Cummings v. Deutsche Bank Und

• Decision Date: 01 February 1937
• Docket Number: No. 254,DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT,254
• Citation: 81 L.Ed. 545,57 S.Ct. 359,300 U.S. 115
• Parties: CUMMINGS, Atty. Gen. of the United States, et al. v. DEUTSCHE BANK UND
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

300 U.S. 115

57 S.Ct. 359

81 L.Ed. 545

CUMMINGS, Atty. Gen. of the United States, et al.

v DEUTSCHE BANK UND DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT.

No. 254.

Argued Jan. 4, 5, 1937.

Decided Feb. 1, 1937.

Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and James W. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioners.

Messrs. James J. Lenihan, of Washington, D.C., and Otto C. Sommerich, of New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Justice BUTLERdelivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit in equity brought October 3, 1934, by respondent in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia¹ against petitioners praying a decree directing delivery of property seized by the Alien Property Custodian and withheld by petitioners under the Trading with the Enemy Act from 'Direction der Disconto Gesellschaft,' an alien enemy.Petitioners moved to dismiss the bill upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain it because by Public ResolutionNo. 53 of June 27, 1934, 48 Stat. 1267, the return of the money and property sought has been postponed.The court sustained the motion and dismissed the bill.The Court of Appeals reversed.65 App.D.C. 297, 83 F. (2d) 554.This court granted a writ of certiorari.299 U.S. 527, 57 S.Ct. 34, 81 L.Ed. -.

In substance the bill alleges: Respondent, a German corporation, was created in 1929 by consolidation of Deutsche Bank and Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft.After the merger, the assets of the latter became respondent's property.The Custodian determined the Disconto-Gesellschaft to be an alien enemy and seized its money and property in this country, which was held by the Custodian and deposited in the Treasury.Respondent, acting under the Settlement of War Claims Act(45 Stat. 254) and in accordance with the Custodian's rules and regulations, filed notice of claim to the property and applied to the President for its return.Before commencement of this suit, the Custodian found it entitled to the property.In March, 1931, Sprunt and others brought an action in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against respondent; a warrant of attachment issued and, pursuant to it, the marshal levied on the money and property so held; because of the attachment petitioners refused to deliver it to respondent and retained custody.In May, 1934, that action was discontinued by plaintiffs and the attachment was released.July 1, 1934, the office of Custodian ceased; his powers and duties were transferred to the Department of Justice; all money and property held by or in trust for him was transferred to the Attorney General.Before commencement of this suit, respondent demanded and petitioners refused delivery of that here in question.Their refusal was based on Public ResolutionNo. 53.

The questions for decision are whether that resolution withdrew from the trial court jurisdiction to entertain the bill, and whether it deprives respondent of its property without due process of law in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.

1.This is in substance a suit against the United States.Banco Mexicano v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U.S. 591, 603, 44 S.Ct. 209, 212, 68 L.Ed. 465;Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 78, 56 S.Ct. 15, 17, 80 L.Ed. 54.By the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, § 9(a)(b)(c),²as amended by the Settlement of War Claims Act, §§ 11, 20,³ the United States consented, in respect of claims such as the one here in question, to be sued in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.Petitioners maintain ResolutionNo. 53 withdrew that consent.

The recitals of that resolution disclose reasons for its adoption.They are: A Joint Resolution of July 2, 1921,⁴ declared that property of German nationals held under the Trading with the Enemy Act should be retained and no disposition thereof made, except as specifically provided by law, until the German government should make suitable provision for the satisfaction of claims of American nationals against it.The Treaty of Berlin, August 25, 1921,⁵ accorded to the United States all rights and advantages specified in the resolution of July 2, 1921, including, those stipulated for its benefit in the Treaty of Versailles,⁶ not ratified by the United States.The Agreement of August 10, 1922,⁷ established a Mixed Claims Commission to adjudicate claims of American nationals against Germany.And, in the debt-funding agreement of June 23, 1930,⁸ Germany agreed to pay the United States on account of its awards 40,800,000 reichmarks in each year until 1981.Germany was in arrears under that agreement and had failed to make provision for satisfaction of claims established against it.

Therefore, the Resolution (48 Stat. 1267) declared: So long as Germany is in arrears in respect of obligations mentioned, all deliveries of property authorized to be made under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended, or the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928as amended, 'whether or not a judgment or decree has been entered with respect thereto, shall be postponed and the money or property, or the income, issues, profits, and/or avails thereof reserved: * * * Provided * * * That the President may, in his sole discretion, remove the restriction as to any of the cases * * * in relation to which * * * deliveries have been postponed under this resolution.'

The consent of the United States to be sued was revocable at any time.Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581, 54 S.Ct. 840, 844, 78 L.Ed. 1434.It has not been expressly recalled and, unless by ResolutionNo. 53 impliedly withdrawn, the Supreme Court of the District had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.Continuation of the consent was not inconsistent with the purpose of the resolution.The measure was adopted because of Germany's default which, as indicated by the context, was assumed not to be permanent.It was intended only temporarily to postpone final disposition of the seized property, merely to stay deliveries whether directed by administrative order or judgment of a court.Claimants may have deliveries whenever Germany ceases to be in arrears.Fulfillment of her promises will end the restraint imposed by the resolution.Postponement of deliveries does not suggest intention to withdraw consent to be sued.It was given and long continued in order to safeguard former owners against erroneous administration of measures enacted for their benefit.Neither need nor reason has been suggested for change of policy in that regard.In the absence of unmistakable expression of purpose to that end, it may not reasonably be inferred that Congress intended to withdraw that protection.Cf.Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, supra, 296 U.S. 74, 80, 56 S.Ct. 15, 18, 80 L.Ed. 54.We find nothing to warrant that inference.District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 22 S.Ct. 17, 46 L.Ed. 85, gives no support to petitioners' contention.Clearly the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

2.Public ResolutionNo. 53 is not repugnant to the Fifth Amendment.By exertion of the war power, and untrammeled by the due process or just compensation clause, Congress enacted laws directing seizure, use, and disposition of property in this country belonging to subjects of the enemy.Alien enemy owners were divested of every right in respect of the money and property seized and held by the Custodian under the Trading with the Enemy Act.United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 9—11, 47 S.Ct. 1, 4, 71 L.Ed. 131.Woodson v. Deutsche, etc., Vormals, 292 U.S. 449, 454, 54 S.Ct. 804, 805, 78 L.Ed. 1357.The title acquired by the United States was absolute and unaffected by definition of duties or limitations upon the power of the Custodian or the Treasurer of the United States.Congress reserved to itself freedom at any time to dispose of the property as deemed expedient and right under circumstances that might arise during and after the war.Legislative history and terms of measures passed in relation to alien enemy property clearly disclose that from the beginning Congress intended after the war justly to deal with former owners and, by restitution or compensation in whole or part, to ameliorate hardships falling upon them as a result of the seizure of their property.⁹But that intention detracted nothing from title acquired by the United States or its power to retain or dispose of the property upon such terms and conditions as from time to time Congress might direct.As the taking left in enemy owners no beneficial right to, or interest in, the property, the United States did not take or hold as trustee for their benefit.

Respondent maintains that section 11 of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928 (50 U.S.C.A.Appendix§ 9(b)amendingsection 9(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917as amended, vested in former owners an immediate right to the return of their property and that, having complied with the provisions of the act, they cannot be deprived of that right.It argues that its interest in the property taken was not 'completely and irrevocably destroyed' and that the Settlement of War Claims Act was an act under which it 'could and did obtain a vested interest in its property.'To the extent that the argument rests upon the assumption that the taking did not divest enemy owners of every right or that the United States did not acquire absolute title, it is fallacious and need not be noticed.

The Settlement of War Claims Act was not a conveyance and did not grant former owners any right or title to, or interest in, the money or property taken by the Custodian.As amended by it, pertinent provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act are indicated in the margin.¹⁰No change of title was effected by that Act; and in proceedings under it none takes place before delivery to claimant.As the United States owned all, claimant's consent to postponement of delivery of part did not improve its position as to the rest.The President did not order delivery.Action by him was neither a condition precedent nor...