills' fourth attempt to bar CSX from claiming that General Mills contributed to Mr. Burchfield's accident through negligent training and supervision. Already in this lawsuit the Court has denied General Mills' Motions to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings [Docs. 68, 86] based on collateral estoppel, ripeness, and contractual indemnification principles. CSX Transp., 2017 WL 4472787, at *3-4; CSX Transp., Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 2018 WL 3458557, at *3-5 (N.D.Ga. July 18, 2018). On the last of these motions, the Court admonished General Mills for “attempting to repackage the same collateral estoppel argument that this Court has previously rejected.” CSX Transp., 2018 WL 3458557, at *4. ...

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