Culp v. Reynolds, Case No. CIV-19-424-PRW
| Decision Date | 03 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV-19-424-PRW |
| Parties | ANNA KATIE CULP, Plaintiff, v. JIM REYNOLDS, individually and in his official capacity as Cleveland County Treasurer, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Before the Court is Defendant Jim Reynolds' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims (Dkt. 6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposes this request (Dkt. 12) and asks that she be granted leave to amend any claim the Court dismisses. For the reasons outlined below, the motion is granted.
Plaintiff is a former employee of the Cleveland County Treasurer's Office who was terminated in July 2019.1 The reason given was her refusal to accept a transfer to a new department within the office. Plaintiff claims that this reason was pretextual, and that she was terminated for her involvement in helping a fellow employee report sexual assault and harassment to law enforcement and Defendant Reynolds.2 As a result, she brings claims against Defendant Reynolds individually and in his official capacity as Cleveland CountyTreasurer for unlawful retaliation pursuant to Title VII and wrongful discharge pursuant to Oklahoma's recognition of public policy torts.3
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all claims asserted against him arguing that Plaintiff fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted.4 In reviewing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."5 While a complaint need not recite "detailed factual allegations," "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of [her] entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."6 The pleaded facts must establish that the claim is plausible.7
Individual capacity claims and punitive damages claim
First, Defendant argues that all claims against him in his individual capacity must be dismissed because both Title VII and Oklahoma law do not impose liability onindividual supervisors for employment discrimination claims.8 Defendant likewise argues that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages must be dismissed because the law does not allow for recovery of punitive damages in § 1983 actions.9 Plaintiff concedes both arguments,10 so Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Reynolds in his individual capacity and for punitive damages are dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant next seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim related to her reporting of alleged harassment by Brandon Jones and Kim Jones.11 Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."12
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation,13 Plaintiff must show (1) she engaged in protected activity under Title VII, (2) Defendant Reynolds took an adverse employmentaction against her,14 and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.15 To satisfy the causation element "requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer."16 This equates to proof of "'circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive.'"17
The Tenth Circuit explains how the failure to state a claim standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) applies to a Title VII retaliation claim:
A complaint raising a claim of discrimination does not need to conclusively establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but it must contain more than " '[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.' "18 "While we do not mandate the pleading of any specific facts in particular," a plaintiff must include enough context and detail to link the allegedly adverse employment action to a discriminatory or retaliatory motive with something besides "sheer speculation."19 "[A] plaintiff should have"—and must plead—"at least some relevant information to make the claims plausible on their face."20 . . . "Pleadings that do not allowfor at least a reasonable inference of the legally relevant facts are insufficient."2122
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation related to Brandon Jones' alleged harassment of her coworker because this incident involved no conduct protected by Title VII.23 According to Defendant, not only was Plaintiff not present during the alleged sexual assault, but it "occurred off-site and [was committed] by a non-employee of the Treasurer's Office . . . ."24 Assuming Plaintiff attempts to bring a hostile work environment claim, Defendant explains that it necessarily requires harassment to occur in the workplace, not at an after party at Libby's Café.25 Moreover, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim because it is undisputed that Brandon Jones is not a Treasurer's Office employee.26 While Defendant recognizes that employers may be liable for third-party non-employees in some circumstances, he argues "such instances are rare and limited to a situation when the employee's interaction with the third party is a condition of the employment" and the employer had knowledge of a pattern of harassingconduct.27 No such condition of employment or known pattern existed here, says Defendant, because:
[Plaintiff's coworker] was not required to be in the presence of non-employee Mr. Jones at the Libby's Café on December 9, 2016. It was not a condition of her employment with the Treasurer's Office to attend a private get-together after the office party concluded. Further, there are no allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint that Mr. Jones had a history of sexually harassing Treasurer's Office employees, or that Mr. Reynolds was aware of any such pattern of conduct, or that he refused to remedy the situation.28
Plaintiff responds that she has stated a retaliation claim because "assisting the victim in reporting her sexual assault at a work-related function by the husband of a coworker to law enforcement and her employer with the aim of preventing sexual harassment and assault in the workplace in the future" constitutes protected opposition to discrimination.29 She continues:
[I]t is plausible that Culp and the victim reasonably believed that Brandon's actions violated the victim's right to be free from sexual harassment and assault. It is further plausible that Culp addressed the issue in the workplace because the sexual assault was sufficiently related to the workplace to cause her to believe that, if not addressed by the employer, the actions would likely rise to the level of a hostile work environment. Indeed, but for Culp's actions, the victim could very well have been assaulted at work. But Culp acted to prevent this. And Title VII protects such actions.30
Plaintiff also explains that to be protected by Title VII, she need not have complained on her own behalf or prove an actual violation of Title VII.31 Finally, Plaintiff now—for the first time—contends that Brandon Jones is an employee of the Cleveland County Commissioners Office and is therefore a coworker of Plaintiff and her allegedly sexually assaulted coworker.32
Upon a review of the complaint, the Court agrees with Defendant that this incident does not involve conduct implicating Title VII's protections against discrimination in the workplace. First, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff's coworker was assaulted by Brandon Jones, the spouse of another coworker, Kim Jones.33 It does not allege that Brandon Jones was a coworker of Plaintiff,34 nor that Defendant Reynolds had any supervisory control over Brandon Jones—particularly not at an offsite after-party. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred that Defendant Reynolds may be liable under Title VII for the actions of Brandon Jones, a non-employee, third party, that occurred outside the workplace.
Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation related to Kim Jones' alleged harassment of Plaintiff and her coworker. In Defendant's view,Plaintiff has pleaded insufficient facts to show she engaged in protected activity and to establish a causal connection between her termination and a protected activity.35 Defendant concedes that Plaintiff sufficiently pled that she reported Kim Jones' behavior to her supervisor, Defendant Reynolds.36 But Defendant argues that the behavior Plaintiff complained of was not the type of harassment barred by Title VII.37 He explains that Title VII is not a general civility code, but rather a prohibition against gender-based harassment that is "'so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work environment.'"38 In Defendant's view, the factual allegations in the complaint fail to meet this standard because not only are they conclusory and vague, but they also provide no explanation as to how any of Kim Jones' actions were because of Plaintiff's gender.39
Defendant also argues Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim because while she alleges that she complained to her supervisor of a coworker and third party's behavior and was subsequently fired, she does not include any facts from which an inference of a causal connection can be drawn.40
Plaintiff responds that the conduct she complained of was severe because it included threats of physical violence, but even if it wasn't, she doesn't have to wait until harassmentis severe to claim the protections of Title VII.41 She continues that s...
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