Cumberland & P.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

• Citation: 57 Md. 267
• Parties: THE CUMBERLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, and the BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY IN MARYLAND. THE CUMBBERLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY IN MARYLAND.
• Decision Date: 22 July 1881
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

57 Md. 267

THE CUMBERLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, and the BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY IN MARYLAND.

THE CUMBBERLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY IN MARYLAND.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

July 22, 1881

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., GRASON, MILLER ROBINSON, IRVING, and MAGRUDER, J.

William F. Frick, for the appellant, the Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

I Nevett Steele, for the appellant, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company.

Ferdinand Williams and William Walsh, for the appellee.

MAGRUDER J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appeals in these two cases have been argued together, and as they present substantially the same questions, one opinion will serve for both.

The bills were filed, in the one case by the Cumberland & Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, and in the other by the first named Company alone, seeking to restrain the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in Maryland in the one case, from proceeding further with its proposed condemnation of an easement of crossing, of a lot theretofore belonging to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company outside of its regular line of condemnation, and extending to the line of condemnation of the Cumberland & Pennsylvania Railroad at its point of connection with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, but which had been since acquired by the Cumberland & Pennsylvania Railroad Company; and which proceedings were then pending in the Circuit Court, awaiting confirmation: and in the other, after the said proceedings for condemnation had been confirmed by the Court; to restrain the defendant from destroying, injuring or in any way interfering with, a station house and other property of the Cumberland & Pennsylvania Railroad Company erected upon the said lot, and from laying and maintaining its tracks upon the site of said station house and other property, from interfering with the complainant and its officers, agents and employés in the possession of the said station house and property, and in the repair and restoration thereof, in the event of the same having been injured or impaired before the service of the writs of injunction; both bills concluding with a prayer for general relief.

It is unnecessary to refer to the averments of these bills in regard to previous proceedings and negotiations between these companies, with reference to the crossing of the tracks of the first named complainant at other points; as those are matters which seem in no way connected with the present grounds upon which we deem the decision to rest; nor to a good many other extraneous matters not in anywise affecting the merits of the case.

The injunction in each case, was refused by the learned Judge of the Circuit Court, on the ground that the jurisdiction to determine the matters in controversy, was in the Circuit Court sitting in review of the condemnation proceedings; and in his opinion, refusing the injunction we fully concur. Not only were the alleged grounds of objection open to the complainant by way of objection to the confirmation of the inquisition at the time of filing the first bill; but the said company did actually go into the said Court, and made objections to the confirmation of the inquisition; and if it did not make all the objections, jurisdictional or otherwise, that could be made to the confirmation, it was its own fault, and it cannot complain if there was any omission; and if its objections did not receive due consideration by that Court, or were erroneously decided; it is still bound by the decision; and we can see no reason why it should have another trial of the same questions, by the same Court, sitting in another capacity, and having no more ample power or authority to decide the questions involved, while sitting in the one capacity than in the other.

We are of the opinion that the right to the interference of a Court of equity, for the purposes alleged in these bills, and under the alleged facts and circumstances which are made the groundwork of the claim to relief, has been negatived by the current of decisions in this State and elsewhere, as well as by the fundamental principles defining the line of demarcation between the jurisdiction of Courts of law and Courts of equity.

We will first refer to these elementary principles of equity jurisdiction, limiting the class of cases in which the protective remedy by injunction can be invoked.

In 1 Story Eq., (12 th Ed.,) sec. 33, it is said:

"Perhaps the most general, if not the most precise description of a Court of equity, in the English and American sense, is, that it has jurisdiction in cases of rights, recognized and protected by the municipal jurisprudence, where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had in the Courts of common law. (Cooper Eq. Pl., 128, 129; Mitford Pl. Eq., by Jeremy, 111, 123; 1 Wooddes., sec. VII, pp. 214, 215.) The remedy must be plain; for if it be doubtful and obscure at law, equity will assert a jurisdiction. (Rathbone vs. Warren, 10 Johns., 587; King vs. Baldwin, 17 Johns., 384.) It must be adequate; for if at law it falls short of what the party is entitled to, that founds a jurisdiction in equity. And it must be complete; that is, must obtain the full end and justice of the case. It must reach the whole mischief, and secure the whole right of the party in a perfect manner, at the present time and in future; otherwise, equity will interfere and give such relief and aid as the exigency of the particular case may require. The jurisdiction of a Court of equity is, therefore, sometimes concurrent with the jurisdiction of a Court of law, it is sometimes exclusive of it; and it is sometimes auxiliary to it."

And on the specific question of the remedy by injunction to interfere with proceedings at law, it is said in Kerr on Injunctions, (2 nd Edition, 581:) "If the defendant at law has a good defence at law, and the remedy at law is as perfect and complete as the remedy in equity, the Court will not restrain the action."

This is subject to the qualification that the party has not been deprived of his defence by surprise, accident or fraud. ( Adams' Eq., 197.)

"And still less can any equity arise, if the facts were known at the trial, and the grievance complained of has been caused either by a mistake in pleading or other mismanagement or by a supposed error in the judgment of the Court." ( Id.)

And in 3 Waits' Actions and Defences, 684: "But it is an established principle that a Court of equity will not lend its aid to restrain by injunction, the commission of any act injurious to the complainant where he has an adequate remedy at law. And where the party asking an injunction has an adequate remedy by a statutory proceeding, though it is one not known to the common law, an injunction should be refused upon the same general ground as where there is an adequate remedy at law."

And upon this question of a remedy by a statutory proceeding, as excluding interference by injunction, there are many and conclusive authorities. It was pointed out and enforced very clearly in Hamersley vs. Germantown, &c. Turnpike Co., 8 Phil., (Penn., 314.)

In Hardinge vs. Webster, 1 Dreney & Smale, 107, which was a bill to restrain the defendant from taking steps to recover from a shareholder a debt due by a corporation, the relief was refused on the ground that an Act of Parliament gave a remedy by a specific proceeding. The Court says: "But I apprehend that the very purpose and object of the Act was to enable a Court of law to determine to what extent, or whether at all, a shareholder should be made liable on this proceeding, which is by way of substitute for scire facias. It will be Dr. Hardinge's fault if he does not bring all the circumstances of the case before the Court of law."

And in Johnson vs. Jones, 75 N. C., 206, an injunction was refused on the ground of the statute having afforded a specific remedy by a proceeding at law.

In Gott and Wilson vs. Carr, 6 G. & J., 312, where it was sought to restrain the execution of judgments rendered by a justice of the peace, upon certain alleged equitable grounds, the Court (BUCHANAN, C.J.,) uses this language:

"It is a salutary principle of law, that every person is bound to take care of and protect his own rights and interests and to vindicate them in due season, and in the proper place. And that if a defendant having the means of defence in his power in an action against him in a competent tribunal, neglects to use them, and suffers a recovery to be had against him, he is forever precluded from obtaining relief in chancery, in relation to the same matter. The application of this principle may not be universal; but the cases in which chancery will furnish relief against recoveries suffered to be had at law, are exceptions. The well settled general rule being, that a Court of equity will not relieve against a recovery in a trial at law, unless the justice of the verdict can be impeached by facts or on grounds, of which the party seeking the aid of chancery, could not have availed himself at law, or was prevented from doing it by fraud or accident, or the act of the opposite party unmixed with any negligence or fault on his part.

And chancery will only sustain a bill invoking its aid upon some new matter of equity, not arising in the former case; or seeking some relief to which the powers of the Court of law were not fully adequate."

And in the like cases, in Lyday vs. Douple, 17 Md., 188, and Chappell vs. Cox, 18 Md., 513, the same principle is declared.

Upon the like ground of confining the party to the tribunal specially provided by law to decide the merits of his...