Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-cv-01716 (TSC) |
| Decision Date | 01 November 2023 |
| Parties | CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; WILDEARTH GUARDIANS; CITIZENS CARING FOR THE FUTURE; NEW MEXICO INTERFAITH POWER AND LIGHT, Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; DEB HAALAND; U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT; TRACY STONE-MANNING, Defendants, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC; OXY USA INC.; OXY USA WTP LP; ANADARKO E&P ONSHORE LLC; PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF WYOMING; AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE; STATE OF WYOMING; PEAK POWDER RIVER RESOURCES, LLC; NEW MEXICO OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION; ANSCHUTZ EXPLORATION CORPORATION; FRANKLIN MOUNTAIN ENERGY LLC, Intervenors-Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity (“the Center”) WildEarth Guardians, Citizens Caring for the Future, and New Mexico Interfaith Power and Light, seek declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the production of oil and gas drilling wells approved by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). Several private and public entities intervened and then moved to dismiss the suit, alleging that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege Article III standing, the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs' challenges to most of the approvals, and Plaintiffs' claims are barred because they failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Having considered the parties' briefing and the record, the court will GRANT Intervenor-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
On June 15, 2022, the Center, WildEarth Guardians, Citizens Caring for the Future, and New Mexico Interfaith Power and Light filed this suit against the U.S. Department of the Interior and its Secretary, Deb Haaland, as well as BLM and its Director, Tracy Stone-Manning. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs challenge 4,366 approvals Defendants issued in response to discrete applications for permit to drill (“APDs”) for oil and gas in New Mexico's Permian Basin and Wyoming's Powder River Basin. Id. at 1-2, 63-254. Plaintiffs claim the APD approvals violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq., and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq., as well as their implementing regulations. Id. at 2.
NEPA, ESA, and FLPMA are environmental protection statutes governing executive action. If an agency determines that a potential major federal action could have significant environmental impacts, NEPA requires the agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement analyzing the environmental impacts and identifying reasonable alternatives to avoid or minimize those impacts. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). Then, ESA mandates that the agency ensures that the action “is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Finally, FLPMA requires the Secretary of the Interior to “take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
Plaintiffs allege that the drilling of these oil and gas wells “will likely emit 490-600 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent greenhouse gas pollution over the course of their lifespans”-“a nationally and globally significant quantity of emissions.” ECF No. 1 at 2. They contend that despite these significant consequences, Defendants “failed to evaluate the cumulative impacts of greenhouse gas emissions that will result from these approvals under NEPA, and failed to consider the impact of these emissions as they relate to BLM's procedural and substantive obligations under the ESA and FLPMA” Id. at 2-6. Plaintiffs therefore ask the court to declare the approvals unlawful, vacate the approvals, and enjoin Defendants from “approving or otherwise taking action to approve any applications for permits to drill on federal public lands and minerals until [they] have fully complied with” federal law. Id. at 6; see id. at 61-62.
Several additional entities-OXY USA Inc., OXY USA WTP LP, Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC, Petroleum Association of Wyoming, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., America Petroleum Institute, State of Wyoming, Peak Powder River Resources LLC, New Mexico Oil and Gas Association, Anschutz Exploration Corporation, and Franklin Mountain Energy LLC (“Intervenor-Defendants”)-moved to intervene. See Mots. to Intervene, ECF Nos. 8, 12, 17, 20, 27, 32, 37, 41, 53. The court granted those motions on November 9, 2022. See ECF Nos. 75, 76.
Intervenors-Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint on January 20, 2023. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 84. Defendants supported the motion, see Resp., ECF No. 91, and Plaintiffs opposed it, see Opp'n, ECF No. 93.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move to dismiss an action or claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff must establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction as to each claim, not just one. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017).
In assessing a motion to dismiss, “the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and must construe ‘the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.'” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Regan, 597 F.Supp.3d 173, 186 (D.D.C. 2022) (citation omitted). That said, because the court has “an affirmative obligation to ensure it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority,” the “factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny [than those allegations would] in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim,” Grand Lodge of Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In deciding the motion, the “court may consider materials outside the pleadings.” Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
It is an “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement” that in order to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must establish Article III standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To demonstrate standing at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must plead (i) an “injury in fact,” that is (ii) “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court,” and that (iii) is “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 560-61 (cleaned up).
“Article III grants federal courts the power to redress harms that defendants cause plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants accountable for legal infractions.” Trans Union LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (citation omitted). “Only those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant's statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in federal court.” Id.
In the environmental context, that means that care and concern for the aesthetics or the well-being of the environment alone does not suffice to establish injury in fact. See Id. Typically, a plaintiff challenging the effect of a ruling or decision on the environment alleges injury in fact based on their “geographic proximity to the action challenged.” City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In other words, plaintiffs may establish standing to challenge environmental harms by alleging “that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened' by the challenged activity.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
An organizational plaintiff can demonstrate injury either by showing that the challenged action harms its organizational interests (organizational standing), or by showing that at least one of its members has individual standing (associational standing). Plaintiffs here focus on associational standing, and the Center also briefly contends it has organizational standing. ECF No. 93 at 29.
An entity may establish organizational standing if it alleges “concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities-with the consequent drain on the organization's activities-[that] constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization's resources.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). In Havens Realty, the Supreme Court found the plaintiff had alleged injury in fact by claiming that the defendant's “steering practices have perceptibly impaired [the plaintiff's] ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income homeseekers.” Id. An entity's “abstract interest in a problem,” by contrast, “is insufficient to establish standing, ‘no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem.'” Am. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739). For example, “frustration of an organization's objectives” is such an “abstract concern.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
In sum the D.C. Circuit “establishes two important limitations” on organizational standing: the organization (1) “must show ‘a direct conflict between the defendant's conduct and the organization's mission,'” and (2) “may not ‘manufacture the injury...
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