Cullison v. Medley, 84

CourtSupreme Court of Indiana
Citation570 N.E.2d 27
Decision Date23 April 1991
Docket NumberNo. 84,84
PartiesDan R. CULLISON, Appellant, (Plaintiff Below), v. Ernest W. MEDLEY, Doris Medley, Ron Medley, Sandy Medley, and Terry Simmons, Appellees. (Defendants Below). Sol 9104 CV 32.

Rudolph Wm. Savich, Bloomington, for appellant.

Robert C. Price, Price and Runnells, Bloomington, for appellees.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

KRAHULIK, Justice.

Dan R. Cullison (Appellant-Plaintiff below) petitions this Court to accept transfer of this cause in order to reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment against him and in favor of the Appellees-Defendants below (collectively "the Medleys"). The Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment. Cullison v. Medley (1990), Ind.App., 559 N.E.2d 619. For the reasons set forth below, we grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand to the trial court.

The sole issue presented for review is whether the "impact rule" prohibits Cullison from recovering under any of several legal theories for emotional distress resulting from the Medleys alleged wrongdoings. In his four-count complaint, Cullison alleged trespass, assault, harrassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and sought to recover damages for his emotional and psychological injury.

In reviewing the propriety of the trial court's entry of summary judgment, we apply the same standard applicable in the trial court. We must construe the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Only if such evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law should the summary judgment be affirmed. Ind.Trial Rule 56; Ayres v. Indiana Heights Volunteer Fire Dept. (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234. We conclude that the evidence presented to the trial court construed in favor of the non-moving party, Cullison, establishes questions of fact which require jury resolution on three of the four counts alleged in Cullison's complaint.

According to Cullison's deposition testimony, on February 2, 1986, he encountered Sandy, the 16-year-old daughter of Ernest, in a Linton, Indiana, grocery store parking lot. They exchanged pleasantries and Cullison invited her to have a Coke with him and to come to his home to talk further. A few hours later, someone knocked on the door of his mobile home. Cullison got out of bed and answered the door. He testified that he saw a person standing in the darkness who said that she wanted to talk to him. Cullison answered that he would have to get dressed because he had been in bed. Cullison went back to his bedroom, dressed, and returned to the darkened living room of his trailer. When he entered the living room and turned the lights on, he was confronted by Sandy Medley, as well as by father Ernest, brother Ron, mother Doris, and brother-in-law Terry Simmons. Ernest was on crutches due to knee surgery and had a revolver in a holster strapped to his thigh. Cullison testified that Sandy called him a "pervert" and told him he was "sick," mother Doris berated him while keeping her hand in her pocket, convincing Cullison that she also was carrying a pistol. Ron and Terry said nothing to Cullison, but their presence in his trailer home further intimidated him. Primarily, however, Cullison's attention was As the Medleys were leaving, Cullison suffered chest pains and feared that he was having a heart attack. Approximately two months later, Cullison testified that Ernest glared at him in a menacing manner while again armed with a handgun at a restaurant in Linton. On one of these occasions, Ernest stood next to the booth where Cullison was seated while wearing a pistol and a holster approximately one foot from Cullison's face. Shortly after the incident at his home, Cullison learned that Ernest had previously shot a man. This added greatly to his fear and apprehension of Ernest on the later occasions when Ernest glared at him and stood next to the booth at which he was seated while armed with a handgun in a holster.

riveted to the gun carried by Ernest. Cullison testified that, while Ernest never withdrew the gun from his holster, he "grabbed for the gun a few times and shook the gun" at plaintiff while threatening to "jump astraddle" of Cullison if he did not leave Sandy alone. Cullison testified that Ernest "kept grabbing at it with his hand, like he was going to take it out," and "took it to mean he was going to shoot me" when Ernest threatened to "jump astraddle" of Cullison. Although no one actually touched Cullison, his testimony was that he feared he was about to be shot throughout the episode because Ernest kept moving his hand toward the gun as if to draw the revolver from the holster while threatening Cullison to leave Sandy alone.

Cullison testified that as a result of the incident, he sought psychological counseling and therapy and continued to see a therapist for approximately 18 months. Additionally, Cullison sought psychiatric help and received prescription medication which prevented him from operating power tools or driving an automobile, thus injuring Cullison in his sole proprietorship construction business. Additionally, Cullison testified that he suffered from nervousness, depression, sleeplessness, inability to concentrate and impotency following his run-in with the Medleys.

I. Trespass

Cullison alleged that the Medleys trespassed when they entered his trailer without his permission after he had gone to the back of the trailer to dress. Every unauthorized entry on the land of another constitutes a trespass. State ex rel. McPherson v. Beckner (1892), 132 Ind. 371, 31 N.E. 950; Evans v. State (1986) Ind.App. 493 N.E.2d 806. Here, Cullison did not directly or impliedly invite the five members of the Medley family to enter into his trailer home. Clearly, Cullison's complaint properly alleged an actionable count of trespass. The Court of Appeals agreed that a trespass may have occurred and that Cullison may be entitled to receive nominal damages, but relying upon Indiana Motorcycle Association v. Hudson (1980), Ind.App., 399 N.E.2d 775, decided that absent a showing of physical injury caused by the defendants or evidence that defendants' behavior was willful, callous or malicious, an action for trespass would not support the emotional distress damages requested by Cullison. The Court of Appeals concluded that because there was no physical injury and the Medleys' actions could not be said to be malicious, callous, or willful, Cullison's claim for mental injuries occasioned by the trespass must fail.

The Court of Appeals accurately stated the rule of law and its justification:

The general rule in Indiana, known as the impact rule, is that damages for mental anguish are recoverable only when accompanied by and resulting from a physical injury. Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith (1976), 171 Ind.App. 315, 357 N.E.2d 247, modified on other grounds, 175 Ind.App. 1, 369 N.E.2d 947. The rationale behind this rule is that absent physical injury, mental anguish is speculative, subject to exaggeration, likely to lead to fictitious claims, and often so unforeseeable that there is no rational basis for awarding damages.

559 N.E.2d at 621. The Court of Appeals applied this rule and rationale to the court in Cullison's complaint alleging trespass.

We now conclude that the rationale for this rule, whatever its historical foundation, is no longer valid and, therefore, the so-called "impact rule" does not apply to prohibit recovery for emotional distress when sustained in the course of a tortious trespass. When one intentionally invades the premises of another in such a way as to provoke a reasonably foreseeable emotional disturbance or trauma of the rightful occupier of the premises, the occupier may, in addition to recovering damages to the realty, if any, recover damages for such emotional injury. The mere fact of a physical...

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