Cuka v. State

Decision Date05 June 1963
Docket NumberNo. 9982,9982
Citation80 S.D. 232,122 N.W.2d 83
PartiesMatt M. CUKA, Plaintiff, v. STATE of South Dakota, Defendant.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Elmer E. Gemar, Springfield, for plaintiff.

John B. Wehde, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for defendant.

HANSON, Presiding Judge.

This is an original proceeding against the state in which plaintiff seeks to recover $280 according to the terms of an option agreement with the State Highway Commission for right of way on an abandoned highway project. As there are 46 other land owners similar situated this proceeding is in the nature of a 'pilot' case.

The matter was referred to the Hon. James R. Bandy, as Referee, who entered and reported conclusions in favor of the state based upon the following findings of fact:

'1. On or about November 18, 1960, the State Highway Commission of the State of South Dakota, by resolution, determined the necessity to relocate a portion of State Highway Number 50, the same being a part of the Trunk Highway System.

'2. Such relocation required the use of real property owned by the plaintiff which was not then subject to any existing easement for highway purposes.

'3. On December 21, 1960 the State Highway Commission offered to pay the plaintiff $280.00 for such tract of land, 'for highway purposes only.'

'4. On December 21, 1960 the plaintiff accepted such offer and made, executed and delivered a warranty deed conveying said premises to the State of South Dakota.

'5. The contract for purchase and sale provided that the taking of a deed should render the payment thereunder due.

'6. Thereafter the State Highway Commission audited and approved the plaintiff's claim for $280.00.

'7. On January 24, 1961 the State Auditor issued warrant number 17204 in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $280.00 and delivered the same into the possession of the State Highway Commission. Such warrant was never delivered to the plaintiff but was subsequently returned to the State Auditor and cancelled. The State Auditor refuses to reissue such warrant or a new one in its stead.

'8. On March 8, 1961 the State Highway Commission, by resolution, determined that rerouting of State Highway Number 50 was not necessary and rescinded its resolution of November 18, 1960.

'9. On or about May 11, 1961 the State Highway Commission returned the warranty deed to the plaintiff who refused to keep the same and returned it to the State Highway Commission.

'10. Such tract of land was never used for any highway purpose.

'11. On June 7, 1962 the State Highway Commission, by resolution, vacated and abandoned the said tract of land and reverted the same to the plaintiff.

'12. The plaintiff has offered no proof, by stipulation or otherwise, as to the excess, if any, of the amount which would have been due the seller under the contract, over the value of the property to him.'

Plaintiff contends this is simply an action at law to recover the contract price of land pursuant to the terms of an executed agreement; that the option agreement lost its executory character upon delivery of deed at which time his right to payment became vested; and the fact the state is a party to the contract and the nature and purpose of the land purchase are immaterial factors which do not constitute grounds for the rejection of his claim. We cannot agree.

Because of its sovereign status there is no inherent right to sue the state. Plaintiff's action is brought under the permissive provisions of SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0604 and recovery thereunder is limited to claims for which there is an available appropriation. Sigwald v. State, 50 S.D. 37, 208 N.W. 162; Kansas City Bridge Co. v. State, 61 S.D. 580, 250 N.W. 343; Brams v. State, 63 S.D. 571, 262 N.W. 89; Pietz v. State, 65 S.D. 52, 270 N.W. 648; Griffis v. State, 68 S.D. 360, 2 N.W.2d 666, and 69 S.D. 439, 11 N.W.2d 138. The essential question presented here then is whether or not there are appropriated funds available to pay for right of way on the abandoned highway project.

The State Highway Commission is charged with the duty of acquiring right of way for the construction or improvement of State Trunk Highways. Its restricted authority and manner of proceeding, in this regard, is set forth in the following statutory provisions: '* * * whenever any land or lands, easement in same or material is necessary for right of way in order to make a safe or proper grade, or for widening, changing, relocating, constructing, reconstructing, maintaining or repairing any portion of the State Trunk Highway * * * the state of South Dakota, through and by its State Highway Commission, shall acquire and pay for same out of state highway funds. The...

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14 cases
  • Tripp v. F & K Assam Family, LLC
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 6 Agosto 2008
    ...property for highway right of way it merely acquires an easement and fee title remains in the abutting landowner." Cuka v. State, 80 S.D. 232, 236, 122 N.W.2d 83, 85 (1963) (citing Edmison v. Lowry, 3 S.D. 77, 52 N.W. 583 (1892); Meek v. Meade County, 12 S.D. 162, 80 N.W. 182 (1899); Sweatm......
  • City of Rapid City v. Boland
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 26 Octubre 1978
    ...of jurisprudence, that the state cannot be sued unless it has given its consent or has otherwise waived its immunity. Cuka v. State, 1963, 80 S.D. 232, 122 N.W.2d 83; 72 Am.Jur.2d, States, Etc., §§ 99, 100; 81A C.J.S. States § 298. A municipal corporation acting within its governmental powe......
  • Blue Fox Bar, Inc. v. City of Yankton
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 8 Junio 1988
    ...given its consent or has otherwise waived its immunity. City of Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 64 (S.D.1978); Cuka v. State, 80 S.D. 232, 122 N.W.2d 83, 85 (1963). When acting within its governmental powers, a municipal corporation is acting as an agent for the state and partakes in i......
  • Hurley v. State
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 21 Junio 1966
    ...to abutting owners for loss of access. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. State, 61 S.D. 580, 250 N.W. 343; Griffis v. State, supra; Cuka v. State, 80 S.D. 232, 122 N.W.2d 83. It can be aptly stated that the legislature has been consistent and has made clear its intention which is all important in s......
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