CTS v. State, 49A02-0206-JV-439.
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Citation | 781 N.E.2d 1193 |
Docket Number | No. 49A02-0206-JV-439.,49A02-0206-JV-439. |
Parties | C.T.S., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Decision Date | 29 January 2003 |
Janice E. Smith, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
C.T.S. was found to be a delinquent child by the Marion Superior Court because he committed the following offenses: pointing a firearm,1 a Class A misdemeanor when committed by an adult, and battery,2 a Class A misdemeanor when committed by an adult. At the dispositional hearing, the trial court granted wardship of C.T.S. to the Department of Correction and recommended a period of commitment of twelve months. C.T.S. appeals raising seven issues, which we reorder and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over C.T.S.;
II. Whether the trial court erred when it denied C.T.S.'s request for access to a polygraph examiner while he was detained;
III. Whether C.T.S. was properly detained for over four months in the Juvenile Detention Center before he was adjudicated a delinquent child;
IV. Whether the trial court properly excluded C.T.S.'s stepfather from the proceedings due to a witness separation order;
V. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that C.T.S. committed the acts of pointing a firearm and battery, which are Class A misdemeanors if committed by an adult;
VI. Whether the trial court properly committed C.T.S. to the Department of Correction; and,
VII. Whether Indiana Code section 31-32-6-3 unconstitutionally removes from the trial court its authority to determine if the public should be excluded from a juvenile proceeding.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The facts most favorable to the trial court's judgment reveal that on October 20, 2001, both C.T.S. and D.A.O. were at a party at the clubhouse at Martin Manor Apartments in Indianapolis. During a fight that occurred at the party, C.T.S. and D.A.O. yelled at each other using vulgar language. As D.A.O. was walking back to his car to leave after the party ended due to the fight, C.T.S. approached him. When D.A.O. arrived at his car, C.T.S. walked up, stood next to him and pulled out a gun. He then threatened D.A.O. and with his finger on the trigger, put the gun against D.A.O.'s stomach. Tr. p. 31. D.A.O. stated "don't you ever pull a gun out on me" and pushed it away. Id. While D.A.O. and C.T.S. yelled obscenities at one another, one of C.T.S.'s friends took the gun from him, and another friend pulled C.T.S. away from D.A.O. D.A.O. then left with his friends.
On October 22, 2001, at approximately 7:00 p.m., D.A.O. was at home when he heard a knock on the door. As he opened the door, the individual at the door asked D.A.O. if Rob lived there. D.A.O. replied in the negative and saw C.T.S. approach. After a short conversation, C.T.S. and the other individual grabbed D.A.O. and dragged him outside. D.A.O. observed that C.T.S. had something in his hand, which he thought was the "butt of a gun." Tr. p. 36. C.T.S. then hit D.A.O. with the object on his face near his eyebrow. D.A.O. collapsed and was punched and kicked repeatedly. A neighbor observed what was happening and called 911. D.A.O. was taken to St. Vincent's Hospital where he received stitches as a result of the blow to his face.
As a result of the two incidents, on November 1, 2001, C.T.S. was charged with pointing a firearm, a Class D felony if committed by an adult, and battery, a Class C felony if committed by an adult.3 An initial hearing was also held on that date, at which C.T.S. entered a denial as to both charges. The trial court ordered C.T.S. detained at the Marion County Juvenile Detention Center finding that C.T.S. "is unlikely to appear for subsequent proceedings and detention is essential to protect the child or the community." Appellant's App. p. 43. Also at the initial hearing, a denial hearing was scheduled for November 26, 2001.
On November 14, 2001, C.T.S. filed a notice of alibi defense and a request for visitation by an investigator and a polygraph examiner. The trial court granted the request for the investigator, but denied access to a polygraph examiner. On November 21, 2001, at a pretrial hearing, C.T.S. filed a motion for continuance, which was granted. The denial hearing was rescheduled for December 19, 2001. Also, on November 21, C.T.S. filed a motion requesting to be released from detention. The motion was denied.
On December 19, 2001, the trial court convened the denial hearing and evidence was heard. Due to time constraints, the trial court continued the denial hearing to January 3, 2002. Also on December 19, the trial court held a detention hearing and ordered C.T.S. to remain in detention. Evidence was heard at the January 3, 2002 denial hearing, but the hearing was continued for a second time due to time constraints. Another detention hearing was also held on that date, and the trial court found that C.T.S. should remain in detention.
The denial hearing was then continued twice on the court's own motion. On February 8, 2002, the denial hearing resumed, and the parties rested. On that date, a detention hearing was held as well, and the trial court ordered C.T.S. to remain in detention. After proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were submitted by both parties, on March 8, 2002, the trial court issued its findings of fact and found C.T.S. to be a delinquent child. Also, on that date, C.T.S. filed another request for release from detention, which the trial court granted, and C.T.S. was released to his parents on electronic monitoring.
On April 15, 2002, a disposition hearing was held. At that time, the trial court found that C.T.S. was a delinquent child for pointing a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, and battery, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult.4 The trial court then granted wardship of C.T.S. to the Department of Correction and recommended a period of commitment of twelve months because of C.T.S.'s prior history of delinquent activity. The trial court also found that "its disposition is the least restrictive alternative to insure [C.T.S.'s] welfare and rehabilitation." Appellant's App. p. 5. C.T.S. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
C.T.S. first argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because a summons was not issued as required by Indiana Code section 31-37-12-2(b).5 C.T.S. and his parents appeared at the initial hearing held on November 1, 2001; therefore, they clearly had actual notice of the date and time of the initial hearing. In K.D. v. State, 754 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), our court held that the juvenile could not "successfully challenge the court's personal jurisdiction over him because he submitted himself to the authority of the juvenile court and did not challenge personal jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss." C.T.S. and his parents appeared at every hearing, did not challenge personal jurisdiction, and fully submitted themselves to the authority of the trial court. Under these facts and circumstances, the trial court had personal jurisdiction even though a summons was not issued as required by Indiana Code section 31-37-12-2(b).
C.T.S. next argues that the trial court improperly denied his request for access to a polygraph examiner. Specifically, he alleges that the trial court's refusal to grant him access to a polygraph examiner prejudiced the preparation of his defense and violated his state and federal constitutional rights to counsel and due process of law.
In general, polygraph examinations are not admissible as evidence in Indiana because of their inherent unreliability. Gray v. State, 758 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Ind. 2001) (citations omitted). While C.T.S. acknowledges the restriction on the admissibility of such examinations, he contends that polygraph examinations can assist in the preparation of a defense and can be used in negotiations with prosecutors. The State responds that C.T.S. has failed to demonstrate how a polygraph examination would have been essential to the preparation of his defense and observes that C.T.S.'s defense was well prepared. At the denial hearings, C.T.S. conducted lengthy cross-examinations of the State's witnesses and presented numerous witnesses on his own behalf.
We agree that C.T.S. has failed to specifically demonstrate how lack of access to a polygraph examination prejudiced his defense. Therefore, given Indiana's general rule that polygraph examinations are not admissible as evidence, the trial court did not err when it denied C.T.S.'s request for access to a polygraph examination.6
C.T.S. next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it detained him in the Marion County Juvenile Detention Center for over four months during the pendency of the proceedings. Initially, we note that the State argues that this issue is moot because if C.T.S. prevails on this argument, our court is not in any position to render effective relief to him. However, our courts "have long recognized that a case may be decided on its merits under an exception to the general rule when the case involves questions of `great public interest.' " R.A. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 376, 378 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (citation omitted). Issues that are likely to recur generally fall within the public interest exception. Id. This issue is one likely to recur, and therefore, we will address this issue on its merits. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-37-6-6, a juvenile court is generally required to release a "child on the child's own recognizance or to the child's parent, guardian, or custodian upon the person's written...
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