Cummings v. Regan

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: Before MOULE; CARDAMONE; MOULE
• Citation: Cummings v. Regan, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260, 45 A.D.2d 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)
• Decision Date: 05 July 1974
• Parties: Application of Thomas A. CUMMINGS et al., on behalf of themselves and all other inmates who are denied parole release, similarly situated, Respondents, v. Paul J. REGAN, Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, et al., Appellants.

Page 260

357 N.Y.S.2d 260

45 A.D.2d 222

Application of Thomas A. CUMMINGS et al., on behalf of themselves and all other inmates who are denied parole release, similarly situated, Respondents, v. Paul J. REGAN, Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

July 5, 1974.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Albany, for appellants; Bruce R. Schmidt, Buffalo, of counsel.

Herman Schwartz, Amherst, of counsel; Edward I. Koren, Amherst, for respondents.

Prisoners Legal Assistance Project, Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo, amicus curiae; Stephen J. Perrello, Jr., Buffalo, of counsel.

Before MOULE, J.P., and CARDAMONE, SIMONS, MAHONEY and DEL VECCHIO, JJ.

OPINION

CARDAMONE, Justice:

The instant proceeding was commenced as a class action by petitioner-respondent Thomas A. Cummings and several intervenors-respondents pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules seeking a judgment directing respondents-appellants, New York State Board of Parole, its Chairman, and the Commissioner of the New York Department of Correctional Services to furnish meaningful statements of reasons in support of determinations denying parole release to petitioners and all other inmates in correctional facilities in New York State similarly situated. In an opinion by Justice Doerr, Special Term of Supreme Court, Erie County, granted the relief requested in the petition and ordered appellants to disclose meaningful reasons for denial of parole, and also determined that the instant proceeding was properly cognizable as a class action.

On this appeal appellants challenge the judgment on two grounds: first, that the instant proceeding was inappropriately commenced as a class action and should be dismissed for that reason; second, that a requirement that a parole board state meaningful reasons in support of its determination to deny parole is neither constitutionally nor statutorily required and would interfere with the broad discretion delegated to the parole board necessary to the performance of its duties.

CPLR 1005 (subd. (a)) provides that a class action may be maintained '(w)here the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons . . ..' The statute as construed by our appellate courts limits its application to persons who have a common grievance and as to which grievance only a common defense may be asserted (Hall v. Coburn Corp. of Amer., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 259 N.E.2d 720; Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584, 204 N.E.2d 627; Usen v. Sipprell, 41 A.D.2d 251, 342 N.Y.S.2d 599; Christman v. Skinner, 38 A.D.2d 884, 329 N.Y.S.2d 114). In this case we have as a common question of law and fact the conceded policy of the State Board of Parole that it will not state to an inmate denied parole the reasons underlying its determination. In the case of each petitioner or intervenor presently before this court the record reveals that the sole communication received from the parole board with the notification that parole release was denied is the terse statement, 'Held for one year.' In each case request was made of the parole board for amplification of the reasons behind the denial. In each case a meaningful statement of reasons was refused. At issue here is a matter of general concern to a definite and ascertainable class of persons (inmates of New York State correctional facilities who have attained parole eligibility but who have been denied parole release). Because petitioners are not demanding release from incarceration but rather a statement of reasons in support of the board's determination their cause is shared by all who are similarly situated (see e.g., Young v. Shuart, 39 A.D.2d 724, 331 N.Y.S.2d 962; Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hospitals Corp., 38 A.D.2d 316, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722; Greer v. Monroe County Department of Social Services, 67 Misc.2d 480, 324 N.Y.S.2d 446; Harris v. Wyman, 60 Misc.2d 1076, 304 N.Y.S.2d 423). Thus, we do not have the circumstances where the wrong asserted (i.e., the refusal to grant a meaningful statement of reasons) is individual to the different persons involved. Rather, it is grievance shared by all. Similarly, the remedy sought here, that of injunction and declaration, is particularly appropriate to all members of the class. Further, since we are concerned with a challenge to a policy in force throughout the state, no hardship can result to appellants, nor is it argued that any has occurred, by reason of maintaining this proceeding in the form of a class action. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of suits are served by permitting this matter to be treated as a class action.

We come now to the central question involved in this proceeding: must the State Board of Parole give its reasons when parole is denied to a prisoner who appears before it? We hold that due process considerations as well as the public policy of this State require that a meaningful statement of reasons be furnished to every applicant who has been denied parole release in the exercise of discretion delegated to the Board of Parole.

Article 8 of the Correction Law contains the statutory framework within which the parole system of New York State operates. A prisoner, of course, has no 'right' to parole. Nor is parole release merely a reward for good conduct or efficient performance while incarcerated. The standard for parole release is met when in the 'opinion' of the parole board 'there is reasonable probability that, if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.' (Correction Law, § 213.) The essence of the parole system and the entire thrust of modern penology is to focus on the rehabilitative goals of the system. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 at 477, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2598, 33 L.D.2d 293 in the context of due process in relation to parole revocation, stated that:

'During the past 60 years, the practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their sentences has become an integral part of the penological system. Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 Geo.L.J., 705 (1968). Rather than being an Ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals. Its purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined for the full term of the sentence imposed. It also serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an individual in prison. The essence of parole is release from prison, before the...