Cummings v. Fca U.S. LLC

• Decision Date: 01 August 2019
• Docket Number: 5:18-CV-1072 (GTS/TWD)
• Citation: 401 F.Supp.3d 288
• Parties: Lisa CUMMINGS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

401 F.Supp.3d 288

Lisa CUMMINGS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.FCA US LLC, Defendant.

5:18-CV-1072 (GTS/TWD)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed August 1, 2019

OF COUNSEL: TODD S. GARBER, ESQ., FINKLESTEIN BLANKINSHIP FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP, 445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 605, White Plains, New York 10601, Counsel for Plaintiff.

OF COUNSEL: KATHY A. WISNIEWSKI, ESQ., STEPHEN A. D'AUNOY, ESQ., THOMAS L. AZAR, Jr., ESQ., THOMPSON COBURN LLP, One US Bank Plaza, St. Louis, Missouri 63101, Counsel for Defendant.

OF COUNSEL: ALAN J. POPE, ESQ., COUGHLIN & GERHART LLP, P.O. Box 2039, 99 Corporate Drive, Binghamton, New York 13902, Co-Counsel for Defendant.

DECISION and ORDER

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

Currently before the Court, in this breach-of-contract proposed class action filed by Lisa Cummings ("Plaintiff") against FCA US LLC ("Defendant"), is Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and/or 12(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 8.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint

Generally, in her Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff asserts six causes of action. (Dkt. No. 1 [Pl.'s Compl.].) First, Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the class, or, alternatively, the New York subclass, a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"). (Id. at ¶¶ 61-74.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (a) Defendant provided Plaintiff and class members with written warranties related to their purchase of the relevant vehicles, (b) Defendant breached those warranties by misrepresenting the standard, quality or grade of those vehicles, in particular a defect in the transmission, (c) Defendant failed to provide a suitable remedy to the defective transmission in the relevant vehicles, and (d) Defendant knew, should have known, or was reckless in not knowing, of its misrepresentations and omissions concerning the relevant vehicles. (Id. )

Second, Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that Defendant violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349. (Id. at ¶¶ 75-84.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knowingly misrepresented and intentionally omitted material information about the safety and effectiveness of the transmission in the relevant vehicles by failing to inform members of the New York subclass that the transmission was defective and presented a safety risk. (Id. )

Third, Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that Defendant violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 350. (Id. at ¶¶ 85-95.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, through advertisements and other statements, made untrue and misleading representations about the transmission in the relevant vehicles that it knew or should have known were untrue and misleading, and failed to inform the New York subclass that the transmission was defective and posed a safety risk. (Id. )

Fourth, Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability. (Id. at ¶¶ 96-105.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that N.Y. U.C.C. L. §§ 2-314 and 2A-212 imposed an implied warranty that the relevant vehicles were in merchantable condition and fit for their ordinary purpose, but that the relevant vehicles were not in fact in merchantable condition and fit for their ordinary purpose due to the defect in the transmission. (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was provided notice of the transmission defect within a reasonable time after the allegations of the defect became public. (Id. )

Fifth, Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that Defendant breached express warranties. (Id. at ¶¶ 106-22.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (a) Defendant provided a written warranty in connection with purchase or lease of the relevant vehicles (and in fact was required to do so), (b) Defendant failed to inform the New York subclass that the vehicle was designed and manufactured in a way that posed an inherent safety risk, and (c) Defendant has failed to repair or correct the defect despite the existence of the warranty. (Id. )

Sixth, and last, Plaintiff asserts, on behalf of the New York subclass, that Defendant was unjustly enriched by its contract with Plaintiff and the members of the New York subclass. (Id. at ¶¶ 123-30.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant continued to market and sell the relevant vehicles despite being aware that the transmission on those vehicles was defective and posed a risk of danger to consumers and the general public, and that Defendant therefore made a profit at the expense of Plaintiff and the members of the New York subclass, who received a vehicle that was worth less than the purchase price. (Id. )

B. Parties' Briefing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

1. Defendant's Memorandum of Law

Generally, in its memorandum of law, Defendant makes seven arguments. (Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 2, at 14-27 [Def.'s Mem. of Law].) First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 14-15.) More specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her claims because she has not alleged an injury-in-fact in that she has not alleged that she actually had to pay to have her vehicle fixed or that her vehicle was of diminished value given that she acknowledges that there are procedures outlined to fix her vehicle, which is still under warranty, meaning she would not be required to pay for future attempts to fix her vehicle. (Id. )

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's First Claim pursuant to the MMWA must be dismissed if the state law claims for breach of implied and express warranties are found to be legally insufficient because the MMWA does not provide an independent cause of action. (Id. at 15-16.)

Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Second and Third Claims must be dismissed because (a) she has failed to plead facts plausibly suggesting that she suffered an injury as the result of any deceptive practice or false advertising in that she admits she did not pay for any repairs on the vehicle related to the allegedly defective transmission and that there are noted procedures for fixing the transmission in place, (b) she has not otherwise pled any injury beyond a contractual injury, which is insufficient to satisfy the requirements for these claims, (c) she has not pled allegations as to what constituted the alleged misrepresentations, the specific statements she has alleged are non-actionable puffery or opinion, statements made by Jeep representatives in a business-oriented magazine did not constitute an advertisement or consumer-oriented communication and she has nonetheless not alleged facts plausibly suggesting those statements were false, (d) she has not pled facts plausibly alleging that she actually saw any of the alleged false advertisements or misrepresentation before she purchased her vehicle, and (e) her allegations of misrepresentative omissions based on testing conducted on the transmission are made solely on information and belief, she acknowledged that there were no technical service bulletins ("TSBs") or cited complaints as to the problem before she purchased her vehicle, and she has not pled any facts that she saw any statements that were rendered misleading by any such omission. (Id. at 16-22.)

Fourth, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Fourth Claim for breach of implied warranty must be dismissed because she was not in privity with Defendant. (Id. at 22-23.) More specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff purchased her car from a third-party vendor (not Defendant). (Id. ) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts plausibly suggesting that her vehicle was unmerchantable because she alleges that she continued to drive it a significant amount even after becoming aware of the alleged defect. (Id. )

Fifth, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Fifth Claim for breach of express warranty must be dismissed because that claim is based on a design defect and the warranty covers only defects in material, workmanship, and factory preparation. (Id. at 24-25.)

Sixth, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Sixth Claim for unjust enrichment must be dismissed because it is duplicative of her other causes of action. (Id. at 25.)

Seventh, Defendant argues that, alternatively, Plaintiff's class allegations should be dismissed because they are overbroad and legally insufficient. (Id. at 25-27.) More specifically, Defendant argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over a vast majority of the putative class members, arguing that (a) there is no general jurisdiction because Defendant is not incorporated in New York and New York is not its principal place of business, and (b) there is no specific jurisdiction because the class contains members from outside of New York and Plaintiff has not plead facts plausibly alleging that there is any connection between New York and those members. (Id. )

2. Plaintiff's Opposition Memorandum of Law

Generally, in opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff makes seven arguments.¹ (Dkt. No. 23, at 11-31 [Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. of Law].) First, Plaintiff argues that she has sufficiently established Article III standing. (Id. at 11-15.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues that she suffered injury (a) by overpaying for a defective vehicle and (b) by experiencing the diminished value of her vehicle after disclosure of the defect (noting that the defect received national media attention). (Id. ) Plaintiff argues that the TSBs, software updates, and purported repair attempts do not defeat standing because they were all ineffective at fixing the defect. (Id. ) Plaintiff also argues that the specific dangers posed by the defective transmission do not need to actually manifest to constitute...