Cullars-Doty v. City of St. Paul

• Decision Date: 10 December 2021
• Docket Number: 21-cv-94 (NEB/ECW)
• Parties: Monique C. Cullars-Doty as Special Administator and Trustee for the Next of Kin of Marcus Ryan Cullars Golden; Ericka Cullars-Golden; and Pauline Cullars, Plaintiffs, v. City of St. Paul; Ofc. Jeremy Doverspike; Ofc. Daniel Peck; Ofc. Sheila Lambie; Ofc. Jody Larsen; Ofc. Jean Barber; Ofc. Patrick Cheshier; Ofc. Benjamin Lego; Ofc. Charles Sims; and Sgt. Shawn Shanley; in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Monique C. Cullars-Doty as Special Administator and Trustee for the Next of Kin of Marcus Ryan Cullars Golden; Ericka Cullars-Golden; and Pauline Cullars, Plaintiffs,
v.
City of St. Paul; Ofc. Jeremy Doverspike; Ofc. Daniel Peck; Ofc. Sheila Lambie; Ofc. Jody Larsen; Ofc. Jean Barber; Ofc. Patrick Cheshier; Ofc. Benjamin Lego; Ofc. Charles Sims; and Sgt. Shawn Shanley; in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-94 (NEB/ECW)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

December 10, 2021

ORDER

ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint (“Motion”) (Dkt. 27). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. General Background

On January 12, 2021, Plaintiffs initiated the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting in part that it arose “out of the January 14, 2015 fatal shooting of Marcus Ryan Cullars Golden resulting from a violation of his Constitutional rights by City of St. Paul and on-duty St. Paul police officers Jeremy Doverspike, and Daniel Peck. Plaintiff asserts these officers violated Marcus' well-settled federal civil rights

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while acting under color of state law.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs in this action initially proceeded pro se. Counsel for Plaintiff made his first appearance in June 2021. (Dkt. 18.)

Plaintiffs filed the present Motion on October 1, 2021. The proposed amended complaint seeks primarily to reframe Count II from a claim that alleges the deprivation of Golden's rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, to a wrongful death claim against Defendants Doverspike and Peck related to the death of Golden based on the assertion that they either intended to cause the death of Golden when firing their weapons, or alternatively were perpetrating an eminently dangerous act without regard for Golden's life and that their actions were unlawful under Minnesota's authorized use of deadly force by police officers, Minn. Stat. § 609.066. (See Dkt. 27-6 at 10-11; Dkt. 33 at 8.)

Specifically, the current version of the proposed amended pleading alleges as follows: In the early morning hours of January 14, 2015, Marcus Golden drove unarmed to the apartment complex at 261 University Avenue in St. Paul. (Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 13-14.) Golden parked in the parking lot of the apartment and remained in his vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) An unidentified man inside of the apartment called 911 and reported that someone was texting threats to him.^[1] (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) Two squads, not including Doverspike and

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Peck (who went to the scene on their own volition), were dispatched to the apartment complex on a harassment complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.)

Doverspike and Peck arrived in a squad without activating the siren or emergency lights, exited their vehicle, and began to approach Golden in his vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) Golden attempted to drive around the officers and their vehicle.^[2] (Id. ¶ 24.) Both officers opened fire on Golden's vehicle^[3] during which he was shot twice: once in the left forearm, entering nearer the elbow than the wrist and exiting nearer the wrist than the elbow; while the other shot entered the back of Golden's skull. (Id. ¶¶ 25-29.)

The wrongful death claim alleges that Doverspike and Peck intentionally fired their weapons at Golden even though he did not pose a threat of death or harm to them and did not pose an immediate threat of death or harm to others at the time he was shot; Doverspike and Peck's actions in firing their weapons was unlawful under Minn. Stat. § 609.066; Doverspike and Peck either intended to cause the death of Golden when firing

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their weapons, or alternatively were perpetrating an eminently dangerous act without regard for Golden's life; and that as a result of their conduct, Golden lost his life. (Id. ¶¶ 71-76.)

B. Appointment of Wrongful Death Trustee

The operative Complaint and the initial proposed amended complaint both allege that “By order dated December 24, 2020, Ramsey County District Court Judge Sara Grewing appointed Monique Cassandra Cullars-Doty (‘Cullars-Doty') as Special Administrator for the estate of Marcus Ryan Cullars Golden.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 1; Dkt. 27-6 ¶ 1.) There was no mention in these pleadings that Cullars-Doty was also the wrongful death trustee pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subdivision 3. As part of its opposition, Defendants argued that the Motion should be denied as futile on the basis that the pleadings only allege that Cullars-Doty is Special Administrator for the estate of Golden, as opposed to the wrongful death trustee for the next of kin pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subdivision 3, necessary to bring a wrongful death action. (Dkt. 31 at 3.)

Minnesota's wrongful death statute provides in relevant part as follows:

When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person or corporation, the trustee appointed as provided in subdivision 3 may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused by the wrongful act or omission

Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 (emphasis added).

Thus, under Minnesota law, in order to bring a claim for wrongful death, a plaintiff must be appointed as a wrongful death trustee pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subdivision 3. See also Minn. Stat. § 573.01 (“A cause of action arising out of an injury

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to the person dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, except as provided in section 573.02. All other causes of action by one against another, whether arising on contract or not, survive to the personal representatives of the former and against those of the latter.”).

When Plaintiff's counsel was asked about this issue during the October 18, 2021 hearing, he represented that Cullars-Doty had been appointed as trustee for the heirs and kin of Golden in April 2021, and was willing to further amend the proposed amended complaint to reflect her appointment. Defendants did not object to such an additional amendment, subject to their other arguments with respect to futility. At the hearing, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a further redlined proposed amended complaint reflecting the appointment, and ordered the parties to provide the Court with supplemental briefing, which was completed on November 5, 2021. (Dkts. 32-36.)

As part of the second version of the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiffs now allege that “By order dated April 20, 2021, the Honorable John Guthmann appointed Monique Cassandra Cullars-Doty as Trustee for the heirs and kin of Marcus Ryan Cullars Golden.” (Dkt. 33 ¶ 1.) As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Cullars-Doty has standing, subject to the other arguments raised by Defendants, to bring the wrongful death action as the trustee.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” The determination as to whether to grant leave to amend is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Niagara of Wisconsin Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus. Union Mgmt. Pension Fund,

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800 F.2d 742, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The Eighth Circuit has held that “[a]lthough amendment of a complaint should be allowed liberally to ensure that a case is decided on its merits . . . there is no absolute right to amend.” Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau Cty., 88 F.3d 647, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Thompson-El v. Jones, 876 F.2d 66, 67 (8th Cir. 1989); Chesnut v. St. Louis Cty., 656 F.2d 343, 349 (8th Cir. 1981)). Denial of leave to amend may be justified by “undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the amendment or unfair prejudice to the opposing party.” Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see also Hillesheim v. Myron's Cards and Gifts, Inc., 897 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (“A district court's denial of leave to amend a complaint may be justified if the amendment would be futile.”). “Although ordinarily the decision of whether to allow a plaintiff to amend the complaint is within the trial court's discretion, when a court denies leave to amend on the ground of futility, it means that the court reached a legal conclusion that the amended complaint could not withstand a Rule 12 motion. . . .” In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2007). “Accordingly, in reviewing a denial of leave to amend we ask whether the proposed amended [pleading] states a cause of action under the Twombly pleading standard. . . .” Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 850-51 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation and marks omitted). This includes on the grounds that a claimant lacks standing to raise the proposed claims. See Dalton v. Simonson Station Stores, Inc., No. 17-CV-4427 (SRN/LIB), 2018 WL 11025788, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2018).

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Denial of leave to amend may be justified by “undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the amendment or unfair prejudice to the opposing party.” Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see also Hillesheim v. Myron's Cards and Gifts, Inc., 897 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (“A district court's denial of leave to amend a complaint may be justified if the amendment would be futile.”).

On a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must take the well-pleaded allegations of a claim as true, and construe the pleading, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, most favorably to the pleader. See Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to...