Culberson v. Empire Coal Co.

Decision Date13 February 1908
Citation156 Ala. 416,47 So. 237
PartiesCULBERSON v. EMPIRE COAL CO.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied July 3, 1908.

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Walker County; T. L. Sowell Judge.

Action by John M. Culberson against the Empire Coal Company for damages for an assault and battery committed upon him by other passengers while a passenger himself on one of defendant's cars. From a judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The third count of the complaint was in the following language "Plaintiff claims of defendant, the Empire Coal Company a corporation, $50,000 damages, for that on, to wit, the 2d day of October, 1905, the defendant was operating a railroad between Bergin and Empire, in Walker county, Ala., and was engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire between said points on said railway, and that on, to wit, said day, plaintiff was a passenger on board one of the cars used by defendant for the carriage of passengers, and that George Ross and Joe Rainer were also passengers on said car, and that soon after the train had started on its way from Bergin to Empire the plaintiff was assaulted and knocked, pushed, shoved, or precipitated from said train by the said George Ross and Joe Rainer, or by one of the said last-named parties, while the train was moving, and the said plaintiff as the result of the premises had his skull cracked, bruised, etc. [ Here follows a number of special damages.] And plaintiff avers that the conductor on said train, or some one or more of the servants or agents of the defendant in charge of said train, had knowledge of the danger that was impending to plaintiff, and was informed that said assault was impending, or had knowledge that it was necessary to intervene in order to protect plaintiff, and said conductor or said servant knowingly failed or refused to discharge the duty devolving upon him by interfering or intervening in order to protect the plaintiff, and such negligence on the part of such servants of defendant resulted in the injuries to the plaintiff."

The following demurrers were filed to this count: "Said count fails to allege any facts showing that the negligence of defendant's servants or agents was the proximate cause of the injury. Said count fails to allege the character of the danger with which plaintiff was threatened by said Ross and Rainer. There is no allegation in said count that plaintiff was without fault in bringing on the alleged assault, or that he was not the aggressor therein. Said count does not allege in what way or manner the conductor was informed of the danger to plaintiff, or that the assault with which he was threatened was of a dangerous character. Said count fails to allege in what the negligence of defendant's servants consisted. There is no allegation showing that defendant's servants were acting within the line and scope of their duty and authority at the time of the alleged injury."

M. L. Leith, John A. Coleman, and Bowman, Harsh & Beddow, for appellant.

Cabaniss & Bowie and Bankhead & Bankhead, for appellee.

ANDERSON J.

The third count of the complaint sufficiently averred that the plaintiff was a passenger and that the defendant was a carrier of passengers for hire. It also avers that the conductor or other servants of the defendant knew of the impending danger of the plaintiff from Ross and Rainer, and knowingly failed or refused to discharge the duty devolved upon them by interfering in order to protect the plaintiff "and such negligence on the part of said servants of the defendant resulted in the injuries to plaintiff as aforesaid." If the officers could have prevented the injuries to the plaintiff by intervening or interfering, and knowingly or willfully failed to do so, after knowing of the threatened danger, their failure to do so was a breach of duty to the plaintiff for which the defendant would be answerable. It is true the complaint should aver that the agents or servants could have prevented the injury complained of; but we think the averment that "such negligence on the part of the servants of the defendant resulted in the injuries of plaintiff as aforesaid" was sufficient. The negligence complained of was the failure to interfere after knowledge of plaintiff's threatened danger, and, if said negligence resulted in plaintiff's injury, then the injury could have, of course, been prevented by an interference. " 'The carrier's obligation is to carry his passenger safely and properly, and to treat him respectfully; and, if he intrusts the performance of this duty to his servants, the law holds him responsible for the manner in which they execute the trust. The law seems to be now well settled that the carrier is obliged to protect his passenger from violence and insult, from whatever source arising. He is not regarded as an insurer of his passenger's safety against every possible source of danger; but he is bound...

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