Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company, 30678.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 30678.,30678.
• Citation: 442 F.2d 1078
• Parties: Samuel CULPEPPER, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

442 F.2d 1078 (1971)

Samuel CULPEPPER, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

No. 30678.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 7, 1971.

William M. Pate, Atlanta, Ga., Fred R. Edney, Richmond, Va., Mitchell, Pate & Anderson, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

Howard Moore, Jr., Peter E. Rindskopf, Atlanta, Ga., Jack Greenberg, William Robinson, New York City, for plaintiff-appellee.

Stanley P. Hebert, Gen. Counsel, Julia P. Cooper, Chief, Appellate Section, Vincent A. Fuller, Jr., Marian Halley, Attys., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm., Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae.

Before THORNBERRY and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges, and BOOTLE, District Judge.

BOOTLE, District Judge.

Samuel Culpepper filed his complaint in the court below against his employer, Reynolds Metals Company, seeking injunctive relief pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., enjoining said employer from continuing or maintaining any policy, practice, custom and usage of denying or interfering with the right of plaintiff to equal employment opportunities on the basis of race or color. Jurisdiction was invoked also under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 providing for equal rights of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. The complaint sought also a declaratory judgment and sought relief not only for Culpepper but for the class he claimed to represent. The trial court, after holding a full evidentiary hearing, denied all relief sought, holding, inter alia: (1) that under Title VII appellant's claim must be dismissed for failure to file timely charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; (2) that under Title VII the court does not have the power to grant a preliminary injunction to an individual litigant, and (3) that a claim for relief against purely private racial discrimination in employment could not be predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. For the trial court's opinion, see Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company, D.C., 296 F.Supp. 1232 (1969). On appeal this court reversed the trial court as to holdings (1) and (2), and did not reach the issue with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company, 421 F.2d 888 (1970). The case was remanded for further proceedings. The retrial in the court below was conducted by agreement almost entirely upon the evidence adduced at the first trial. The evidence will not be restated here because it appears fully in the two cases above cited. The only additional evidence was a photograph of a "slitter machine" used in the job position, promotion to which Culpepper had unsuccessfully sought, and answers to interrogatories propounded to the employer.¹

At the conclusion of this second trial the court entered its "Order of Judgment" containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordering that plaintiff recover the sum of $156.00 in back pay, the sum of $1500.00 attorneys' fees, and costs. From that judgment each party has appealed.

Reynolds' direct appeal challenges these awards, claiming that under the facts as found by the district judge there was no discrimination based on race, hence no violation of Title VII, and that judgment should have gone for Reynolds. Culpepper's cross-appeal challenges the attorneys' fees award as being so inadequate as to require an upward modification. We sustain both awards against all attacks made and affirm as to both the direct appeal and cross-appeal.

REYNOLDS' DIRECT APPEAL

This appeal is based not so much, if at all, upon any alleged inadequacy of the evidence to show discrimination because of race, but rather upon the contention that the district judge has made no finding of discrimination based on race, and upon the further contention that the facts as found by the district judge would not support such a finding, if made. We disagree.

While there could have been more explicit, specific and detailed findings of fact, Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, says: "If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein", thus happily dispensing with the necessity of formalistic and stereotyped findings. Looking at the four corners of the Order of Judgment, we deem its findings and conclusions legally sufficient and their intendment sufficiently clear. The able and conscientious district judge, facing up to the ordeal of decision in this case and fully aware of the factual problems and legal principles involved, characterized the decision he was about to make as "another close question involving the nebulous question of implied intent", citing his then 42-day-old decision in Colbert v. H-K Corporation, D.C., 295 F. Supp. 1091 (1970) another EEOC case in which he had stated "the issues involved in a determination of this question (discrimination in fact) depend upon somewhat nebulous inferences on both sides and as such constitute difficult decisions. * * * The burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff and the court is concerned about the difficulty often inherent therein. Normally, it can be aided by an overall statistical showing but in a limited case such as this it is dependent upon inferences of motive, intent and state of mind often from very slight circumstances. For claimant and counsel, this is not an easy task. In such instances, all a court can do is evaluate these intangibles through the witnesses and weigh the overall situation and performance of the employer. On balance, the evidence preponderates toward the company here. Accordingly, the court must find for defendant."

Then in the Order of Judgment in the case at bar, the court continued: "At the trial, the court was and still is of the opinion that the personal problems of Culpepper more properly lay in the area of labor-management relations than under Title VII and that the case was a weak showing of racial motivation against him in the face of a general finding of non-discriminatory policies by the company (Tr. 320a-332a). Meanwhile, United States v. Local 189 Local 189, United Papermakers and Paper-Workers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir., July 28, 1969) and its opening of the Pandora's box of all pre-1965 happenings intervened. While the court erroneously construed the effect of pre-1965 actions, the case nevertheless remains tenuous."

The court then rejected Culpepper's contention that his 1963 test was a "sham" and held that Culpepper failed to qualify upon that test. In the same breath, he continued: "The court has consistently felt that a previous failure to qualify (1963) ought not to bar a worker forever (1967) from bidding the same or a similar job." Noting, however, that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the employer had ever allowed white workers a second opportunity to qualify, the court narrowed the claim to a "technical one based on the following elements:

"(1) Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to bid in 1962 in violation of the collective bargaining contract and a junior white worker was allowed to do so.

"(2) In 1967, plaintiff was

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