Cumberland & Westernport Transit Co. v. Metz
| Decision Date | 13 March 1930 |
| Docket Number | 63,64. |
| Parties | CUMBERLAND & WESTERNPORT TRANSIT CO. v. METZ. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Allegany County; Albert A. Doub, Judge.
On motion for reargument. Motion overruled.
For former opinion, see 149 A. 4.
Walter C. Capper, of Cumberland, for appellant in first case.
Edwin H. Brownley, of Baltimore, and George Henderson, of Cumberland, for appellant in second case.
A Taylor Smith and Lewis M. Wilson, both of Cumberland, for appellee in both cases.
The American Oil Company has filed a motion for reargument in this case, wherein it complains that the decision denies it the rights to which it is entitled under chapter 539 of the Acts of 1927, Code Supp. art. 50, § 12A, which provides that "Where a judgment has been entered against two or more joint defendants in an action ex delicto, said defendants shall be subject to contribution between them."
The judgment appealed from in this case was reversed and a new trial awarded as to the Cumberland & Westernport Transit Company, and affirmed as to the American Oil Company on the authority of the Act of 1920, c. 229, § 22 B, Code, art. 5, § 26.
If the oil company is right in its contention that it is deprived of the benefit of the Act of 1927, chapter 539, by the action of this court, then under no circumstances could a plaintiff ever receive the benefit of the Act of 1920, chapter 229 where a judgment is recovered against plural defendants, and a reversal had as to any of the defendants. To yield to the oil company's contention on the motion filed would nullify the Act of 1920, chapter 229. This anomalous situation has been created by the acts themselves, and so far as we consistently can, this court will give effect to both statutes. The plaintiff was not obliged to sue both defendants; each of them was charged with negligence, and she might have sued both in separate suits, or one and not the other. If she had sued the oil company and not the transit company, the oil company could have contended that no judgment should be entered against it under those circumstances as consistently as it now makes the contention that it should not be held on the judgment here affirmed.
The oil company also contends that it excepted to the granting of the plaintiff's C prayer, and that it should have the same benefits from the ruling as the transit company. With this we cannot...
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