Cua v. Ramos

Decision Date26 March 1981
Docket NumberNo. 2-679-A-189,2-679-A-189
Citation418 N.E.2d 1163
PartiesRosita L. CUA, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Virginia G. RAMOS, Blas Davila, Appellees (Defendants Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Donald A. Schabel, Indianapolis, Stephen H. Free, Christian, Waltz, White, Klotz & Free, Noblesville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John K. Silk, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.

BUCHANAN, Chief Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Plaintiff-appellant Rosita L. Cua appeals a judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Virginia G. Ramos and Blas Davila, claiming: trial court error in entering judgment on the evidence as to an implied right of action (Count I); and, as to a libel action (Count II), error in admitting or excluding evidence, in giving or refusing instructions, and in ruling on numerous questions of procedure.

We reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

On February 15, 1976 Cua was appointed to the position of psychiatrist at Central State Hospital. At the time, Ramos, also was a psychiatrist at Central State Hospital and senior physician in the Bolton Building, where Cua was assigned. Davila was Chief of Services at the Bolton Building. Both Ramos and Davila were charged with the supervision of Cua and the evaluation of her performance.

Cua and Ramos eventually disagreed over the assignment of patients and Cua's work schedule. In December 1976, Ramos and Davila submitted a performance report to the Indiana State Personnel Division in which Cua was given a non-satisfactory rating. The substance of the report follows:

                CATEGORY                     RATING
                --------                     ------
                Planning--Sets realistic
                --------
                goals and objectives
                anticipates and prepares
                for future requirements
                establishes logical
                priorities:                  NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
                Leadership--Sets
                ----------
                high standards; provides
                good managerial
                example; delegates
                authority and
                responsibility effectively:  NOT SATISFACTORY
                Subordinate
                -----------
                Development--Helps
                -----------
                subordinates in job
                development; gives
                guidance and counseling:     NOT SATISFACTORY
                Human Relations
                ---------------
                --Establishes and
                maintains cordial work
                climate; promotes
                harmony; displays
                sincere interest in
                assisting employeees:        NOT SATISFACTORY
                Quantity of Work
                ----------------
                --Consider amount of
                work generated to
                amount of work expected
                for current job or
                position:                    NOT SATISFACTORY
                Quality of Work
                ---------------------------
                --Consider overall
                knowledge of duties and
                responsibilities and
                completeness and             MEETS REQUIREMENTS
                accuracy of work
                Use of Time--Consider
                -----------
                attendance: is punctual
                reporting to work
                accomplishes required
                work on or ahead of
                schedule:                    NOT SATISFACTORY
                Initiative--Consider
                ----------
                amount of direction or
                supervision required and
                concern for consistency
                in trying to do better:      NOT SATISFACTORY
                

The possible ratings were "SUPERIOR, HIGHLY SATISFACTORY, MEETS REQUIREMENTS, NEEDS IMPROVEMENT," and "NOT SATISFACTORY." Ratings which were less than "MEETS REQUIREMENTS" were explained:

1) Quanity (sic) of Work Substandard for position. More concerned with who is doing less than she, rather than her own output.

3) Use of time Poor. Spends much time in closed office and out of building. Often cannot be found when needed. Ward visits brief and not frequent enough.

4) Initiative Requires frequent supervision and direction. Must be asked to do routine duties.

5) Planning Generally waits till last minute to inform team of plans, especially absences.

6) Leadership Rejects leadership role. Provides poor managerial example. Makes demands of others without willing to do own share.

7) Subordinate Development Does nothing to enhance growth of her subordinates.

8) Human Relations Very poor interpersonnal (sic) relationship with staff and peers. Has interest only in own personal concerns.

Record at 511.

On January 14, 1977, Ramos and Davila sent a memorandum to Superintendent Helmer recommending that Cua not be granted permanent status, as provided for in the State Personnel Act, and that her employment be terminated. On January 20, 1977, Superintendent Helmer sent a letter of notification to Cua stating that she would be dismissed on January 31, 1977, because of "unsatisfactory work performance."

Cua subsequently brought an action for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that Ramos and Davila had submitted a false performance report to the State Personnel Division. The complaint contained two counts: Court I was for an implied right of action arising from the defendants' violation of a criminal statute; 1 Count II was for libel.

After Cua had presented her evidence and rested her case, Ramos and Davila moved for judgment on the evidence on both counts of the complaint. The trial court granted the motion as to Count I (violation of a criminal statute) but denied the motion as to the Count II (libel). Count II was tried to a jury, the jury finding for Ramos and Davila.

ISSUES

Cua now appeals, alleging twenty-five separate points of error. We have consolidated the issues for appeal as follows:

1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in giving or refusing to give certain instructions?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Cua's motion to strike the defendants' answer as "sham and false"?

3. Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting or excluding certain evidence?

Though we reverse for a new trial because of the trial court's failure to give the substance of Cua's tendered instruction No. 5 (Issue I B), we consider only other issues most likely to arise on retrial.

Other claimed errors we do not consider likely to arise on retrial are: (1) The admission of Exhibits L, M and N (effect of pre-trial order); (2) the admission of Mary Sigler's testimony; (3) the ruling on a motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; and (4) the striking of testimony because of violation of a separation of witness order. Burk v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 407, 257 N.E.2d 1.

DECISION
ISSUE ONE Instructions

Did the trial court commit reversible error in giving or refusing to give certain instructions?

CONCLUSION The court committed reversible error in refusing one of Cua's tendered instructions.

A.

Cua first asserts that the court erred in giving the defendants' tendered instruction No. 1 and refusing to give Cua's requested instruction No. 4. Defendants' tendered instruction No. 1, which was given, is:

Libel is defined as a malicious publication, expressed either in writing or printing, of a false statement to blacken the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him or her to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. In the absence of an injury to reputation, even though the statement caused the plaintiff humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering, your verdict must be for the defendants. By a publication which brings plaintiff into public hatred, contempt or ridicule is not meant one which causes plaintiff embarrassment or injures her feelings, but one which actually lowers her in the estimation of the public and injures her reputation.

Record at 1747. On the other hand, Cua offered the following instruction:

A libel has been defined as a malicious defamation expressed either by writing or printing, or by signs, pictures, effigies, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects, of one who is alive and thereby exposed him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy; or to cause him to be shunned or avoided, or to injure him in his office, business, or occupation.

Id. at 193. The fault with the defendants' instruction No. 1, according to Cua, is that it only speaks of injury to public reputation, failing to mention injury to Cua's reputation as a professional. She seems to be arguing that one may be libeled in her reputation as a professional without being injured in her public reputation. In effect, the instruction given is attacked, not as erroneous, but as incomplete.

Libel, generally, is a defamatory statement in written form. The injury to public reputation can be either to one's reputation as a professional or to one's reputation as an individual: "(D)efamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name." W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, the definition of defamation is sometimes stated in disjunctive terms:

A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 559, P. 140 (1938).

Erdman v. White, (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 653, at 658. But this is not to say that a court errs in refusing to give a more specific definition of defamation rather than a general one. A person who is injured in his reputation as a professional is necessarily injured in his public reputation. See Local 15 of Independent Workers v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, (N.D.Ind. 1967) 273 F.Supp. 313, 320:

A statement may be defamatory when it is such as would tend to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; when it causes him to be shunned or avoided or tends to injure him in his profession, trade, or calling. Prosser v. Callis, 117 Ind. 105, 19 N.E. 735 (1889); Patchell v. Jaqua, 6 Ind.App. 70, 33 N.E. 132 (1893). In general, it may be said that defamation is that which tends to injure "reputation" or to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. Prosser, Torts (2nd.) § 92.

To obtain reversal Cua has the burden of proving prejudicial error. State v. Hall, (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 366. Assuming that an...

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2 cases
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    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 29, 1981
    ...brief, default judgments are not favored in the law for they are rendered without a trial of any issue of law or fact. Cua v. Ramos, (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 1163; Davis v. Davis, (1980) Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 993. Generally, any doubt as to a default judgment's propriety must be resolved ......
  • Cua v. Ramos, 482S128
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • April 1, 1982
    ...jury found in favor of Ramos and Davila. The Court of Appeals, Second District, reversed the decision of the trial court. Cua v. Ramos, (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 1163. The question presented for review is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court, in refusing to g......

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