Cuddy v. Schiavonne
| Decision Date | 01 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-375-A,88-375-A |
| Citation | 568 A.2d 1387 |
| Parties | Stephen R. CUDDY et al. v. Joseph SCHIAVONNE et al. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The plaintiff in this negligence action, Stephen R. Cuddy (Cuddy), filed suit in the Providence County Superior Court against the defendants, Joseph Schiavonne (Schiavonne) and Hertz Car Rental Agency (Hertz), for personal injuries allegedly resulting from an automobile collision in which Cuddy's car was struck from the rear by a Hertz rental car being driven by Schiavonne. After an eight-day jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Schiavonne and Hertz. 1 Shortly thereafter Cuddy's motion for a new trial was denied. Cuddy now appeals from the denial of that motion.
The facts of the collision are not complicated. On February 6, 1980, Cuddy was driving on a one-way section of Charles Street in Providence, Rhode Island. He turned onto a short road in order to turn again onto Ashburton Street, a one-way street heading in the opposite direction. He stopped as he approached the turn. Schiavonne, who was behind Cuddy, was making the same maneuver. He also came to a stop, but he then started forward, striking Cuddy's car in the rear. Apparently Schiavonne was looking for oncoming traffic to his right and mistakenly believed that Cuddy had already merged onto Ashburton Street. The record indicates that Cuddy's car sustained only a minor dent in the rear fender, and there was no visible damage to the Hertz rental car driven by Schiavonne. Police and a rescue squad were summoned, and Cuddy was taken by an ambulance to St. Joseph Hospital. After the examination in the emergency room was completed, Cuddy began to dress himself. As he was pulling on his pants, he fell to the floor. He was then admitted into the hospital and remained for eight days while being treated for a concussion.
In the months following his discharge from St. Joseph's, Cuddy consulted several physicians for a multitude of physical ailments. He complained of recurring headaches, blackouts, and seizures. These blackouts apparently led to subsequent mishaps that, in turn, caused him further pain and injury.
When this matter came to trial, it was Cuddy's burden to present evidence that the injuries complained of were causally linked to the collision. Cuddy presented extensive medical testimony and evidence relating to his injuries. Despite the voluminous medical testimony and evidence, which was often confusing, the jury remained unconvinced and returned a verdict in favor of defendants. Cuddy then moved for a new trial. During the hearing of that motion the trial justice stated that different minds could have come to different conclusions based on the evidence presented. In his view, Cuddy had not carried his burden of proof, and the verdict had done "substantial justice between the parties." He then denied the motion.
Cuddy, in appealing that denial, raises several issues. He first argues that the trial justice erred in excluding many of the medical affidavits he had offered into evidence. He also contends that various exhibits offered into evidence by defense counsel were improperly admitted by the trial justice. Finally Cuddy asserts that the verdict was against the law and the evidence because, at a minimum, they had proven that plaintiff sustained a concussion and cervical strain as a result of the collision. We shall now address these issues.
First, Cuddy contends that the trial justice erred in excluding a medical affidavit of a deceased doctor. The trial justice excluded the records offered on the grounds that there were "obviously some gaps, and it seems to me that the defendant would be unduly prejudiced by my permitting [the] affidavit going in."
Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." As the record indicates the particular medical records offered were not complete. The affidavit contained medical records dating back to June 24, 1980, but notes contained therein indicated a "prior visit." The unavailability of the records pertaining to that "prior visit" placed "an untenable burden * * * on defense counsel," according to the trial justice.
We have stated in State v. Martini, 460 A.2d 936, 938 (R.I.1983): See State v. St. Pierre, 118 R.I. 45, 371 A.2d 1048 (1977).
The gaps in the records relating to possible treatment before or immediately after the collision are sufficient grounds for the trial justice to find the affidavit to be unduly prejudicial to defendants. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial justice's actions pertaining to this particular affidavit.
Second, Cuddy argues that the trial justice erred in excluding several other medical affidavits offered by Cuddy's counsel. Excluded were numerous exhibits, each comprising various records and charges from several hospitals, doctors, and medical-testing services. All dealt with treatment that had occurred after the collision. Each was excluded because it did not individually establish any causal connection between the injuries complained of and the collision. The trial justice stated that each failed "to meet the requisite requirement of medical affidavits in that the causal connection has not been made properly, and it is my understanding of the recent case of Parrillo v. Woolworth that the plaintiff cannot rely on other evidence to supply the missing link of causal connection in medical affidavits."
The case cited by the trial justice, Parrillo v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 518 A.2d 354 (R.I.1986), reads, in pertinent part, "Expert testimony, if it is to have any evidentiary value, must state with some degree of certainty that a given state of affairs is the result of a given cause." Id. at 355-56. "Each affidavit must satisfy the requirements for expert medical testimony on its own and may not rely on separate evidence to supply missing links." Id. at 356.
These exhibits were offered under G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-19-27(a), P.L.1989, ch. 290, § 1, 2 which offers an alternative method of introducing medical evidence through the use of medical affidavits. We have, however, stated in Parrillo, "Although all litigants have the right...
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...unless it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Tempest, 651 A.2d 1198, 1216 (R.I.1995) (citing Cuddy v. Schiavonne, 568 A.2d 1387, 1389 (R.I.1990)). In our opinion, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he ruled that the jury would be informed about the length of......
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