Culver-Union Tp. Ambulance Service v. Steindler

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SULLIVAN; SHEPARD
• Citation: Culver-Union Tp. Ambulance Service v. Steindler, 629 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 1994)
• Decision Date: 07 March 1994
• Docket Number: CULVER-UNION,No. 50S04-9403-CV-216,50S04-9403-CV-216
• Parties: TOWNSHIP AMBULANCE SERVICE; Marvalene Leffert, as Trustee of Union Township, Marshall County, Indiana; Bernard Bursart, as President of the Culver Town Board, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Barbara STEINDLER, as Executrix of the Estate of Rolin G. Popplewell, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Page 1231

629 N.E.2d 1231

CULVER-UNION TOWNSHIP AMBULANCE SERVICE; Marvalene Leffert as Trustee of Union Township, Marshall County, Indiana Bernard Bursart, as President of the Culver Town Board Appellants (Defendants below), v. Barbara STEINDLER, as Executrix of the Estate of Rolin G Popplewell, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 50S04-9403-CV-216.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 7, 1994.

Steven P. Polick, Steven P. Polick & Associates, Merrillville, for Marvalene Leffert.

Michael R. Morow, Stephenson and Kurnik, Indianapolis, for Culver-Union & Bernard Bursart.

Roger A. Weitgenant, Blachly, Tabor Bozik & Hartman, Valparaiso, for appellee.

Richard A. Waples, Bette J. Dodd, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, for amicus curiae.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

SULLIVAN, Justice.

This case asks whether a decedent's estate can maintain causes of action for wrongful death and under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against a township ambulance service in the face of motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. We hold that the wrongful death claim may be maintained but the Sec. 1983 action may not.

Facts

On September 6, 1988, Popplewell allegedly suffered a heart attack. Personnel from the Culver-Union Ambulance Service responded to the emergency call and provided certain treatment. Popplewell subsequently died.

Barbara Steindler, as Executrix of Popplewell's estate, filed a two-count complaint against Culver-Union Township Ambulance Service, Marvalene Leffert as Trustee of Union Township, Marshall County, Indiana, and Bernard Bursart as President of the Culver Town Board. The complaint seeks recovery for violation of Popplewell's constitutional rights under Sec. 1983 and for negligence.

Leffert filed an Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss both counts, arguing that the complaint failed to allege any duty owed by the governmental defendants and that the Estate had no cognizable claim under Sec. 1983. The other two defendants, Culver-Union and Bursart, answered the complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Trial Rule 12(C) on Count II. They argued that even if the Sec. 1983 claim was legally cognizable in substance, it did not survive Popplewell's death. Each defendant joined in the other's motions, all of which the trial court denied. At defendants' request, the case was certified for interlocutory appeal.

The Court of Appeals held: (1) although the Estate's "claim stretches the intendment of Sec. 1983 to, if not beyond, the limits of judicial cognizance," the allegations were sufficient to defeat a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion; but (2) the Sec. 1983 claim did not survive Popplewell's death under Indiana's survival statute, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 34-1-1-1 (West Supp.1993); and (3) the complaint stated a claim for negligence under the Wrongful Death statute, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 34-1-1-2 (West Supp.1993). Culver Union Township Ambulance Service v. Steindler (1993), Ind.App., 611 N.E.2d 698. Judge Chezem dissented to issue number (1): "Because there was no constitutional violation, the claim asserted under Sec. 1983 cannot be sustained on any legal ground." Id. at 707-08. Judge Miller dissented to issue number (2): "[I]t is well settled that a Sec. 1983 claim, a federally created cause of action, cannot be abrogated by a state survival statute." Id. at 706-07.

Section 1983 Action

Count II of the complaint charged that various policies adopted by the defendants constituted a reckless indifference to Popplewell's constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ¹ In order to recover damages under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) he held a constitutionally-protected right; (2) he was deprived of this right; (3) the defendants acted with reckless indifference to cause this deprivation; and (4) the defendants acted under color of state law. Patrick v. Jasper County, 901 F.2d 561, 565 (7th Cir.1990).

It is well-established that Sec. 1983 creates no substantive rights; it merely provides the procedure for enforcing substantive federal rights. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1916, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979).

Here, the parties dispute that the county policy resulted in a deprivation of Popplewell's constitutional rights. The Estate alleges that Popplewell had a "constitutionally-guaranteed right to live" which defendants violated "by failing to properly administer emergency care." As such, the Estate's constitutional claim clearly rests on the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Popplewell did not have a constitutional "right to live" and that his right not to be deprived of life without due process was not violated.

Section 1983 was designed to prevent the states from violating the constitution (and certain federal statutes) and to compensate injured plaintiffs for deprivations of those federal rights. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695-96, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). It was not intended to supplant state tort law by providing a remedy for every wrong. As the Court stated in Daniels v. Williams:

Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society. We have previously rejected reasoning that 'would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.'

474 U.S. 327, 332, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976)).

A state tort does not become a constitutional violation simply because it is committed by a government actor. See generally, Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1070, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (city's failure to warn city employee about workplace dangers); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. at 335-36, 106 S.Ct. at 667 (prisoner injured when pillow negligently left on stairway); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160-61, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), reh'g. denied 425 U.S. 985, 96 S.Ct. 2194, 48 L.Ed.2d 811 (simple defamation by police); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. at 2695-96 (false imprisonment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), reh'g denied 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 798, 50 L.Ed.2d 785 (1977) (medical malpractice in the treatment of prisoner).

The Estate alleges that the decedent had a "constitutionally guaranteed right to live." That's not what the 14th Amendment promises. Instead, the Constitution prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

The 14th Amendment generally does not confer any affirmative right to governmental aid. It serves "as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1003, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (the 14th Amendment "confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual").

Although providing services may impose various common law or contractual duties upon the government, it is not, standing alone, sufficient to impose a constitutional duty. ² DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1002-3 (child who was not removed from abusive household had no Sec. 1983 action against social workers for their failure to act); Wideman v. Shallowford Comm. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir.1987) (no Sec. 1983 action when ambulance drivers refused to take pregnant woman to a particular hospital); Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 994 (1st Cir.1992) (voluntary mental patient injured when he left van in which he was being transported had no Sec. 1983 action); Handley v. City of Seagoville, Texas, 798 F.Supp. 1267, 1272 (N.D.Tex.1992) (failure of ambulance service to provide service when requested states no Sec. 1983 action).

There is no constitutional right to be rescued by the government, and inept rescue is not a cognizable theory for due process liability under Sec. 1983. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049, 104 S.Ct. 1325, 79 L.Ed.2d 720 (1984). In Jackson, the occupants of a car were involved in a one-vehicle accident. Neither police nor firemen who arrived on the scene made any effort to assist the occupants. By the time ambulance personnel arrived, it was too late to save them. Plaintiffs alleged that the decedents could have been saved if police had rendered help sooner or, at least, had not directed traffic in a way that prevented other potential rescuers from reaching them. The district court denied defendants' 12(B)(6) motions. The Seventh Circuit reversed. In doing so, the court reviewed the general law concerning rescue.

[E]ven if the complaints state good claims under general tort principles, it does not follow that they state good claims under Sec. 1983 just because the defendants are public officers. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for violations of federal law. ....

....

.... It is enough to note that, as currently understood, the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a right to basic services, whether competently provided or otherwise.

But the plaintiffs have another argument: The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to deprive anyone of his life without due process of law; to deprive a person of his life through negligence is the antithesis of due process; therefore the complaints...