Cullen v. Town Council of Lincoln

Citation850 A.2d 900
Decision Date12 April 2004
Docket NumberNo. 2001-212-M.P.,2001-212-M.P.
PartiesJohn J. CULLEN et al. v. TOWN COUNCIL OF the TOWN OF LINCOLN.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Stephen H. Burke, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Teresa Paiva Weed, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLANDERS, GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and SUTTELL, JJ.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari directing the respondent, the Town Council of the Town of Lincoln (council) to deliver the record to this Court so that we may review its decision denying the petitioners', John J. Cullen and Roland Montigny (petitioners), application to tie into the sewer system of the Town of Lincoln (town). Because the council failed to accompany its decision with adequate factual findings and legal conclusions, we remand the record to the council with instructions to make such findings and conclusions.

I Facts and Travel1

The petitioners own a tract of land, known as Whipple Cullen Farm, in the town. With hopes of developing the tract into a residential subdivision (subdivision), the petitioners began the approval process outlined in G.L.1956 § 45-23-39(b), which requires people proposing major land developments and major subdivisions to obtain master plan approval, preliminary plan approval, and then final plan approval.2 After receiving master plan approval from the planning board in 1998, the petitioners sought preliminary plan approval pursuant to § 45-23-41. To that end, petitioners requested approval to connect the proposed subdivision's sewer line to the town's sewer system.

By ordinance, application to connect to the town's sewer system must be made to the town's director of public works. Lincoln, Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. II, § 19-96 (1990) (ch. 19, art. II is hereafter referred to as sewer ordinance). If the director of public works rejects the application, the property owner may appeal to the town sewer appeal board (appeal board), which in turn forwards its recommendation to the council for final determination. Id. at § 19-32.

In March 1999, petitioners met with then-director, Robert C. Schultz, P.E. (director), about their request to connect to the town's sewer system. Their plans proposed a sewer line that would discharge into a town pumping station, known as the Lower River Road pumping station (pumping station). Concerned about the pumping station's capacity to handle the additional effluent that the subdivision would generate, the director suggested three alternate routes for the subdivision's sewer lines. Each of the alternate routes would allow petitioners to tie into the sewer system, but would avoid connecting through the pumping station. Although the alternates would allow the subdivision effluent to be propelled by gravity rather than a pump, they apparently would require the lines to traverse designated wetlands. Thus, petitioners met with officials from the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) to discuss the alternates.

In a letter dated April 21, 1999, DEM informed petitioners that the proposed alternate routes would pass through and alter wetlands and, therefore, they would have to apply for DEM approval. The letter explained that "[t]hrough its review of an Application to Alter, the [DEM] would have to determine if the proposed alteration would result in a random, unnecessary, and/or undesirable alteration of a freshwater wetland * * *." DEM's determination would depend on whether and to what extent impacts to the wetlands have been avoided, whether the proposed routes "eliminate[] or minimize[] probable impacts to freshwater wetland functions and values, and the environmental, health, welfare and general well-being of the populance [sic]" and whether the proposed project would contribute to an adverse cumulative impact on the wetlands. The DEM estimated that the application process would take eight to twelve months, but it did not intimate a likely outcome.

Believing they would not receive the necessary permits from DEM, petitioners moved forward with their application to connect the sewer lines through the pumping station as they originally had planned. The town denied petitioners' application, citing concerns over esthetics, environmental impacts and the pump station's ability to handle the subdivision's sewerage.3 The denial letter also noted that petitioners still had not submitted a detailed analysis of the alternate routes.

The petitioners appealed the rejection of their application to the appeal board. The appeal board held two days of hearings, during which time various proponents and objectors testified on the matter. Ultimately, the appeal board recommended that the council grant petitioners' request to lay the sewer lines as they proposed and connect through the pumping station on the condition that petitioners provide certain upgrades to the pumping station. This decision was forwarded to the council for final determination.

The council reviewed petitioners' application at a town council meeting on February 20, 2001. David McCombs (McCombs), an engineer retained by petitioners, explained that the pumping station route was the best option because it did not require traversing wetlands. He explained that the pumping station was acting only at 34 percent capacity and, after accepting sewage from the subdivision, the capacity would only be at 60 to 65 percent. According to McCombs, the pumping station was designed to handle 280 homes, but only 80 homes were connected to it at the time. Thus, he testified, with appropriate upgrades paid for by petitioners, the pumping station could handle the additional load. The town's engineer, Larry Smith (Smith), testified that he believed that alternate routes could be explored further. The council also heard testimony from citizens opposing and supporting petitioners' project due to environmental concerns.

After hearing all the testimony, Councilman Dennis Auclair4 moved to reject petitioners' application to tie into the pumping station because "there are other alternate routes" available to petitioners that would allow them to tie into the sewer system without using the pumping station. The council unanimously approved the motion and denied the application. We granted a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the council.

II Standard of Review

When reviewing a case before this Court on a writ of certiorari, we "scour the record to discern whether any legally competent evidence supports the lower tribunal's decision and whether the decision[-]maker committed any reversible errors of law in the matter under review." Kent County Water Authority v. State (Department of Health), 723 A.2d 1132, 1134 (R.I.1999). "If legally competent evidence exists to support that determination, we will affirm it unless one or more errors of law have so infected the validity of the proceedings as to warrant reversal." Id.

III Adequacy of the Decision

The petitioners first argue that the council's decision must be quashed because it is lacking sufficient factual findings and legal conclusions. We agree.

This Court has consistently held that municipal councils and boards acting in a quasi-judicial capacity must make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support their decisions. E.g., Cranston Print Works Co. v. City of Cranston, 684 A.2d 689, 691 (R.I.1996)

; Sambo's of Rhode Island, Inc. v. McCanna, 431 A.2d 1192, 1193 (R.I.1981); Eastern Scrap Services, Inc. v. Harty, 115 R.I. 260, 263, 341 A.2d 718, 720 (1975). These basic requirements "have to do with facilitating judicial review, avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assuring more careful administrative consideration, helping parties plan their cases for rehearings and judicial review, and keeping agencies within their jurisdiction." Hooper v. Goldstein, 104 R.I. 32, 44, 241 A.2d 809, 815 (1968). The absence of such findings and conclusions precludes judicial review of a council's decision. Cranston Print Works Co.,

684 A.2d at 691.

In determining whether the municipal body has complied with these basic requirements, this Court is concerned with the content, rather than the form, of the decision. May-Day Realty Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Pawtucket, 107 R.I. 235, 239, 267 A.2d 400, 403 (1970). A written decision, although strongly preferred, is not required. See id. What is required, however, is "the making of findings of fact and the application of legal principles in such a manner that a judicial body might review a decision with a reasonable understanding of the manner in which evidentiary conflicts have been resolved and the provisions of the * * * ordinance applied." Thorpe v. Zoning Board of Review of North Kingstown, 492 A.2d 1236, 1237 (R.I.1985); see also May-Day, 107 R.I. at 239,

267 A.2d at 403.

The requirement that a municipal council's decision be accompanied by sufficient factual findings is especially important when evidentiary conflicts abound. It is only by making basic findings of fact that a reviewing court is able to determine how such conflicts were resolved. "[I]f a tribunal fails to disclose the basic findings upon which its ultimate findings are premised, we will neither search the record for supporting evidence nor will we decide for ourselves what is proper in the circumstances." Hooper, 104 R.I. at 44, 241 A.2d at 815. Although basic facts may not be implied, this Court may, "where appropriate, imply an ultimate finding from the action taken." Id. at 45, 241 A.2d at 816.

In Cranston Print Works Co., 684 A.2d at 690-92, we were unable to review the Cranston Safety Services and Licenses Committee's (committee) rejection of the plaintiff's request to install two 30,000-gallon propane tanks on its commercial property. During the application process, citizens expressed safety concerns over the proposed location of the tanks, which was downstream from an "antiquated and deteriorating" dam. Id. at 690-91. At a final hearing on the application, the...

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