Culbreath v. State
Decision Date | 14 April 1995 |
Docket Number | CR-94-291 |
Citation | 667 So.2d 156 |
Parties | Kenneth H. CULBREATH v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Cullman Circuit Court, No. CC-94-374; Frank Brunner, Judge.
Gregory Nicholas, Cullman, for appellant.
Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Norbert Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Kenneth H. Culbreath, was convicted of the crime of stalking his former wife, a violation of § 13A-6-90, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to seven years in the penitentiary.
The appellant initially contends that Alabama's stalking statute is unconstitutional because, he says, it is vague and overbroad. Section 13A-6-90, defines the crime of stalking as follows:
"A person who intentionally and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat, either express or implied, with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm is guilty of the crime of stalking."
"Harasses" as that term is used in the above statute is defined in § 13A-6-92(c) as follows:
"Credible threat" as the phrase is used in the above statute is defined in § 13A-6-92(b) as follows:
"A threat, expressed or implied, made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to fear for his or her safety or the safety of a family member and to cause reasonable mental anxiety, anguish, or fear."
"Course of conduct" is defined in § 13A-6-92(a) as follows:
"A pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time which evidence a continuity of purpose."
The United States Supreme Court has stated the following about the void for vagueness challenge:
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), quoting, in part, Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1323, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964). See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617-18, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). To withstand a challenge of vagueness, a statute must: 1) give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, and, 2) provide explicit standards to those who apply the laws. Grayned.
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 244, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975). "A defendant who challenges a statute on the ground of vagueness 'must demonstrate that the statute under attack is vague as applied to his own conduct, regardless of the potentially vague applications to others.' " Senf v. State, 622 So.2d 435, 437 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), quoting Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir.1980). (Emphasis supplied.)
This court has stated the following about the overbreadth doctrine:
"The overbroad doctrine derives from the First Amendment, see Young v. American Mini Theaters [Theatres], 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974), and serves to invalidate legislation so sweeping that, along with its allowable proscriptions, it also restricts constitutionally-protected rights of free speech, press, or assembly, see, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)."
McCrary v. State, 429 So.2d 1121, 1123 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 913, 104 S.Ct. 273, 78 L.Ed.2d 254 (1983).
Alabama appellate courts have never had occasion to address the issue of whether Alabama's stalking statute, § 13A-6-90, is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Forty-eight states have enacted stalking laws. "Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia now have laws that make it a crime to stalk another person--that is, to follow and harass that person." Boychuk, M. Katerine, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw.U.L.Rev. 769 (1994).
Several states have addressed this issue and found their stalking statutes to be neither vague nor overbroad. See Pallas v. State, 636 So.2d 1358 (Fla.Dist.App.1994), review granted, 648 So.2d 723 (Fla.1994) 1; People v. Heilman, 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 (1994); Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 449 S.E.2d 94 (1994); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 447 S.E.2d 530 (1994); State v. Bilder, 99 Ohio App.3d 653, 651 N.E.2d 502 (1994); State v. Culmo, 43 Conn.Supp. 46, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn.Super.1993).
The Alabama stalking statute is substantially similar to both the Florida and California statutes. The Alabama stalking statute, like the Florida and California statutes, has three components. First, the accused must intentionally commit the offense. Second, there must be a "credible threat." Third, there must be an "act" of repeatedly following or harassing another person that places that person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm.
Alabama's statute provides that the offense must be intentional. 88 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 781.
The Florida District Court of Appeals in upholding the Florida aggravated stalking statute, § 784.048(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1992), 2 against challenges of vagueness in Pallas, stated the following about the statute's intent requirement:
Pallas, 636 So.2d at 1360. Alabama's stalking statute likewise is not vague in this regard.
Second, there must be a credible threat, which is defined in § 13A-6-92(b) as "[a] threat, expressed or implied, made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to fear for his or her safety or the safety of a family member and to cause reasonable mental anxiety, anguish, or fear."
88 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 779. Alabama's stalking law clearly defines a "credible threat" and provides that the threat must be communicated. There is no vagueness or overbreadth problem here.
Third, Alabama's stalking law requires "acts," i.e., repeatedly following or harassing another person. The phrase "repeatedly follows" was evaluated by the Superior Court of Connecticut in Culmo, supra, when the court was reviewing the constitutionality of Connecticut's stalking law. 3 The court stated:
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